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Abstract
The first essay constitutes a theory which lends truth to the Kuznets hypothesis. The
attention is centered on the role of financial markets in defining the process of knowledge
accumulation, and ultimately the distribution of income earning capabilities in a
population of ex ante heterogeneous individuals. The provision of credit is hindered by
one-sided lack of commitment embedded in the area of educational investment.
Adaptation in the legislative system to accommodate a punishment scheme conditional
on default is the critical requirement for the economy to be carried on a dynamic growth
path, albeit one of higher and worsening inequality. Owing to the accumulation of human
capital and the associated externality on future generations’ knowledge productivity, the
economy ultimately makes its transition to a state of lower income differentials.
The second essay is an enquiry on the role of monetary policy in determining the
growth dynamics of a small open economy. We postulate that the possibility of
intermediated credit does not exist, the intention of the assumption being to uncover the
role of inflation as tax on private spending. The analysis brings a valid argument of the
superneutrality of money. Inflation when operating as consumption tax has no impact on
the growth rate of output. This is established irrespective of the labor supply be held
fixed, or incorporated as endogenous decision. When imitating the role of capital
taxation, inflationary policy has a negative effect on capital accumulation in a framework
of fixed labor supply. However, the validity of the superneutrality result is once again
reestablished in an environment accommodating the endogeneity of labor supply.
The third essay is a theoretical investigation of the long-run effects of tax and
expenditure policies in an open economy framework. The aim is to establish an analytic
basis for the factual evidence associated with the non-monotonic response of the current
account to fiscal shocks. To this endeavor we sought two sources of time non-separability
in the preference structure, habit-forming consumption in consumer durable goods.
Optimal private choices induce non-monotonic dynamics on consumption behavior that
are exactly consistent with the evidence on the current account.
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General Introduction
This thesis is a collection of three essays on economic growth, and development. The
theme of our inquiry is the role of government intervention in defining the pace, and
character of economic growth in the distant future. The analysis in the entire volume is
undertaken at purely theoretical level. We proceed with a general summary of the three
essays, as well as a brief overview of the thesis’ arrangement. The chapters themselves
contain individual introductory sections. We do not attempt to repeat them here, but wish
simply to provide a concise introduction in the subject of our research.
In the first essay we seek to construct a theory which in a novel way lends truth to the
proposition formed by Kuznets (1955), with respect to the causal non-monotonic
relationship between aggregate prosperity and inequality of income distribution. Our
attention centers on the role of financial markets in defining the process of economic
development, and ultimately the distribution of income earning capabilities in a
population of ex ante heterogeneous individuals. If the roots of development lie in human
capital accumulation, the possibility to fund educational choices through private credit
organizations may prove critical. The provision of credit in this market is hindered by
one-sided lack of commitment, and particular enforcement issues embedded in the area of
educational investment. Contract enforcement hinging on the nature of consequences
following an act of default, ultimately is a matter of the legislative system. In the tradition
of Kehoe and Levine (1993) we assume that legislation accommodates the complete and
permanent exclusion of defaulting borrowers from financial markets. The prospect of
being prohibited from investment in tangible assets induces agents to choose commitment
to prrior agreements. Contract arrangements thus become enforceable, leading credit
institutions to eagerly engage in educational funding. This is the critical requirement for
the economy to be carried on a dynamic growth path, escaping the ever-sustained trap in
poverty state. We trace out paths of development so constructed as to give an explicit
proof of the trickle-down theory of economic growth. Initially, an equilibrium is taken to
exist in which a particular group of individuals, those with the highest investment return
only choose to engage in education. Owing to the accumulation of human capital and the
1

associated externality on future generations’ knowledge productivity, the economy
ultimately makes its transition to a state where the aggregate of all agents invest in
individual improvement. As endogenous technological knowledge takes off, the
externality effect arising from knowledge spillovers gives rise to inverted-U dynamics in
the evolution of income distribution. A pattern of worsening inequality prevails in the
early stages of growth. However, as dynamics bring the economy on a more evolved
stage income differentials appear to shrink. Hence, income convergence is established to
be the signal that an advanced level has been attained on the development path.
The second essay, titled “Money’s Role in Determining Long-Run Growth”, is an
enquiry on the theme of monetary effectiveness in determining the growth dynamics. The
analysis is carried with reference to an economy being open, yet a price taker in the
international capital markets. Exploiting the developments in the theory of endogenous
growth, perpetual unbounded growth is sustained upon the accumulation of a broad
concept of capital, encompassing both physical and human notions. In a framework of
endogenously determined growth it is possible to analyze the effects of economic policy
on the growth rate of the aggregate real variables. At this level, the analysis departs from
the traditional approach in the literature which had been to focus on the impact of
monetary policy on the steady state levels of real economic aggregates. Theorists in the
monetary literature concentrated early on, on how developments in the economy’s
financial system in essence define the role of money, and therefore, the character of
influence of monetary policy on real aggregates. In an influential paper, Stockman (1981)
proposed that when a credit market for consumption and capital goods is missing,
distortionary monetary policy interacts with private capital decisions, causing investment,
and real output to fall at a lower steady state level. Examining the theoretical validity of
Stockman’s argument in the context of equilibrium growth is the aim of the present
research. We postulate that the possibility of intermediated credit does not exist, with the
intention of the assumption being to uncover the role of inflation as tax on private
spending. Initially, the postulate applies on purchases of consumption goods solely. In an
alternative version of the model, investment on capital goods is also being subjected to
the constraint that real cash holdings are the only means of conducting the purchase
2

transaction. In this latter case, inflation bears an evident analogy to a capital tax. The
theory been constructed thus gives us an insight into how inflation is been conceived to
imitating fiscal tax instruments. To elucidate the consequences of endogenously
determined labor, the theory is initially built on models that abstract from the decision to
allocate time between leisure and other productive activities. In the latter part of this
essay the analysis is extended to account for the endogeneity of the time-allocation
decision.
The third, and last, part of this dissertation constitutes a theoretical essay on the long
run effects of tax and expenditure policies. The analysis is carried with reference to an
open economy, yet a price taker in the international markets. Our interest lies in exploring
the transitional dynamics of the current account in response to permanent fiscal shocks.
The empirical literature in the international macroeconomics has established that the
current account evolves non-monotonically along its adjustment path to the long run
equilibrium. It has been the aim of this study to show that this empirical phenomenon is
proved within the theory, thus been validated on the ground of acceptance of a
mathematical proposition. To this endeavor we sought two sources of time nonseparability in the preference structure, habit forming consumption in consumer durable
goods. When households choose to maintain their habitual standard of living and
consumption exhibits a degree of durability, optimal private choices induce nonmonotonic dynamics on consumption (saving) behavior that are exactly consistent with
the factual evidence on the current account.
The dissertation is concluded with a general discussion upon the results of the
research analysis. At the end of the volume there is a bibliography, and an appendix. The
bibliography is comprehensive, covering all the reference sources been used in the
development of the three essays.
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ESSAY I
A Modern Theory of Kuznets’ Hypothesis
I. Introduction
The Kuznets hypothesis The character of evolution of the distribution of income
along an economy’s development process has been a theme with a long history in
economic enquiry. The literature starts with the classic contribution of Simon Kuznets
(1955), who was the first to identify economic growth as a determinant cause of long
term changes in the distribution of income. Establishing his proposition on data from the
time of industrialization of currently advanced nations, Kuznets (1955) initiated the idea
that the inequality characterizing income distribution exhibits a non-monotonic trend
along the process of economic development: it appears to widen during a society’s
transition from a pre-industrial to an industrial system, it remains stable for a while and
narrows as more mature stages of growth are reached.2 This systematic evolution of
income distribution along a country’s development path became known as the Kuznets
Curve –an inverted U-shape relationship between income per capita and personal income
inequality.
In his article, Kuznets lays out a simple model that places weight on the process of
industrialization in driving the observed trends in the distribution of income. All
developing countries are characterized by the coexistence of a traditional agricultural, and
an industrial sector. The former is distinguished by its lower per capita income, and
possibly narrower, but never wider inequality of distribution. Economic development
proceeds by the rapid growth of industry, and the accompanied resource flows from
agriculture. In earlier stages of this process, pronounced urban income inequalities
exacerbate the countrywide magnitude of income variation. However, the rise over time
in the relative weight of the industrial sector leads eventually to a narrowing of the
overall inequality of distribution. A variety of forces interact to bolster the economic
position of poorer segments of the population. As economic development proceeds,
2

Kuznets (1955) formulates his proposition using available data from the industrialization period for the
United States, England and Germany.

4

continually more individuals move from rural to urban areas, thus taking advantage of the
opportunities of the relatively rich industrial sector. Furthermore, many workers who
started out at the bottom rungs of the industrial sector walk up economically and socially.
At the same time, a smaller size of the labor force is connected to agriculture, and this
causes the relative wage rate in the rural sector to increase. These along with other,
political and social considerations suggest a rise in the relative shares of lower-income
groups.
The inverted-U: Evidence The subsequent literature evolved mainly in the direction
of examining the robustness of the Kuznets curve on an empirical ground. Ideally, the
evolution of inequality along the course of development should be examined in the
historical context of individual countries. However, reliable time series data are scarce for
most countries as we go back into the past. Consequently, the route has been to draw on
cross country experience. Evidence on variations in inequality of countries that are at
different stages along the development process provides information for exactly what is
lacked for a single country. A bulk of cross-sectional studies has provided justification of
the inverted-U hypothesis, leading to its acceptance in the 1970s as a stylized fact. This
literature is represented by Paukert (1973), Ahluwalia (1976a,b), Adelman and Morris
(1973), Chenery et al. (1974), Bacha (1977, 1979), Ahluwalia, Carter and Chenery
(1979), and Adelman and Robinson (1989).
However, the alleged status of the Kuznets hypothesis was called into question by an
array of subsequent studies. Papanek and Kyn (1986) challenged its empirical validity in
an analysis of cross-section and time series data for 83 countries. They found that the
support for the Kuznets relation is not strong, and may be weakening over time. In
addition they point that there is considerable variability in income distribution at all
levels of income, which is failed to be explained by the Kuznets effect. In a similar vein,
Bourguignon and Morrison (1990) find a weak link between per capita income and
income distribution in a cross-section study of developing countries. Anand and Kanbur
(1993) have also suggested that the relation had weakened over time. Li, Squire and Zou
(1998) suggest that the Kuznets hypothesis is generally in accord with cross-sectional
observations obtained at a point in time. However, they present evidence that counter the
5

validity of an inverted-U pattern over the course of evolution of individual economies.
Their position is that the inequality of income distribution has remained relatively stable
in the second half of the 20th century in a sample of 49 developed and developing
countries. In a more recent contribution to the literature, Barro (2000) has re-established
the inverted-U as a central theory in linking inequality to economic growth. In a panel
study of closely 100 countries and covering from 1960 to 1995 the Kuznets hypothesis is
established as a strong empirical regularity.
The ‘trickle-down’ theory

Several theorists have concentrated more recently on

extending the theoretical basis behind the Kuznets hypothesis. The proposed theories
relate each in a different way to the notion of trickle-down. The idea is that with enough
growth and little intervention to correct income inequality, the fruits of economic
development will eventually filter or trickle-down to the poor, as the demands for what
the latter can offer are magnified (Debraj Ray, 1998).
Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) formulate a theory in which economic growth is
inextricably linked to the development of financial markets and institutions. In their
model intermediation structure is costly to build; hence, the level of financial
development depends on the stage of the growth cycle. At the same time, a welladvanced financial system spurs economic growth by mitigating the effects of
information and transaction costs, thus contributing to an efficient allocation of
investment funds. Intermediaries provide savers with a distribution of returns on their
investments that both is preferred and has a higher mean. However, investment through
financial markets is costly, and relatively poor agents may not afford to use the superior
technology. The theoretical validity of the Kuznets curve is rooted in the advancement of
an economy’s financial system, and the extent to which its services are spread across
population. In its earlier stages, the process of economic growth is accompanied by the
progressive development of financial intermediation. Since relatively rich individuals
may only be able to take advantage of the developing financial markets, the variation of
income initially widens. Along the course of development, the sustained improvement in
the economic position of progressively more and more individuals translates into a
distribution of higher initial endowments of capital. The economy approaches a state
6

where the entire population may claim a share in the higher income prospects of the
investment technology provided by the financial sector. Income disparities ultimately
fade away as the benefits of development permeate more widely.
A closely related argument was developed by Aghion and Bolton (1997) in a model
of endogenous income distribution that also generates the dynamics of the Kuznets curve.
Individuals face two investment opportunities: a backyard activity that yields a
deterministic rate of return, and an entrepreneurial technology with superior, yet
uncertain revenue. The latter requires a minimum amount of capital investment, which
agents may borrow in the capital market if endowed with sufficient initial wealth. In this
model, it is the middle class that borrows to finance costly investment, whereas the very
poor and rich agents act as lenders through their investment in the safe asset. The key
feature that drives the relation between growth and wealth inequality is the endogenous
determination of the cost of borrowing. In the early phases of development aggregate
wealth, hence the supply of credit provided by the rich class of lenders, is small implying
a high cost of capital. As capital is further accumulated, the wealth of rich lenders grows
relatively faster, leading to widening wealth inequalities. However, as economic growth
progresses, more and more funds become available to finance a progressively smaller
pool of borrowers. The equilibrium lending terms shift in favor of borrowers, thus
equalizing the distribution of wealth.
Another strand of literature emphasizes the role of technological progress in
governing the pattern of income inequality. Studies within this field represent Galor and
Tsiddon (1997a), Aghion and Howitt (1997), and Helpman (1997). Two technologies
coexist, an old and a more advanced one, and individuals choose where they seek to be
employed. Intergenerational mobility is represented by the choice of a different
employment sector than that of one’s parents. The model predicts that following periods
of major inventions – the factory system, electrical power, computers– economies
undergo a phase of rapid economic growth associated with enhanced intergenerational
mobility and increased inequality. This outcome depends on characteristics of the
technologically advanced sector, such as paying a higher marginal return to ability while
a lower reward to the less able. Along the course of development, complex technologies
7

gain accessibility to a wider range of individuals. This process has the effect of
diminishing intergenerational mobility, hence reducing the inequality of income
distribution.
In another study, Galor and Tsiddon (1997b) present a theory of trickle-down based
on human capital accumulation and the expansion of technological knowledge that stems
from it. The forces that drive economic growth in this setting are the accumulation of
human capital and the advancement of technology with the former taking the leading
role. Technological knowledge augments endogenously, and is the by-product of
individuals’ investment in enhancing own education. The vehicle through which
technological progress contributes to growth is the accumulation of knowledge. The latter
acts to enhance the marginal return to individual investment in education, thus feeding
back in the accumulation of human capital. A key feature of the analysis is the postulate
that the individual learning aptitude is determined, in addition to own investment of
resources in education, by parental human capital and society’s aggregate knowledge.
The model yields the dynamics of an inverted-U path. An initially poor economy
composed of an uneducated population is characterized by a highly equitable distribution
of income. To its largest extent the entire population earns a fairly low income stemming
from minimum skill and productivity levels. Investment in human capital is initially
undertaken by individuals of high educational background, since they are the only ones
with high effectiveness in own investment in education. The economy as a whole
registers growth, but the benefits of this growth are highly concentrated in a relatively
small number of individuals. Technical progress is likely to have a more uneven character
at low to intermediate levels of income. As technological knowledge takes off, ultimately
the gains find their way to everybody. And along with the growing educational status of
the labor force, the economy enters a cycle of steadily declining inequality.
In this paper we seek to offer an additional contribution in the research elaborating on
the theoretical underpinnings of the Kuznets hypothesis. Close in spirit to Galor and
Tsiddon (1997b), our theory builds on the trickle-down hypothesis in a model where
growth is driven by accumulation of human capital and the expansion of knowledge in
society. Our attention is concentrated on the role of financial markets in determining the
8

potential for acquiring education, and therefore the distribution of income earning
capabilities. We explore what fundamental forces lead to the non-existence of credit
institutions in the market for funding education, and show that the emergence of the latter
may play a critical role in spurring economic development. As endogenous technological
knowledge takes off, the externality effect arising from knowledge spillovers gives rise to
inverted-U dynamics in the evolution of income distribution.
Human capital: A missing market We construct an overlapping-generations model in
which private incentives induce agents to invest in education, and where non-rival
inventions are the by-product of the education process. Pursuing to address the issue of
income distribution we develop a model with heterogeneous agents distinguished on the
level of innate learning aptitude. Individuals who belong in the same generation, and thus
face the same social capital, are characterized by different human capital levels due to the
postulated heterogeneity in the effectiveness of their investment in education. An
individual’s level of human capital upon entering the workforce determines her
productivity of labor, hence her income at that period of life. The character of income
distribution, and its evolution across time, is therefore governed by the distribution of
human capital in society.
This paper may be viewed as contribution to the literature on the role of financial
intermediation in determining the pace, and character of economic growth.3 In line with
the traditional view, we establish on theoretical ground that the development of financial
markets constitutes an inextricable part of the process of economic development. In a
model where the roots of development lie in human capital accumulation, our aim is to
examine how intermediated credit may spur or hinder individual investment in education,
hence economic growth. We assume that formal education is costly, in the sense that it
incurs a direct pecuniary cost.4 Individuals may not fund educational choices out of

3

The relationship between financial development and economic growth has long been examined in the
macroeconomic literature. Early research on the topic is associated with the work of Goldsmith (1969),
McKinnon (1973), and Shaw (1973). Important contributions more recently include Greenwood and
Jovanovic (1990), Bencivenga and Smith (1991), King and Levine (1993), Saint-Paul (1992) and Levine
(1992).
4
We abstract from consumption or other form of expenditure incurred in the period the investment is made.
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retained earnings, wealth or any form of inherited bequests.5 Such investment must be
financed from human capital loans through formal credit organizations.6 In economies
lacking such institutions, individuals are entirely barred from productive educational
choices; a consequence of the failure of the credit market.
That credit markets for education loans may not function perfectly, or be entirely
missing, is an argument with a long recognition in macroeconomics. Early on, Friedman
(1962) attributed the source of the failure of this market to the intrinsic nature of human
capital, in being embodied in those who possess it. It is thus impossible for the return of
the investment to be passed on to lenders, or serve as collateral in the event of failure to
repay. Moreover, it is particularly difficult to monitor the productive use of the loan, and
the effort put up by the investor. The ability to make use of human capital may be
unknown even to the borrower. Genuine bankruptcies and strategic default may well
occur, with there being little that a lender can do to get his money back. These issues
make the provision of credit in this market problematic.
Quite some research in the macroeconomic literature has adopted this idea; however
most have formally modeled it on an ad hoc foundation, by imposing some form of
exogenous borrowing constraints. Loury (1981) has examined the dynamics of income
distribution in a stochastic model with an absent market for educational loans. Ljungqvist
(1993) emphasizes the role of missing markets for human capital in explaining the
persistence of underdevelopment in a world with free trade in consumption goods and
physical capital. Buiter and Kletzer (1992) argue that the inability to borrow may reduce
human capital accumulation in a model where individuals must self-finance own training
5

The analysis in version VII looks at the case where individuals receive an endowment in the retirement
age, independent of their prior income.
6
Our emphasis is placed on the existence of credit support for tuition type expenses in education. The
structure of the model implies that individuals do not demand credit to fund consumption, or other
investment purposes. This channel of effect of intermediated credit on human capital accumulation has
been investigated by De Gregorio and Kim (2000). In an economy with heterogeneous agents, financial
institutions through the provision of consumption credit allow high-ability individuals to abstain from
productive work in their youth, and devote the whole time endowment in education. On the other hand,
agents with low efficiency in human capital investment may find it optimal to specialize in market
activities, and use the financial markets to engage in intertemporal smoothing. By providing these
opportunities for specialization, credit markets enhance the economy’s average efficiency of education, and
consequently growth and welfare for all current and future generations. Evidence in support of the presence
of this effect has been presented, for the United States and other OECD countries by Behrman et al. (1989)
and De Gregorio (1996).
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costs. And Barro, Mankiw, and Sala-i-Martin (1995) re-examine the theory of
convergence in income across countries in the context of a model in which financing for
human capital investment is not available.
Endogenous debt constraints The focus in the present paper centers on the forces that
lie behind the observed credit market imperfections in education funding, as well as the
development of institutional infrastructure that may lead to overcome this market failure.
Our contribution lies in integrating the theory of endogenous credit constraints into an
analysis of the relationship between economic growth and the dynamic evolution of
income distribution.
There are two alternative theoretical approaches within which debt constraints may
emerge endogenously. The first builds on the premise that credit rationing arises as an
optimal response of lending institutions to issues of asymmetric information. The core
argument consists of the claim that moral hazard and adverse selection are interwoven in
the lender-borrower relationship, and interfere with market behavior leading to a variety
of failures in loan markets. There are several different microeconomic theories relating to
private information problems that imply a form of credit rationing. These are mostly
based upon the non-observability of labor input (moral hazard)7, physical output8, and
individual ability (adverse selection)9. In the context of human capital analysis with
external financing of education, Zeira (1991) shows that as a result of asymmetric
information, credit may be endogenously rationed as a precautionary measure against the
possibility of moral hazard. In the growth area, Tsiddon (1992) relies on moral hazard
issues in the educational market to provide an explanation of the long run divergence of
income levels across countries.
The second approach is based not on underlying information problems, but on the
inability of creditors to enforce a loan contract. The central idea draws from the work of
Schechtman and Escudero (1977), Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), and Manuelli (1986) in
the international literature on sovereign debt. The framework was originally formalized in
7

The reader may see Jaffee and Russell (1976), Stiglitz and Weiss (1981, 1987), Aghion and Bolton (1997)
for more information.
8
An interested reader may further look at Banerjee and Newman (1993), Galor and Zeira (1993).
9
Jaffee and Stiglitz (1990) provide information on this subject.
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the area of partial insurance against idiosyncratic risk by Kehoe and Levine (1993). Their
study marks a new tradition in modeling endogenous borrowing limits, and is the path
taken in this study as well.10 In their formulation, the system of creditors’ legal rights
allows the punishment of a borrower committing default in the form of her exclusion
from future participation in formal financial markets. Defaulters are denied access to new
loans in the credit market, and intermediate institutions have the legal right to seize the
tangible assets in the debtor’s possession. This renders lending through capital markets
following default an irrational act. In this setting, participation constraints ensure that in
equilibrium agents entering into a contract would at no time be better off contemplating
default.
Outline of the essay A word about the essay’s arrangement. The precise structure of
the model is set out in the following section, in accompaniment of an elaborate discussion
on how financial intermediation is embedded into the analysis. Section III presents an
exposition of circumstances that may lead to a state of poverty persist over time, and the
possibility of transition on a path of equilibrium unbounded growth. The dynamic impact
of the process of development on the economy-wide income distribution is discussed in
Section IV. The final two sections augment the core analysis each in a different direction.
Section V allows for the economy’s interest rate to be endogenously determined. In
Section VI the analysis is extended to accommodate a higher, more general degree of
heterogeneity. The analysis in Section VII is the exposition of a case where the effective
punishment scheme imposes less stringent consequences on a borrower committing
default. Although difficult and often very complex, the exposition offers complementary
insight, which stands in need for delving deeper into the theory. A brief discussion in the
end takes the role of final conclusion.

10

This enforcement mechanism has also been adopted by Azariadis and Lambertini (2003) in a pure
exchange framework with overlapping generations. Andolfatto and Gervais (2006) has been the first study
to embody a similar enforcement mechanism in a model with endogenous human capital formation, in
which costly education is financed through private credit markets. De la Croix and Michel (2007) extend
the latter analysis in a general equilibrium framework, allowing for the interest rate be endogenously
determined.
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II. The model
Demographic composition

The model is a variant of the overlapping-generations

model with production introduced by Diamond (1965) and Samuelson (1968). Time is
measured as discrete intervals, beginning at time t=0. Individuals have finite life spans of
three periods, with a new generation born in each period. We call an individual young in
the first, adult in the second and old in the last period of life. An equal number of
individuals enter and leave the economy in each period, implying a stationary population.
Each new generation is composed of a continuum of individuals, with total measure
normalized to unity, i ∈ [0,1] . Generations are named after their birth date.
Human capital accumulation and heterogeneity Human capital is defined to refer to
the skills and knowledge level possessed by an individual. It is an intangible and
inalienable factor that cannot be treated separately from those who create it or possess it.
We assume that young agents are born with a minimum level of human capital hmin > 0 ,

which can be thought of as the ability to talk and coordinate with each other. While
young, one may make an investment on individual improvement by devoting real
resources to formal education. Education is costly in the sense that it incurs a direct
pecuniary cost equal to q units of output per person.11
The individual’s level of human capital upon entering the labor force depends on the
effectiveness of her investment given that she engages in the education process. We
postulate that the return on education is determined by the stock of knowledge in society
while the investment is undertaken, and by the individual’s innate ability.12 Consistent
with Tamura (1991) we postulate that the investment sector is characterized by an
external spillover effect of human capital. The human capital of the average citizen
contributes to enhance any individual’s ability to acquire knowledge.13 The assumption is
11

We abstract from other aspects of costly education, such as the sacrifice of leisure and the disutility from
effort.
12
Education may be considered as a form of vocational process, in which q can include the cost of tuition,
books, tools as well as a subsistence level of consumption. Students learn from every adult who is currently
alive. Thus, the level of human capital acquired by an individual who invests in education depends upon the
average stock of human capital among all adults in the society, (H).
13
The meaning attached to the concept of societal knowledge is that of being embodied in the human
capital possessed by the members of the population. We do not make a conceptual distinction between the
stock of disembodied knowledge, in other words knowledge in books, and that of being embodied in
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further adopted that the magnitude of the external effect is strictly increasing in own
talent.
In the words of Loury (1981), “…the term ability refers to all factors outside of the
individual’s control which affect his productive capacity”. Allowing individuals be
distinguished on the level of their innate aptitude provides a source of heterogeneity at a
skill level.14 With the exception of innate ability, hence their effective learning parameter,
individuals share access to a common non-linear investment technology. At the moment
we assume that there are two types of agents in the economy, with high and low ability
respectively. Since all individuals of a given type are identical, henceforth we
characterize an agent by her type. The human capital level of an agent born in period t
with ability A j is represented by the following function15

j
t +1

h

 Aδj H t1−δ

=
hmin

if invest

,

(1)

o.w.

human inputs. In studies that do adopt this distinction (see Stokey, 1991, Laing et al., 2003) it is the
potential of unbounded increases in the former that provides the basis for persistent growth. In our setting,
endogenous never-ending growth is made feasible due to an intergenerational external spillover effect in
the process of knowledge creation.
14
The role of innate ability in shaping one’s acquired human capital has been addressed in several studies
in the literature. Levhari and Weiss (1974) use the term uncertain inputs to refer to innate talent as a
determinant factor of earning capacity (at the completion of one’s education). Individual ability is modeled
through a random variable reflecting in part the unpredictable component of innate aptitude. The stochastic
nature of the variable has the interpretation that, at the time when making a choice about the investment in
her education, an individual has imperfect knowledge of exogenous characteristics such as her actual
ability. A similar type of uncertainty has also been accommodated in other studies such as Eaton and Rosen
(1980), Loury (1981), Snow and Warren (1990), and Benabou (1996, 2002). In our model we allow
individuals to have perfect knowledge of their own aptitude; thus we abstract from the stochastic aspect of
the latter variable.
15
The literature builds on two alternative ways of production of intangible human capital. In the standard
formulation proposed by Lucas (1988) human capital is produced within the household, and is determined
solely by the time-investment in education. According to this approach, the price of new human capital is
the implicit price evaluated by the household’s utility. The other formulation has been employed by King,
Plosser, and Rebelo (1988) and Rebelo (1991) and assumes that there is a market for new human capital.
Human capital is produced in the education-service industry, and physical, in addition to human capital
may serve as an input. The price of new human capital is the market price of education [Mino, 1996]. In the
present context, our objective is to investigate the role of credit markets in the growth process of human
capital, hence the latter formulation is more appropriate to adopt. However, since the relevance of the factor
intensity condition is limited, physical capital is not incorporated as an input in the technology of the
investment sector.
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where j denotes an individual’s type, j ∈ {L, H } , δ ∈ (0,1) and H (t ) , ∀t ≥ 0 , represents
the society’s aggregate (and average) stock of human capital at date t.16 Evidently, we
assume that AL < AH , with AL > 1 17 We further postulate the following condition
Assumption 1
ALδ H t1−δ > hmin .

We assume that in every period agents with high- and low level of ability constitute
fractions λ H = λ and λL = 1 − λ of the population, respectively. Then, in any given
period t, the stock of the economy’s aggregate (and average) level of human capital is
H t = λ htH + (1 − λ ) htL

λ ∈ [0, 1] ,

(2)

where we assume that in period t = 0 there exists an initial old generation with H 0 > 0 .
Without loss of generality we assume that H 0 = hmin .18 We note that λ htH ≡ H tH represents
the human capital level of the group of high-ability agents in period t (this constitutes the
high-ability fraction of individuals of generation t-1). Similarly, (1 − λ ) htL ≡ H tL .
Equations (1) and (2) reveal that the investment sector is characterized by an
(intergenerational) external spillover effect. Private human capital investment causes
growth in the average stock of human capital, which increases the effectiveness of
investment in education by later cohorts. Since individuals are finitely lived, the external
effect is the only source of steady-state growth.19 Growth can be sustained by continuing
accumulation of the input that generates the positive externality. Since no individual
16

It would be reasonable to postulate that an individual’s level of human capital is a function of parental
educational background. The role of quality of the home environment in human capital formation has been
investigated theoretically, and empirically, by several authors (see Coleman et al. 1966, Becker and Tomes
1986, Bénabou 1996, Galor and Tsiddon 1997a, b). We abstract from such intergenerational linkage in
human capital levels, so as to focus on technological spillovers across individual investors.
17
That the low-level of ability must exceed unity is logically derived in footnote 18.
18
The assumptions AL H t > hmin and H 0 = hmin combine to imply that AL > 1 .
19
This externality may be distinguished from the conventional transmission of human capital within
households in the literature (e.g. Becker and Tomes, 1986). In an overlapping generations model it has been
often interpreted as intergenerational externality (e.g. Stokey, 1991; Bovenberg and van Ewijk, 1997;
Hendricks, 1999). We do not assume externality in output production (e.g. Lucas, 1990), human capital
production (e.g. Azariadis and Drazen, 1990) or training time among individuals within a generation (e.g.
Chamley 1993; Benhabib and Perli 1994) in order to exclude the possible indeterminacy of equilibrium
paths. Tamura (1990) suggests a similar spillover effect in the technology of the educational sector.
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decisions affect in an appreciable way the average skill level, no one takes this effect into
account when deciding whether to invest in education.
Structure of individual’s life

We lay out the decision-making process of a

representative member of generation t. As mentioned, in the first period of life a choice
must be made whether to enter the educational sector, and acquire human capital in
excess of hmin . If the individual decides to invest in education she must incur the cost q.
In the absence of any initial wealth or labor income, the cost of education must be
financed by borrowing in the credit market.
Denote first period’s saving (borrowing) by s1t > 0 ( < 0 ). Assuming that this
period’s consumption is not valued, the budget constraint is expressed by
− q if invest
s1jt = 
∀j ∈ {L, H } ,
0
o.w.

(3)

in other words, the young borrows.
In the second period of life adults enter the labor market, supplying one unit of time
inelastically.20 We normalize units so that output produced is equal to the human capital
employed. That is, the labor income of an individual with human capital ht j+1 is given by
ytj+1 = ht j+1 ,

(4)

where ytj+1 stands for the individual wage income earned in period t+1. The hypothesis
that income earning ability depends upon innate aptitude is consistent with evidence from
the empirical literature. Griliches and Mason (1972) provide some direct evidence about
the positive role of ability. The vast literature about returns to human capital supplies
some indirect evidence, provided that education is positively correlated with ability
[Galor & Tsiddon, 1997a p.365].
Let c2jt +1 and s 2jt +1 denote respectively the second-period consumption and saving of a
member of generation t with ability A j , j = L, H . Earned income net of debt repayment
is allocated between consumption and savings21
20

We assume that workers do not acquire human capital through on-the-job training.
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c2jt +1 + s 2jt +1 = y tj+1 + R s1jt .

(5)

Using (4) the budget constraint in the second period of life is expressed as
c2jt +1 = ht j+1 + R s1jt − s 2jt +1

.

(5')

And using (1) and (3), (5') is written as

c

j
2 t +1

 Aδj H t1−δ − R q − s 2jt +1

=
hmin − s 2jt +1

if q > 0

.

(5'')

if q = 0

In the third period of life agents retire, using the entire return of savings for consumption
c3jt + 2 = R s 2jt +1 ,

(6)

where c3jt + 2 denotes consumption in old age of a member of generation t who is of type j ,
j ∈ {L, H }.22
Individual’s optimization problem

All young agents share identical preferences,

defined over consumption in the second and third period of their lives. The preferences of
an individual of type j born at time t are represented by the intertemporally additive
utility function

(

)

(

)

U t j = β ln c 2jt +1 + (1 − β ) ln c3jt + 2 ,

(7)

where U t j stands for the lifetime utility of a member of generation t, who is of type j. In
the first period of life an agent decides whether to acquire education, a decision
determining her gross lifetime income. At the same time, the individual shall decide
whether to default on her debt or remain committed to her obligation. The joint decision
determines the agent’s net lifetime income, which she allocates between second- and

21

We abstract from other forms of transferring consumption from one period to another, such as fiat money
or types of storage technology. Income may be transferred from the second to third period only by lending
through the financial system.
22
Alternatively, one may assume that individuals receive in old age an endowment, ω 3 , irrespective of
their educational status. This may be thought of as a type of retirement income. The analysis of this case is
demonstrated in Section VII.
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third-period consumption so as to maximize her lifetime utility (equation 7) subject to the
two budget constraints (equations 5'' and 6). There exists a unique and interior solution to
the optimization problem that is expressed by

s

j∗
2 t +1

(

(1 − β ) Aδj H t1−δ − R q

=
(1 − β ) hmin

)

if q > 0
∀j = L, H .

(8)

if q = 0

Setting equation (8) into (5'') we obtain the optimal level of second-period consumption

c

j∗
2 t +1

(

β Aδj H t1−δ − R q

=
β hmin

)

if q > 0

∀j ∈ {L, H }.

(9)

if q = 0

Similarly, substitution of (8) into (6) yields the optimal level of third-period consumption,
expressed by

c

j∗
3t + 2

(

(1 − β ) R Aδj H t1−δ − R q

=
(1 − β ) R hmin

)

if q > 0

∀j ∈ {L, H }.

(10)

if q = 0

Financial intermediation and contract enforcement We assume that there exists a
market of financial institutions that allow individuals to trade in financial markets, as well
as to obtain credit for human capital investment. Financial institutions intermediate
economic activity between (adult) individuals who save to enhance third period
consumption, and those who borrow. We postulate the existence of κ = 1,..., K members
within the financial system. As referred by Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004), and first
espoused by Green (1987), we suppose that financial institutions have access to a capital
market “outside” the economy, where they can borrow or lend at a riskless real interest
rate. Individual households do not have access to this outside market, and they are
prohibited from borrowing or lending with each other (Ljungqvist and Sargent, 2004).
Should they engage in intertemporal trade, they must do so solely through the
intermediary system. At the moment we assume that private contracts may be signed at a
fixed (gross) real interest rate, R, charged on both deposits and borrowing.
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We assume that young individuals, once obtaining credit they always invest in human
capital. By assumption, an educational loan is not to be used in alternative ways. When
adult, educated individuals have the option of going bankrupt, thus evading existing debt
payments. A creditor cannot ensure that the borrower will meet her obligations.23 In the
terminology of Jaffee and Russell (1976), individuals in our model are potentially
dishonest in the sense that when there are incentives to default they always choose to do
so.24 We shall consider that this lack of commitment in honoring a private contract is onesided: deposit institutions by supposition always honor their promises to future payment
streams. In an environment with this asymmetry in credible commitment, contracts must
be self-enforcing in the sense that households are induced by their own self-interest to
repay their creditors (Ljungqvist and Sargent, 2004).25
Started by the international literature on sovereign debt, invoking a punishment
scheme on defaulting borrowers has seemed to be the only way out of the particular
difficulties engendered by one- or two-sided lack of commitment on one’s promises. In
line with Kehoe and Levine (1993), the prospect of complete and permanent exclusion
from the financial market is the credible threat that provides in our setting the motive for
individual commitment to contract obligations. The punishment strategy following an act
of default is twofold: on one hand, individuals have no access on financial assets as
medium of saving. Creditors’ legal rights allow them to seize the entire future savings in
the debtor’s possession implying that it is in the strongest interest of the latter to carry no
savings in the formal financial sector. On the second hand, defaulters are denied access to
new loans in the credit market. Given the structure of our model, enforcement may not be
supported by long-term cutoff from further credit. It is never optimal for financial
institutions to provide credit to adult individuals, since no debt is honored in the last
23

The lender could ensure repayment of debt if workers were, for example, required to disclose information
to become employed and reveal information while employed (see Fender and Wang 2003).
24
Jaffee and Russell (1976) distinguish between two types of individuals, the honest, who are
pathologically honest since they refuse to default even when there is an incentive to do so, and the
dishonest that are potentially dishonest, since there are cases where they reveal only honest behavior
[p.652].
25
Recall that limited contractual enforcement in our setting is due to the inalienability of human capital,
which cannot be seized and transferred to a creditor in the event of default. Lack of enforcement is
strengthened by the assumption that existent individual endowments in old age consist of no collateral
goods.
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period of life (Kehoe and Levine, 1993). So, were they to default no payment could be
imposed on them. This reads into the constraint
s 2jt∗+1 ≥ 0 ∀j = L, H ,

(11)

which constitutes an individual rationality constraint for members of the banking system.
Hence, the only individuals who may be able to borrow are the young who choose to
enter the educational sector. Consequently, in our context the Kehoe and Levine
enforcement mechanism reduces into the prohibition of placing savings within the formal
financial system. The only cost of default is the loss of the ability to smooth consumption
along the course of one’s life.26
The full-exclusion scheme of Kehoe and Levine (1993) is structured on the ground of
two critical assumptions that concern the legal rights of financial institutions, and the
interrelationships among them. The ability to prohibit a borrower who repudiates on her
debt from actively participating in the formal financial market rests on the implicit
existence of a legal entity (legislation and judicial system), capable to observe any such
trade actions and confiscate the relevant net payments. In the Kehoe and Levine model
the economy’s legislative system grants creditors the power to appropriate assets in the
debtors’ possession, and preclude their access to future contingent claims markets.27
Extensive legal power of lenders is a necessary prerequisite to support a decentralized
allocation in a structure of partial commitment. We should remark that the existence of a
competitive equilibrium is established in an environment that abstracts from issues of
26

The fact that in our environment the full-exclusion scheme is reducible to a simpler form is not material
for the mechanism’s effectiveness in punishing a defaulting borrower. The vital component of the Kehoe
and Levine scheme is that agents are deprived of the opportunity to invest their savings. It has been shown
by Bulow and Rogoff (1989), and later been confirmed by more contemporary studies (see Bond and
Krishnamurthy, 2004) that the sole elimination to a borrower on default status of his right to further credit,
has no impact on his incentive to remain loyal at first place. If individuals have access to a savings market
irrespective of their contract commitment, the optimal loan size for banks is zero. We ought to make the
remark that this proposition is guaranteed only insofar specific conditions are assumed.
27
From the standpoint of the authors, individuals may not be barred from trade in spot markets, nor can
their endowments be taxed due to unfulfilled obligations on private contracts. The view is justified on the
basis that trades in spot markets are anonymous, and that there may not be a physical separation of private
endowments from individual owners. At the same time, agents must identify themselves to make contracts
and to collect on them in contingent claims markets. Therefore, creditors may seize the assets of a debtor
who defaults on her debt, and may keep track of any future attempts of hers to enter contingent claims
markets. As a consequence, they can exclude the borrower from engaging in intertemporal transactions,
while tax her individual assets [Kehoe and Levine, 1993 p.869].
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competition among financial institutions. Kehoe and Levine presuppose that members of
the banking system form a stringent coalition, thus fully coordinating their decisions. 28 In
like manner, we restrict our attention to the case of no competition within the financial
market. For the sake of simplicity, we assume without loss that the borrower deals with a
single bank, interpreted to represent the entity of financial sector.29
While we recognize the widely accepted status of the Kehoe and Levine arrangement
in studies with contract design problems, we must make a remark on the criticism carried
by Bond and Krishnamurthy (2004). The authors dealt thoroughly with the minimal
practical value of the scheme, reasoning that the full-exclusion enforcement rule is hard
to identify in observed institutions, or resemble laws governing borrowers’ defaulting on
debt and declaring bankruptcy [pp.691-2]. We argue that only an aspect of this criticism
cherishes validity in our context, and that the Kehoe and Levine scheme is a good
representation of the actual legal doctrine regulating educational loan markets. In
connection with any type of non-educational credit, it is indeed the case that the
permanent character of prohibitions imposed on delinquent borrowers is too stringent an
assumption in keeping with a plausible theory. It is common to most if not all legislative
systems that an individual is entitled to declaring bankruptcy on her debt, thus claiming
an opportunity to a “fresh start”. However, the ability to have one’s debt waived does not
extend in the area of educational loans. An individual debtor continues to be liable for all
obligations on student loans even after her claim to bankruptcy is successfully pursued.30
These debts are legally discharged only in the event of full repayment. The creditors’
legal right to confiscate the private assets of the debtor being bound by obligation
establishes the empirical validity of the full-exclusion scheme in the area of educational
investment.
28

The authors say nothing about how this coordination actually occurs. Formal consideration of the
competition within the financial sector has been carried by Bond and Krishnamurthy (2004), in an analysis
which in the main contributes a critic on the Kehoe and Levine absolute-exclusion scheme.
29
The conclusions of the model are the same whether one assumes that the borrower deals with a
representative bank, or whether the entire banking sector behaves as a coalition (monopolist). Bond and
Krishnamurthy (2004) present an elaborate study on salient features of the Kehoe and Levine scheme.
30
The US Bankruptcy Code does not exempt individuals from their obligation on educational debt. The
legal doctrine was formalized in the United States in 1978. Subsequent amendments of legislation (the last
passed on in 2005) extended the array of educational loans covering all credit aiming to higher education,
funded by governmental or private source. Similarly, in the United Kingdom a debtor remains bound by her
obligations on government educational loans after the claim to bankruptcy.
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The second aspect of criticism concerns the Arrow-Debreu trading arrangement of
complete markets. In the Kehoe and Levine structure competitive markets meet at date 0
to trade claims to consumption at all times t > 0 , that are contingent on all possible
realizations of events up to t . In this respect, Bond and Krishnamurthy (2004) posit that
the implementation of debt constraints is in fact complex state- and date-contingent
specifications of payments [p.691]. The crux of the criticism is that the computation of
this system of payments being highly information intensive amounts to an insuperable
task.31 In the words of Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004) “…we are assigning a very
demanding task to the invisible hand who must not only look for market-clearing prices
but also check participation constraints for all agents and all states of the world” [p.740].
The acceptance of this criticism clearly does not lend power to the practical value of our
theoretical construct.
III. Equilibrium
Poverty trap We have claimed that conditional on default, an individual may be
barred forever from asset trading in financial markets. As the preceding analysis brings
out, the character of such prohibition is defined by the law surrounding the creditors’
right to loan repayment. When legislation supports absolute and permanent consequences
upon default, as in the Kehoe and Levine scheme, we say that lenders come out with a
strong legal position (or else strong legal rights). The legislative system entitles them to
full loan repayment in every circumstance; a situation we stated describes educational
credit in well-advanced financial systems. In ever weaker positions, full loan repayment
may not be enforced; a situation we here term weak legal rights. Practically this is true
when debt for higher education may be discharged after declaring bankruptcy, and when
unsecured educational loans gain low priority in the event of property liquidation. As is
generally supposed, the power to which creditors are potentially entitled has a critical
effect on their readiness to finance investment (La Porta, et al, 1998). We postulate that
when the legal system offers little or no protection to lenders, failing on loan repayment

31

Reciting Bond and Krishnamurthy (2004) “… the computation procedure requires the central (judicial)
authority to possess knowledge on agents’ production and consumption possibilities; knowledge that is
unknown how it could be obtained in a decentralized competitive environment.” [p.691].
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is in essence accompanied by no penalty. As a consequence, strategic default may well be
expected, making credit institutions least eager to engage in loan financing. The optimal
response is to deny the provision of any loan, resulting in an extreme form of credit
rationing; an actual feature of educational credit markets in most economies of the world.
Weak legal protection on the account of creditors impedes the development of a
private educational loan market leading to a competitive equilibrium characterized by no
investment in higher education. In a setting where growth hinges on the accumulation of
human capital economic development must then come to a halt. This is self-evident in a
system where education may not be otherwise socially provided, an assumption that has
been postulated at the outset of our analysis.
Given that a member of generation t receives education her intertemporal
consumption if she chooses to default is described by the following equations

(c )

= β Aδj H t1−δ

(c )

= (1 − β ) R Aδj H t1−δ

j ∗ WR , D
2 t +1

q > 0, ∀ j ∈ {L, H } , ∀t ≥ 0 ,

(12)

and
WR , D
j∗
3t + 2

q > 0, ∀ j ∈ {L, H } , ∀t ≥ 0 ,

(13)

where WR (SR) refers to a system of weak (strong) legal rights on creditors’ account, and
D (ND) stands for default (no-default) respectively. When remaining loyal to contract
commitment optimal adult- and old-age consumption is given by, respectively

(c )

= β (A j H t − R q )

(c )

= (1 − β ) R (A j H t − R q )

j ∗ ND
2 t +1

q > 0, ∀j ∈ {L, H }, ∀ t ≥ 0 ,

(14)

and
ND
j∗
3t + 2

(

where cνj t∗+1

)

WR , ND

(

= cνj t∗+1

)

SR , ND

(

≡ cνj t∗+1

)

ND

q > 0, ∀ j ∈ {L, H }, ∀t ≥ 0 .

(15)

for ν = 2, 3.

Evidently, utility is higher when evading debt obligations due to higher second-period
consumption, and because agents can still engage in intertemporal smoothing through
saving. Hence,
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VtWR , D ( j ) > VtWR , ND ( j )

q > 0, ∀ j ∈ {L, H }, ∀t ≥ 0 ,

(16)

where

{

}

VtWR , D ( j ) = ln γ Aδj H t1−δ ,

q > 0, ∀j ∈ {L, H }, ∀ t ≥ 0 ,

(17)

and

{

}

Vt E , ND ( j ) = ln γ Aδj H t1−δ − R q

q > 0, ∀j ∈ {L, H }, ∀t ≥ 0 ,

(18)

with Vt (⋅) standing for the indirect utility function of a member of cohort t, while E
denoting that the individual has received education when young. It obviously applies that
1− β

VtWR , ND ( j ) = Vt SR , ND ( j ) ≡ Vt E , ND ( j ) ∀ j = L, H , while γ ≡ β β (1 − β )

R 1− β . We come to

the conclusion that an individual who acquires education shall always commit default on
her debt.
Were one to receive no education she would earn the unskilled income hmin , hence
the lifetime utility
Vt NE ( j ) ≡ Vt NE = ln {γ hmin } ∀j ∈ {L, H } .

(19)

Drawing on Assumption 1 we infer that remaining unskilled is never the preferred choice.
It is evident that
VtWR , D ( j ) > Vt NE

∀j ∈ {L, H }, ∀ t ≥ 0 .

(20)

Obtaining credit, although desirable, in no circumstance is feasible. Due to the certainty
of default behavior it is individually rational for members of the financial system to deny
the provision of any loan.
Owing to the rationing of all credit, the total measure of population remains
uneducated earning the minimum income of unskilled labor. On the assumption that a
system of weak legal rights prevails in each period of the time interval t ∈ [0, r − 1] r > 0 ,
the equilibrium path has the characteristics
ht j+1 = hmin

∀j ∈ {L, H }, ∀t ∈ [0, r − 1],

and
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(21)

ytj+1 = hmin

∀j ∈ {L, H }, ∀t ∈ [0, r − 1] .

(22)

The competitive outcome along this equilibrium path prescribes that the economy
produces the time-invariant quantity
Yt +NE1 = H tNE
+1 = hmin ,

(23)

where at the outset we postulated y 0j ≡ y 0 = hmin , ∀j = L, H , thus Y0 = hmin . The economy
here is void of any growth, with production merely contributing to sustain the starting
level of effective labor, and output.
Potential for growth: A fraction of population invests We proceed with defining
equilibrium paths along which the potential for ever sustained growth is realized within the
structure of this model. We consider two such equilibria, so constructed as to give an
explicit proof of the trickle-down benefits of economic growth. As our basis, an
equilibrium is taken to exist in which a particular group of individuals, those with the
highest investment return, can only choose to engage in education. Owing to the
accumulation of human capital and the associated externality on future generations’
productivity, the economy reaches the state where the aggregate of all agents invest in
individual improvement. The financial sector, eager to support educational decisions of all
and any prospects, carries the economy on a new dynamic path on its way to development.
With reference to existence issues, we shall stress that the critical requirement for perpetual
growth is the provision of strong legal protection for creditors, should contract obligations
be violated. Even though growth is an endogenous outcome in our model, its manifestation
ultimately hinges on the ability of lenders to enforce loan repayment by imposing financial
consequences on those who default. We take as our basis that effective on period t = r ,
r > 1 , legislation entitles creditors to claim full loan repayment from delinquent borrowers

(case of strong legal rights). Lenders may seize the entire assets of a debtor in default,
effectively prohibiting the latter from any act of saving as time unfolds.
We introduce a formal definition of the postulated heterogeneity at an individual
income level. We recall that individuals are distinguished on the level of their innate
aptitude, and consequently their rate of return from education. Our supposition is that
25

there exist two types of agents in the economy, those with high and low ability
respectively. This is chosen to be our benchmark case, which we subsequently augment
to allow for a (countable) infinite number of types. We employ the definition:
Definition 1 An agent born in time period t is said to be of high type if her (gross) return
from education can support her honoring of debt obligations. Accordingly, low type
agents are discerned by an earned income as low as not in the least covering loan
repayment. This definition reads into the postulates
Assumption 2
AHδ H t1−δ > R q

∀t ≥ 0 .

(α)

ALδ H t1−δ < R q

∀t ≥ 0 .

(β)

The meaning ascribed to the employed distinction thus has to do with the feasibility in
carrying out one’s contract commitments. Assumption (2β) is read to mean that
investment in human capital does not pay off if one is to remain committed to her debt
liability. Were a low-type agent to obtain credit, she would always default on her
obligations, however honest in intention.
We remark here that while an individual knows her type when deciding whether to
invest in education, innate ability has nevertheless an unobservable quality. The private
information of one’s own type is not to be publicly revealed, or otherwise obtained by a
credit institution. The fact that individuals cannot be identified on the basis of their
expected rate of return on education brings about the constraint that borrowers choose to
conform to contract arrangements in equilibrium.32 Such incentive is assuredly instilled
by the stringent nature of consequences of our punishment scheme. With innate ability
being non identifiable, the only possibility to deviate from an equilibrium outcome with
rationing to everyone who applies for credit is with self-selection of individuals to
different choices. Carrying the analysis in formalized language we introduce the
following definition:
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It is to be noted that the value of innate ability for each type, hence educational productivities are known
to moneylenders. The latter have knowledge of the feasibility constraints, as expressed by Assumption 2α,
β. However, potential borrowers may not be discerned on the basis of their individual type. Innate aptitude
is non-identifiable, thus rendering the explicit rationing of low-type agents impossible.
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Definition 2 A contract is said to be self-enforcing if it is individually optimal for
borrowers to conform to prior arrangements at every date and contingency.33
It occurs that within our context, the contract design with the aforementioned absolute
consequences following default elicits only promise-keeping behavior. The present value
of (indirect) utility associated with the consumption stream after repudiating on one’s
debt is given by

{

}

Vt SR , D ( j ) = β ln A δj H t1−δ + (1 − β ) ln {0} → − ∞

∀j = L, H .

(24)

There results, consequently, that
Vt E , ND ( j ) > Vt SR , D ( j )

for j = H ,

(25)

where the lifetime (indirect) utility when adhering to the contract is given by (18).
The high ability agents choose to obtain education and repay their debt for the reason
that default is too costly. Condition (25) cannot possibly hold for low-type agents since
the logarithmic function V E , ND ( j ) is non-definable on a negative argument (low income
realization does not enable debt repayment). Insofar as the only possibility is to renege on
the agreement, the household attains the lowest utility level associated with no
consumption smoothing. V E, ND (L ) in effect degenerates to the lowest value of individual
welfare V SR , D ( j ) → − ∞, ∀ j = L, H . Consequently, we quote the proposition:
Proposition 1 The contract arrangement (q, R) offered in a system where borrowers have
no access to savings opportunities conditional on default is a self-enforcing contract.
Given the feasibility of loan repayment, it is never optimal to renege on agreed
obligations.
Further, we may prove without difficulty
Proposition 2 A private credit market for human capital investment is sustainable if and
only if

33

The definition is borrowed from Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004, p.640).

27

• Given the feasibility of loan repayment agents seeking credit are offered a selfenforcing contract.
• Individuals for whom debt repayment is non-feasible prefer to receive no education.
Proof
We have established that high-ability agents, once obtaining credit always adhere to
the contract agreement. The second necessary condition requires that the low ability
agents choose (optimally) to remain unskilled. For individuals of this type, investment in
human capital comes at the cost of sacrificing the opportunity to smooth consumption.
Therefore, it holds true that they prefer earning the low income of unskilled labor, while
maintaining their ability to ensure their old age consumption via saving in tangible assets.
Upon invoking that V E , ND (L ) → V SR, D (L ) → − ∞ , and recalling expression (19)
Vt NE = ln {γ hmin } > 0 , it is trivially proved that low-talented individuals indeed prefer to

seek no education.34 Within the present context on the basis of the postulate that lastperiod consumption consists exclusively of previous savings, the postulated definitions of
agent types (Assumption 2), and with the use of the logarithmic utility function (7) we
have formally arrived at the sentence that the credit educational market is privately
sustainable.
We conclude with the following proposition
Proposition 3 A competitive equilibrium with a subset of the population acquiring
privately financed education exists on the condition of occurrence of the following
requirements
• A positive measure of individuals choose optimally to obtain education.
• The credit market is sustainable.
• Savings be non-negative for both H and L types.
Proof
• The first condition constitutes the participation constraint for the borrower side.
The high-ability agent can always guarantee herself the present value of utility V NE by
34

The proof is obviously weakened as soon as we remove the assumption of last-period consumption being
exhaustively determined of prior savings. This case is presented in section VII.
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supplying unskilled labor. The contract must offer her at least this utility level. Therefore,
it must be satisfied that
Vt E , ND (H ) > Vt NE ,

(26)

which, drawing upon equations (18) and (19), applies if and only if
AHδ H t1−δ > R q + hmin .

(26')

Expression (26') is also referred as the individual rationality constraint for the high-type
agent (IRH). To ensure the validity of Assumption 2α and of condition (26') it suffices to
impose their intersection, which is expressed by the latter relationship. We are certain of
the truth of (26') in all periods t ≥ r given that
H r = hmin ,

(27)

and the constraint applying solely in period t = r
1−δ
AHδ hmin
> R q + hmin .

(26'')

• Drawing on Proposition 2 we transfer the conclusion that the postulated definitions
of agents types (Assumption 2) suffice as proof of the sentence that the educational
credit market is privately sustainable.
• The last statement of Proposition 3 imposes the individual rationality constraints for
the banking system, as expressed by relationships (11). Invoking equation (8) we
obtain

(

)

s 2Ht +∗1 = (1 − β ) AHδ H t1−δ − R q > 0

∀t ≥ 0 ,

(28)

which is strictly positive on the basis of the definition of the high-type agent (Assumption
2α). With respect to the low-talented individuals saving is represented by
s 2Lt ∗+1 = (1 − β ) hmin > 0

∀t ≥ 0 .

(29)

The proof of Proposition 3 consists basically of imposing Assumption 2β along with
constraint (26''). The validation of the remaining relationships is inferred by means of
logical reasoning.
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The dynamic evolution of the society’s stock of human capital along this equilibrium
path is governed by the first order non-linear difference equation
H t +1 = (1 − λ ) hmin + λ AHδ H t1−δ

∀t > r .

(30)

The solution to the linear difference equation (i.e. δ = 1) characterizes the current stock of
knowledge as a function of society’s historically given H 0 , the level of human capital of
unskilled labor, and the ability as well as the measure of those who invest. Having
presupposed H 0 = hmin , the solution is described by

 (1 − λ ) + λ (λ AH )t (1 − AH )
hmin 

1 − λ AH



Ht = 

[1 + (1 − λ )t ] h ,

min

if λAH ≠ 1
∀ t ≥ 1.

(31)

if λAH = 1

It is easily observed that in the case of λ AH ≠ 1 the numerator of the term in brackets
may most likely be negative. This calls to impose the relation 1 − λ AH < 0 , or
equivalently AH > 1 λ . Evidently, this is stricter compared to the initial assumption
AH > 1 .
Sustained growth carried by the entire population

The equilibrium we described

involves a constant fraction of each generation (the measure of high-type agents)
acquiring education, and earning income AHδ H t1−δ . The remaining population chooses to
remain unskilled and earn the minimum income level hmin . As long as the validity of
Assumption 2β and constraint (26'') is ensured, the composition of the labor force
between educated and uneducated individuals is analogous to the fraction of each
generation being genetically of high aptitude. The latter is established a priori to be a
stationary variable across all time periods.
It has been an initial motivation to prove the existence of possibility that the
educational status is affected dynamically as the economy evolves along the path of
perpetual unbounded growth. Within the structure of this model, sustained growth carries
the potential that the measure of population who find it optimal to invest in education
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changes endogenously. We prove that due to perpetual growth the stock of aggregate
knowledge reaches a threshold level above which individuals of the low type as well
choose optimally to invest in the acquisition of human capital. We establish specific
generality of this result by running through the case of linear human capital technology,

(i.e. δ = 1) .

We do not take the foregoing proof beyond the linear case due to the

particular complexity in solving non-linear difference equations in abstract form.
The theorem states that
Proposition 4 There exists a time period τ > 0 , where τ ∈ [r + 1, ∞ ) , in which the income
realization of educated low-type agents exceeds the threshold level that defines education
the optimal choice. In other words,
δ

AL H

1−δ
t

≥ R q + hmin

< R q + hmin

∀ t ∈ [τ , ∞ )
∀ t ∈ [0,τ − 1]

.

(32)

Considering the linear human capital technology, τ is defined as
 ln[Θ]
if λ AH > 1
 ln[λ A ] ,
H

,
τ =
(
)
+
1
−
R
q
h
A

min
L
 A h (1 − λ ) , if λ AH = 1
L min


with Θ ≡

(33)

(R q + hmin )(1 − λ AH ) − AL hmin (1 − λ ) .
AL hmin λ (1 − AH )

Proof
Relationship (32) written in linear form yields
AL H t ≥ R q + hmin .

(34)

We use the solution of the aggregate human capital stock as given by (31), to substitute
for H t . Equation (33) is then derived in a straightforward manner.
We can prove the existence of time period τ only on the condition that the latter is
greater to unity. More precisely, the theorem is true if and only if
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Case λ AH > 1
Θ > λ AH ,

(35)

which leads to a standard second-order polynomial

(λ

2

)

AL hmin AH2 − λ [R q + hmin (1 + λ AL )] AH + R q + hmin [1 − AL (1 − λ )] > 0 .

(35')

The expression is positive insofar as, either
AH <

R q + hmin (1 + λ AL ) − Ω
≡ AH1 ,
2λ AL hmin

(36α)

AH >

R q + hmin (1 + λ AL ) + Ω
≡ AH2 ,
2λ AL hmin

(36β)

or,

where we note that Ω ≡ [R q + hmin (1 + λ AL )] − 4 AL hmin [R q + hmin (1 − AL (1 − λ ))] ≥ 0 , and
2

A1H > 0 . Being more intuitive plausible, we choose to employ condition (38β).
Case λ AH = 1
The condition τ > 1 implies that
AL <

R q + hmin
.
(2 − λ )hmin

(37)

The right-hand side exceeds unity, as is required, given the imposition of
R q > (1 − λ ) hmin .

(38)

We proceed to construct the mathematical conditions framing the equilibrium path
along the interval t ∈ [τ , ∞ ) . Upon noting that condition (26) is now met for both types of
agents
Vt E , ND ( j ) > Vt SR , D ( j )

for j = L, H , ∀ t ∈ [τ , ∞ ) .

Proposition 2 is rephrased to read as follows
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(39)

Proposition 5 A private credit market for human capital investment is sustainable in the
time interval t ∈ [τ , ∞ ) if and only if agents seeking credit are always offered a selfenforcing contract.
Proof
We have proved in the previous section that in this context with last-period
consumption being exclusively determined by one’s savings, the postulated feasibility of
carrying out loan repayment, the use of a logarithmic utility function, and creditors
backed by a system of strong legal rights, the contract arrangement (q, R) is selfenforcing (see Proposition 1). It follows that it takes only to impose the feasibility
conditions for the two types to ensure that the educational credit market is privately
sustainable. But feasibility is in fact established by Proposition 4 from period τ onward
for both types. It follows that the proof of Proposition 5 entails the validity of35
ALδ H t1−δ > R q + hmin

∀ t ∈ [τ , ∞ ) ,

(32')

which is established as
AL H t ≥ R q + hmin .

∀ t ∈ [τ , ∞ ) .

(34')

Corollary 1 The private credit market for educational investment is sustainable in each
and all time periods of the interval t ∈ [τ , ∞ ) given the validity of condition (34').
The proof of existence of the equilibrium in which the entire population invests in
education is enclosed in the following proposition
Proposition 6 A competitive equilibrium where the entire population acquires privately
financed education exists on the condition of occurrence of the following requirements
• All types choose optimally to invest in individual improvement.
• The credit market is privately sustainable.
• Individual saving be non-negative for both H and L types.
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It is only apparent that imposing the feasibility constraint for the low-type is sufficient to establish the
analogous constraint for the high-ability agent.
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Proof
• We recall that the first condition constitutes the participation constraint for the
borrower side. It is optimal to obtain education if and only if
Vt E , ND ( j ) > Vt NE

∀ j = L, H ,

(40)

which equivalently states
Aδj H t1−δ > R q + hmin

∀ j = L, H .

(40')

It is simply evident that imposing the individual rationality constraint for the low-type is
sufficient to establish the analogous constraint for the high-ability agent. Proposition 4
establishes the validity of optimality condition (34') in the time interval t ∈ [τ , ∞ ) , for the
case of linear human capital technology.
• The second condition of the theorem involves the requirement that the credit market
be sustainable. In light of Corollary 1 we recall that sustainability is established
upon the validity of the optimality condition (34').
• In connection with the last condition, we impose the individual rationality
constraints for the banking system, entailing that individual saving be positive for
all types of agents. Invoking equation (8) we have

(

)

s 2jt∗+1 = (1 − β ) Aδj H t1−δ − R q > 0

∀ j ∈ {L, H } .

(41)

In analogy with our previous reasoning, we need only establish that saving be positive for
the low-type agent. Evidently, this is already met in linear form under constraint (34').
It follows that the sole thing we must postulate to establish Proposition 6 for the case
of the linear human capital technology is the optimality condition (34'). The truth of the
remaining relationships is then logically inferred.
The dynamic evolution of the economy’s aggregate stock of knowledge is governed
by the first order non-linear difference equation:
H t +1 = A H t1−δ

∀∈ [τ , ∞ ) ,

(42)
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where A ≡ (1 − λ ) ALδ + λ AHδ . In the linear case (i.e. δ = 1) the solution to the difference
equation is expressed by
B t H τ ,

Ht = 
 H τ ,

if B ≠ 1
∀t ≥ τ + 1

(43)

if B = 1

where B ≡ λ AH + (1 − λ ) AL . The aggregate human capital H τ is governed by equations
(33).
IV. Income distribution
It has been the aim of this study to establish an analytic basis for the factual evidence
lending truth to the Kuznets hypothesis. We show in the present section that this
empirical phenomenon is proved within the theory, and is thus validated on the ground of
acceptance of a mathematical proposition. Our proof procedure rests on the concept of
Lorenz ordering, a notion which has been formally introduced by Chatterjee and
Ravikumar (1999).
Following Kuznets (1955) we define the income share of a particular segment of
society as the ratio of real per capita income within the specific group over the
corresponding average for the entire population. In our context, individuals fall into two
groups, with all agents within a class earning identical income. Therefore, it becomes
relevant to specify the respective shares of the two distinct income groups (equivalently
of the representative low- and high-type agents). The income share of group j at time
period t is defined as sht j ≡ y tj Yt , ∀ j ∈ {L, H } . The economy-wide distribution is
represented by the set of individual shares of all income classes. We define

{

sh ζt +1 = shtL+1ζ , shtH+1ζ

}

for all

t ≥ 0 , where

ζ

denotes the equilibrium type,

ζ ∈ {I , II , III }. Excerpted by Chatterjee and Ravikumar (1999) the definition of Lorenz
superiority reads as follows
Definition 3 The low- and high-income groups (accordingly the entire measure of
individuals) are arranged in a form of increasing order. Let there be two different
economy-wide distributions of income shares, represented by sh and sh′ respectively. It
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is said that sh is Lorenz superior to, or Lorenz dominates distribution sh′ if

∑

µ
j =L

λ j sht′ j ≤ ∑ j = L λ j sht j for all µ ∈ {L, H } and t ∈ [0, ∞ ) , with the inequality holding
µ

strictly for at least one µ .
The underlying logic of the notion of Lorenz superiority is that the distribution
possessing this property exhibits lower inequality compared to any other income
distribution. As is further brought out by Chatterjee and Ravikumar (1999), a Lorenz
superior distribution is consistently ascribed a higher degree of equality by each and
every conventionally used measure of inequality, such as the Gini coefficient, the
coefficient of variation and the standard deviation of the logarithms.
We proceed to establish that the economy-wide income distribution in the state of
poverty (equilibrium of type-I) Lorenz dominates the income distribution along the
equilibrium path on which the economy develops due a segment of population engaging
in human capital accumulation (type-II equilibrium). Subsequently, we demonstrate that
the income distribution along the last stage of development, where the entire population
participates in human capital accumulation (denoted equilibrium type-III), is Lorenz
superior to the corresponding distribution of the precedent phase (equilibrium type-II).
Invoking the proposed definition by Kuznets (1955), and equations describing
individual and average income, we obtain the following expression for the share of each
income class in the poverty equilibrium
sht j+1I = 1 ∀j ∈ {L, H }, ∀t ∈ [0, r − 1] .

(44)

In the phase of underdevelopment individuals of all types earn per capita income equal to
the economy-wide average, hmin . Genetic differences in learning aptitude vanish in the
sense that they are not reflected in the income earning ability of agents. Absent
heterogeneity in educational status, innate differences do not matter. The potential for
differing earning productivities remains unrealized, with all workers being trapped in the
choice of a single occupation, and therefore identical earnings. We call attention that
perfect equality is an endogenous outcome in this context, caused by a deficiency in the
economy’s legislative system, namely the provision of insufficient legal power to
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financial institutions when faced with the possibility of default. Extreme credit rationing
to educational investment, hence a missing credit market is an optimal response to a lack
of commitment problem.
We have presupposed that adaptations in the legislative and judicial systems to
accommodate strong legal protection of creditors are effective on period t = r , a date
taken to be given exogenously.36 The building of such infrastructure suffices to carry the
economy out of its low income trap.37 Along the growth path following such
development, the different classes of agents earn respectively the income shares
shtL+1II = hmin

{(1 − λ )h

shtH+1II = AHδ H tII 1−δ

min

+ λ AHδ H tII 1−δ

{(1 − λ )h

min

}

+ λ AHδ H tII 1−δ

}

∀t ∈ [r ,τ − 1] .

(45α)

∀t ∈ [r ,τ − 1] .

(45β)

Logically, the high-type agents represent the rich class earning the higher income share in
the labor force. Applying the criterion of Lorenz superiority, we obtain that the income
distribution sh tI+1 Lorenz dominates the distribution sh tII+1 under the condition that the
following requirements be met
• (1 − λ ) shtL+1II ≤ (1 − λ ) shtL+1I ,

(46)

implying
hmin ≤ AHδ H tII 1−δ

∀t ≥ r ,

(47)

and,
• (1 − λ ) shtL+1II + λ shtH+1II ≤ (1 − λ ) shtL+1I + λ shtH+1I ,

(48)

whose elementary validation can be easily proved (each side equals unity). We are certain
of the truth of relationship (47) given our assumption that the income of educated
individuals may not to be exceeded by (or be equal to) the earnings of unskilled labor
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We recall that the switch takes place in time period t = r , with this being the first period in which highability agents may invest in education. Since the return on education is realized on the subsequent date,
t = r + 1 is the first relevant period for computing the income shares of the development stage II.
37
Absent a system of public education, this is also the sole way to guide the economy out of stagnation.
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(Assumption 1).38 We conclude that distribution sh tI+1 is Lorenz superior to the income
distribution sh tII+1 on the condition of Assumption 1.
The logic underlying the conditions of Lorenz dominance relates to the growth
pattern of the income shares of economic classes. We have established that the share of
the group of low-type agents is smaller in each period of the interval t ∈ [r ,τ − 1]
compared to the group’s share in dates of the stagnant equilibrium (relationship 46).
Conversely, the income share of the high-type class is greater when the latter are able to
invest in education compared to when they are constrained not to.39 It immediately
follows that condition (48) may be true only if the growth rate of the share of low-type
class upon transition be larger (in absolute magnitude) to the respective rate of the share
of talented ones. It is simple enough to show that this is in fact the case upon Assumption
1 being true. We have

) (1 −λλ(h)h

(

)

− AHδ H tII 1−δ
< 0,
δ
II 1−δ
min + λ AH H t

(49)

1 − λ ) (AHδ H tII 1−δ − hmin )
(
) = (1 − λ )h + λ Aδ H II 1−δ > 0 ,
min
H
t

(50)

g TII shtL+1 =

min

and
g

II
T

(sh

H
t +1

established to have a negative, and positive sign respectively on the basis of Assumption

(

)

1. In our chosen notation, g Tς sht j+1 denotes the rate of change of the income share of
type-j agents as the economy attains equilibrium path ς ∈ {II , III } (T stands for

(

) (

)

transition). We write g TII sht j+1 ≡ sht j+1II − sht j I sht j I , where by definition t ≡ r . Lowability individuals become relatively poorer in the transition to a higher stage of
development, experiencing their income share to shrink. In addition, as the potential of
high-aptitude agents has the opportunity to materialize, this class becomes richer in the
economy’s escape of poverty. We may easily prove that
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We note that under Assumption 1 relationship (46) holds as strict inequality only. Hence, all conditions
II

I

are met for ascribing sh t +1 the property of Lorenz dominance on distribution sh t +1 .
39
This may be shown to be true upon inequality (47), hence on the already imposed Assumption 1.
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(1 − λ ) g TII (shtL+1 ) >

λ g TII (shtH+1 )

,

(51)

which holds upon Assumption 1 being true. The poor become poorer at a faster rate than
the income of the rich is amplified. It is logically deduced that
ytH+1II y tH I
>
= 1,
ytL+1II y tL I

(52)

where ytj+1II , j ∈ {L, H }, is evaluated on the interval of date t = r , while ytj+1I evaluated
on t ∈ [0, r − 1] has a constant value. It is only evident that shtH+1ζ shtL+1ζ ≡ ytH+1ζ ytL+1ζ ,
∀ζ ∈ {I , II , III }, and t ≥ 0 . Clearly, it applies ytH+1II ytL+1II = AHδ H tII 1−δ hmin .
The pattern of worsening inequality prevails so long as the economy evolves along
this intermediate stage of development. The poor become always poorer relatively to the
society’s average income, while the income of the rich is continuously amplified. It is
plain that this is reflected in the direction of change of the respective income shares, as
expressed by

) (1λ− Aλ )(hH
δ

(

g shtL+1II =

H

II 1−δ
t

min

(

H II
t +1

g sh

)

− H tII+11−δ
<0
+ λ AHδ H tII+11−δ

t ∈ [r + 1,τ − 1] .

1 − λ ) hmin (H tII+11−δ − H tII 1−δ )
(
) = (1 − λ ) h + λ Aδ H II 1−δ > 0
min
H
t +1

t ∈ [r + 1,τ − 1] .

(53)

(54)

In fact, the same conclusion could be drawn from observing that the differential of per
capita earnings widens in proportion to the rate of human capital accumulation realized in
the time passed by. We point that
 ytH+1II
g  L II
 yt +1

 H tII 1−δ − H tII−11−δ
 =
>0,
H tII−11−δ


 ytH+1ζ
where we define g  L II
 y t +1

(

t ∈ [r + 1,τ − 1] ,

) (

)

(55)

 y tH+1ζ y tL+1ζ − y tH ζ ytL ζ
 ≡
, along any equilibrium path ζ ,
ytH ζ y tL ζ


ζ ∈ {I , II , III }.
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We have claimed in the previous section that due to perpetual growth educational
investment may be consistent with optimal incentives eventually for the array of all types
of agents. Income convergence is a characteristic that signals the economy has made its
transition to this advanced stage in the growth path. Along this phase of development
various economic classes earn the respective shares of aggregate output
δ

sht j+1III = Aδj (1 − λ ) ALδ + λ A H

∀j ∈ {L, H }, ∀t ∈ [τ , ∞ ) .

(56)

We establish that distribution sh tII+1 is characterized by greater income inequality, in
terms of Lorenz superiority, compared to the income distribution of the subsequent
equilibrium phase, sh tIII+1 . As it is known, the proof entails the requirement
• (1 − λ ) shtL+1II ≤ (1 − λ ) shtL+1III .

(57)

Upon Assumption 1 relation (57) is satisfied as strict inequality.
hmin < A δL H tII 1−δ .

(58)

It must further be met that
•

(1 − λ ) shtL+1II + λ shtH+1II ≤ (1 − λ ) shtL+1III + λ shtH+1III ,

(59)

be always valid. It is intuitively clear that relation (59) is established upon the
prerequisite that the decrease in the share of the rich class on the impact of transition be
exceeded by the positive growth in the share of the poor. It is straightforward to show
that

λ AHδ (ALδ H tII 1−δ − hmin )
>0,
hmin [(1 − λ ) ALδ + λ AHδ ]

(

)

(

) H(1 − λ )[((h1 − λ−) AA

g TIII shtL+1 =

(60)

while
g TIII shtH+1 =

δ

min

II 1−δ
t

L

δ

L

)
]

H tII 1−δ
< 0,
+ λ AHδ
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(61)

are established to have a positive, and negative sign respectively on the basis of

(

) (

)

Assumption 1. We write g TIII sht j+1 ≡ sht j+1III − sht j II sht j II , where by definition t + 1 ≡ τ .
It is simple to show that

(1 − λ ) g TIII (shtL+1 ) >

λ g TIII (shtH+1 ) ,

(62)

with its validity resting upon Assumption 1.
It becomes evident from relations (60) and (61) that the income differential of the two
classes shrinks as dynamics bring the economy on the more evolved stage in date
t = τ + 1 . In consequence, we have

ytH+1II ytH+1III
> L III ,
ytL+1II
yt +1

(63)

with ytj+1II , j ∈ {L, H }, being evaluated on the interval t ∈ [r ,τ − 1] , while y tj+1III on
t ∈ [τ , ∞ ) . We remark that the narrowing in earnings divergence consists of a discrete
discontinuous jump occurring in consequence of the transition. The latter, we recall, is
effected in the length of a sole time period, on date τ +1. Continuous, persistent fall in
the inequality of income distribution does not follow ever sustained growth along this
final stage of development. Economic classes claim each a constant share of the
economy’s output. Yet the rich remain always richer on this path, an event intrinsically
plausible. It is only apparent that ytH+1III ytL+1III = AHδ ALδ , subject to no endogenous
impact.
The evolution of inequality in aggregate distribution clearly exhibits a non-monotonic
trend along the economy’s path to development. The following theorem acknowledges
the proposition formed by Kuznets (1955) as conclusively established.
Proposition 7 Should Assumption 1 be imposed, the relationship between inequality in
the economy-wide income distribution and aggregate prosperity resembles an inverse-U
shaped curve. Starting from perfect equality in a state of stagnation, income inequality
exhibits a smooth upward trend as growth progressively takes off. Along this process, a
critical threshold of development level is reached causing a qualitative change in
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dynamics. A sudden discontinuous fall in earnings’ inequality is accompanied by a
constant wage differential as unbounded growth is sustained perpetually.
We return our attention to the proposition of Chatterjee and Ravikumar (1999), that a
Lorenz superior distribution is consistently ascribed a higher degree of equality by each
and every conventionally used measure of inequality. The use of a simple example
validates this argument, and lends confirmation to our conclusion that the dynamic
pattern of the inequality of income distribution resembles an inverse-U curve. We choose
to apply the widely used measure of Gini coefficient. The formal definition of the index
reads as follows

1
G=
2 N 2Y

J

J

∑∑ n n
j

k

y j − yk .

(64)

j =1 k =1

where we recall that N denotes the measure of aggregate population, Y represents the
economy’s average income, and J is the number of distinct incomes. Finally, subscripts j
and k each represent an economic class, with j , k ∈ {1, 2,K, J } . The population measure
of each income group is hereby denoted by n j .40 In a recent study, Palivos and Yip
(2007) have proved that for the simple case of J = 2 , the aforementioned definition is
written in the following simplified form
G=

n1 
y 
1 − 1  ,
N Y 

(65)

where evidently n1 + n2 = N , and y1 = min{y j }j =1 . In the context of our analysis, the Gini
J

measure is clearly defined as

hL 
Gt +1 = (1 − λ )1 − t +1 
 H t +1 

.

(65')

It can easily be proved that the value of the index in each equilibrium state is given by
GtI+1 = 0
40

∀t ∈ [0, r − 1] ,

(66)

The definition is excerpted from Debraj Ray (1998).
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G

II
t +1

λ (1 − λ )(AHδ H tII 1−δ − hmin )
=
(1 − λ )hmin + λ AHδ H tII 1−δ

∀t ∈ [r ,τ − 1] ,

(67)

with the latter being strictly positive on the account of Assumption 1. Further,
GtIII+1 =

λ (1 − λ )(AHδ − ALδ )
(1 − λ ) ALδ + λ AHδ

∀t ∈ [τ , ∞] ,

(68)

clearly, being a strictly positive constant. Theoretically, we confirm a positive growth
measure on the account of Assumption 1, and positive growth for aggregate knowledge;
conditions that do apply for both cases of linear and non-linear human capital technology.
It has proved difficult within this framework to obtain a definable prediction of the rate of
change of the growth measure of the Gini coefficient in the course of the intermediate
stage of development. We have

( ) A(A h H (H − h− H) H )
δ

g GtII+1 =

H

1−δ
t

min

δ

1−δ
t −1

H

1−δ
t −1

min

∀t ∈ [r + 1,τ − 1] .

(69)

t

( ) (

)

where we have defined g GtII+1 ≡ GtII+1 − GtII GtII , and δ ∈ (0,1) . In the linear case, the
result is expressed as following
g (GtII+1 ) =

AH hmin H tII−1
g (H tII )
( AH H t −1 − hmin ) H tII

∀t ∈ [r + 1,τ − 1] .

(70)

where in analogous manner we have defined g (H tII ) ≡ (H tII − H tII−1 ) H tII−1 . Using the
solution for H t as given by equation (31), the growth result is written

( )

g GtII+1 =

( AH

− 1)(λ AH − 1) (λ AH )
2

t

t

Ω1 + Ω 2 (λ AH ) + Ω 3 (λ AH )
2

2t

∀t ∈ [r + 1,τ − 1] ,

(70')

2

where Ω1 ≡ AH (1 − λ ) + λ (1 − AH ) AH−1 − (1 − λ AH )(1 − λ ) ,
Ω 2 ≡ AH λ (1 − λ )(1 − AH ) + λ (1 − λ AH )( AH − 1) , and Ω 3 ≡ λ2 (1 − AH ) . Performing a
2

simulation analysis would enable us to sign the expression, and allow us to conclude
about the form of upward trend of the inequality of income distribution.
It is evident that the following holds true
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GtI+1 < GtII+1 ,

(71)

GtIII+1 < GtII+1 ,

(72)

and

with the latter being valid on the basis of Assumption 1. The results lead us to infer once
again an inverted-U pattern of evolution in personal income inequality. Due to strong
legal rights be established for credit institutions, growth prospects start to materialize
carrying the economy to a path of higher and worsening inequality. Society escapes a
poverty loophole, albeit a state of perfect equality. It can be logically guaranteed that
inequality will take eventually a downward jump to a fixed computable level at a high
measure of probability (see equation 68). We have remarked upon the existence of the
critical time period in which this occurs in Proposition 4.
The Kuznets Curve that our theory implies is presented in the following diagram:

G

B

C

A
0

t

Figure I.1: Kuznets Curve (benchmark version of the model)

It is evident to the reader that points A and B correspond to the critical time periods r and

τ , respectively, at which the transition takes place to a new equilibrium path. Point C
marks the start of the advanced phase of development at period τ + 1 .
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V. Extension to general equilibrium
In our previous environment financial intermediaries had access to a hypothesized
credit market outside of the economy. The sole participants in this market were financial
institutions, able to borrow and invest any amount at an exogenously fixed interest rate. It
is within our scope to extend the preceding analysis in a way that allows the interest rate
being endogenously determined. Equilibrating forces in the credit market require that
loan demand be equated to credit supply. Making use of Walras’s law, we choose to
employ the economy’s equilibrium resource constraint, that aggregate investment be
equal to domestic saving.
We proceed with a concise presentation of our theory, as is reformulated to account
for the endogeneity of the interest rate, R. The model’s previous analytical structure is
followed in near precision, while the linguistic accompaniment of mathematics is justly
omitted.
The budget constraint in the working period of life is now given by the expression

c

j
2 t +1

 Aδj H t1−δ − Rt +1 q − s 2jt +1

=
hmin − s 2jt +1

if q > 0

.

(73)

if q = 0

Accordingly, consumption in the retirement age is given by
c3jt + 2 = Rt + 2 s 2jt +1 .

(74)

The optimization problem yields that individual optimal saving is

s

j∗
2 t +1

(

(1 − β ) Aδj H t1−δ − Rt +1 q

=
(1 − β ) hmin

)

if q > 0
∀j = L, H .

(75)

if q = 0

Substituting for optimal saving in equations (73) and (74) we obtain the respective
expressions for optimal second- and third period consumption

c

j∗
2 t +1

(

β Aδj H t1−δ − Rt +1 q

=
β hmin

)

if q > 0
if q = 0
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∀j ∈ {L, H }.

(73')

c

j∗
3t + 2

(

(1 − β ) Rt + 2 Aδj H t1−δ − Rt +1 q

=
(1 − β ) Rt + 2 hmin

)

if q > 0

∀ j ∈ {L, H }.

(74')

if q = 0

State of poverty The preceding analysis established that a state of underdevelopment,
accompanied by perfect equality in low income earnings, is a prospect actualized
indefinitely when credit institutions are entitled to limited rights in claiming debt
repayment. Financial entities lack the incentive to provide credit for human capital
investment, with the consequence of agents’ preclusion from the opportunity to privately
financed education. In that environment, the possibility of saving for retirement age is
served through the private financial system, construed to be composed of a form of
deposit institutions. Saving yields a positive rate of return, modeled as an exogenous
fixed variable, which may not be otherwise endogenously determined.41
A segment of the society invests We proceed to generalize within the context of
general equilibrium the path along which potential ever sustained growth is realized.
Owing to appropriate transformations in the economy’s legislative system, a prior
missing market for human capital investment may function on time period r , where
r ≥ 2.

The postulated heterogeneity on innate aptitude level becomes critical for individual
decision making, and consequently for the economy’s growth pattern and inequality of
income distribution. We redefine formally individual heterogeneity in income earning
ability, recognizing that the interest rate is now endogenously determined in each period.
Definition 1 is mathematically expressed as follows:
Assumption 3 An agent born at time period t is said to be of high type if and only if
AHδ H t1−δ > Rt∗+II1 q

∀t ≥ 0 .

(α)

On the other hand, it is not feasible for low type agents to carry out their contract
commitment, however honest in intention. Mathematically, this reads into
41

An alternative way to retain the possibility of saving for retirement age would be to postulate the
existence of a storage technology, taken to provide a positive return on investment. The conception of such
technology ought to be considered an arbitrarily chosen device, with the meaning to supplement the role of
absent saving institutions.
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ALδ H t1−δ < Rt∗+II1 q

∀t ≥ 0 .

(β)

The variable Rt∗+1II expresses the endogenous value of the interest rate as determined by
the economy’s equilibrium resource constraint. The latter reads that aggregate saving be
equal to the private demand for investment, which solely consists of the credit financing
human capital accumulation. Formally expressed, we have
S 2IIt +1 = λ q

∀t ≥ r ,

(76)

where S 2IIt +1 denotes domestic private saving accumulated in the working period of life
from members of generation t. Evidently, λ q represents the private demand for
educational investment. On the other side, aggregate saving is to be defined as

(

S 2IIt +1 = (1 − λ )(1 − β ) hmin + λ (1 − β ) AHδ H tII 1−δ − Rt∗+II1 q

)

∀t ≥ r .

(77)

We obtain that the equilibrium expression of the interest rate price is given by
∗ II
t +1

R

(1 − λ ) hmin
=
λq

AHδ H tII 1−δ
1
+
−
q
1− β

∀t ≥ r .

(78)

The function conveys that the rate of return on financial assets is derived by the
technology of human capital accumulation.
We confine our attention to establishing the proof of Proposition 3, which forms the
essence of this analysis. Similarly worded, the statement of the theorem is the following
Proposition 8 A competitive equilibrium with a subset of population acquiring privately
financed education exists on the condition of occurrence of the following requirements
• A positive measure of individuals optimally choose to obtain education
• The credit market is sustainable
• Savings be non-negative for both H and L types.

47

Proof
•

The measure of high-type agents must be induced to participate in the contract

arrangement. This translates to mean that the contract must offer a high-ability individual
at least the utility level she would obtain if she chose to remain unskilled. In other words,
Vt E , ND (H ) > Vt NE , II

∀t ≥ r ,

(79)

where it holds that

{

1− β

Vt E , ND ( j ) = ln β β (1 − β )

{

(

Rt∗+12− β Aδj H t1−δ − Rt∗+1 q
1− β

Vt NE ( j ) ≡ Vt NE = ln β β (1 − β )

Rt∗+12− β hmin

}

)}

∀j ∈ {L, H } .

∀j ∈ {L, H }.

(80)
(81)

Relation (79) is expressed as
AHδ H tII 1−δ > hmin + q Rt∗+1

∀t ≥ r ,

(79')

which, evaluated in period t = r yields
1−δ
> hmin + q Rt∗+II1
AHδ hmin

∀t ≥ r .

(79'')

Evidently, it suffices to impose relationship (79'') to ensure the validity of (79') in all
periods t > r .
•

Drawing upon Proposition 2 we transfer the conclusion that the postulated

definitions of agent types (Assumption 3) count as proof of the sentence that the
educational credit market is privately sustainable.
•

The individual rationality constraint for the members of the financial system

amounts to imposing that individual saving is positive for both types. Invoking the
optimal saving function (equation 8), we have that

(

)

s 2Ht +∗1 = (1 − β ) AHδ H t1−δ − Rt*+II1 q > 0 ,

(82)

which is strictly positive on the basis of the definition of the high-type agent (Assumption
3α). With respect to the low-type individuals saving is represented by
s 2Lt ∗+1 = (1 − β ) hmin > 0

∀t ≥ 0 ,

(83)
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which is strictly positive for β ∈ (0,1) , and hmin > 0 .
The proof of Proposition 8 clearly consists of imposing the definitional condition
Assumption 3β, as well as the constraint (79''), along with the equilibrium expression of
the interest rate (equation 77). The truth of the remaining relations is inferred by simple
reasoning.
All types acquire education In analogy with the analysis in the core version the
following theorem proves the transition of the economy to a higher stage of development,
where education is accommodated for all types of agents. The following is a restatement
of Proposition 4, carried in the general equilibrium context
Proposition 9 There exists a time period τ~ > 0 , where τ~ ∈ [r + 1, ∞ ) , in which the income
realization of educated low-type agents exceeds the threshold level that defines education
the optimal choice. This reads as follows
δ

AL H

1−δ
t

≥ Rt∗+1 q + hmin


< Rt∗+1 q + hmin

∀ t ∈ [τ~, ∞ )
∀ t ∈ [0,τ~ − 1]

.

(84)

If we limit ourselves to the linear case (δ = 1) we can prove that τ~ is defined as
~
 ln Θ
,
if λ AH > 1

ln
λ
A
[
]
H


,
τ~ = 
 ∗ III
 Rt +1 q + hmin (1 − AL ) , if λ AH = 1

AL hmin (1 − λ )

[]

(

(85)

)

Rt∗+III
~
1 q + hmin (1 − λ AH ) − AL hmin (1 − λ )
. The expression is identical to the
with Θ ≡
AL hmin λ (1 − AH )
definition of τ in the baseline version with the obvious exception that R is now
endogenously determined.
Proof
The reasoning of the proof is completely analogous to that of Proposition 4.
Relationship (75) yields in linear form
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∀t ∈ [τ~, ∞ ) .

AL H t ≥ Rt∗+III
1 q + hmin

(86)

We use the solution of aggregate human capital stock (equations 31) to substitute for H t .
Deriving expression (85) is then a straightforward task.
We can prove the existence of time period τ~ only on the condition that the latter is
greater to unity. More precisely, the theorem is true if
Case λ AH > 1
~
Θ > λ AH ,

(87)

which leads to a standard second-order polynomial

(λ

2

)

[

]

AL hmin AH2 − λ R ∗t +III1 q + hmin (1 + λ AL ) AH + Rt∗+III
1 q + hmin [1 − AL (1 − λ )] > 0 .

(87')

The expression is positive insofar as, either
AH <

Rt∗+III
1 q + hmin (1 + λ AL ) − Ω
≡ A1H ,
2λ AL hmin

(88α)

or, alternatively
AH >

Rt∗+III
1 q + hmin (1 + λ AL ) + Ω
≡ AH2 ,
2λ AL hmin

where

we

[

]

2

(88β)
note

[

that

]

∗ III
1
Ω ≡ Rt∗+III
1 q + hmin (1 + λ AL ) − 4 AL hmin Rt +1 q + hmin (1 − AL (1 − λ )) ≥ 0 , and AH > 0 .

Being more intuitive plausible, we choose to employ condition (88β).
Case λ AH = 1
The condition τ~ > 1 implies that
AL <

Rt∗+III
1 q + hmin
.
(2 − λ )hmin

(89)

The right-hand side exceeds unity, as is required, given the imposition of
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Rt∗+III
1 q > (1 − λ ) hmin .

(90)

We recall, Rt∗+1 expresses the endogenous value of the interest rate as being determined
by the economy’s equilibrium resource constraint. Along the time interval t ∈ [τ~, ∞ ) , the
latter is defined to read as follows
∀t ∈ [τ~, ∞ ) .

S 2IIIt+1 = q

(91)

where we recall that S 2IIIt+1 denotes the domestic private saving accumulated in the
working period of life from members of generation t. The latter is defined as

{

}

S 2IIIt+1 = (1 − β ) (1 − λ ) ALδ + λ AHδ H t1−δ − (1 − β ) q Rt∗+1

∀t ∈ [τ~, ∞ ) .

(92)

The private demand for educational investment is expressed by variable q . It is
straightforward to obtain the equilibrium expression for the interest rate, being defined as
Rt∗+III
1 =

{(1 − λ ) A

δ

L

}

+ λ AHδ H t1−δ
1
−
q
1− β

∀t ∈ [τ~, ∞ ) .

(93)

The proof of existence of the equilibrium state along which growth is supported by
human capital investment of all types is enclosed in a restatement of Proposition 6
Proposition 10 A competitive equilibrium where the entire population acquires privately
financed education exists on the condition of occurrence of the following requirements
• All types optimally choose to invest in individual improvement
• The credit market is privately sustainable
• Individual saving be non-negative for both H and L types
Proof
• Individuals of either type must be induced to engage in human capital investment.
This is guaranteed only insofar as
Vt E , ND ( j ) > Vt NE

∀ j = L, H , ∀t ∈ [τ~, ∞ ) ,

which is equivalent to
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(94)

Aδj H t1−δ > Rt∗+III
1 q + hmin

∀ j = L, H , ∀t ∈ [τ~, ∞ ) ,

(94')

given that Vt E , ND ( j ) , and Vt NE are defined by equations (80) and (81) respectively.
Evidently, it suffices to impose the sole relation
t = τ~ .

ALδ H t1−δ > Rt∗+III
1 q + hmin

(94'')

• In light of Corollary 1, the sustainability of credit market is established upon the
validity of condition (94'').
• In connection with the last condition, we impose once more the individual
rationality constraints for the banking system (equations 11). Invoking equation (8), we
obtain

(

)

s 2jt∗+1 = (1 − β ) Aδj H t1−δ − Rt∗+III
1 q > 0

∀ j ∈ {L, H } , ∀t ∈ [τ~, ∞ )

(95)

We need only establish that saving be positive for the low-type agent, which evidently is
met under condition (94'').
It follows that the sole thing we must postulate to establish Proposition 10 is
inequality (94''). The truth of the remaining relations is logically inferred.
VI. Higher degree of heterogeneity
An appropriate extension of the basic construct of the model would be to augment the
set of values in the domain of innate ability, A j . Such a generalization is, in and of itself,
a noteworthy task in that we lay down the theory in higher mathematical abstraction. Yet
its practical value is that it provides us with a way of obtaining a smooth inverted-U
curve. Taking heterogeneity to the highest degree of generality, we postulate that the
domain of variable A j forms a district measure of (countable) infinite types. In specific,
we assert that the measure of heterogeneous types is defined on the bounded interval
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∀j ∈ [1,K, J ] , where J ≥ 2 .42 Each class of type-j individuals constitutes a fraction λ j of
the population measure, N = 1 . It is evident that

∑

J
j =1

λj = 1.

It may easily be seen that the structure of the model set out in section II, as well as the
analysis on the stationary equilibrium path, becomes no different when the general case
J > 2 is applied.43 Carrying not an unfruitful repetition, we proceed with the analysis on

equilibrium growth.
We recall that our definition of individual type is intrinsically connected to an agent’s
innate aptitude towards knowledge acquisition, a factor being genetically, or otherwise
exogenously determined. Nevertheless, human capital productivity does not critically
determine the ability to carry out one’s contract commitment.44 Being of a certain type is
accompanied by no idiosyncratic feature determining the feasibility of loan repayment.
The definition of the latter concept formally reads as follows45
Definition 4 Loan repayment is feasible for an agent born in time t if the following holds
to be true
Aδj H t1−δ > R q .

(96)

The following assumption is adopted
Assumption 4 Individuals of type j ∈ [1,K, k ] , where k ∈ [1,K, J − 1] , are discerned by an
income earning ability as low as not in the least covering debt repayment. On the other
hand, the earned income of an agent of type j ∈ [k + 1,K, J ] supports her honoring of debt
liability. Hence, we explicitly postulate
Aδj H t1−δ < R q

j ∈ [1,K, k ] .

(α)

We postulate that for any two cardinal numbers l and m of the set j ∈ [1, 2, K , J ] , with 1 ≤ l < m ≤ J ,
the corresponding members in the set of heterogeneous abilities A j ∈ [ A1 , A2 , K , Am ] are of the same

42

cardinal ordering, i.e. Al < Am .
43

The present analysis refers to the case of exogenously determined interest rate. Hence, it is relevant to
observe equations (1) to (23).
44
This was a natural feature of the simple two-type case. In that setting, differentiation in income earning
ability was inescapably synonymous to critical differences in the feasibility of carrying out contract
obligations.
45
The definition of the concept has already been introduced in Assumption 2.
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Aδj H t1−δ > R q

j ∈ [k + 1,K, J ] .

(β)

Assumption 4(α) says that investment in human capital does not pay off for types
j ∈ [1,K, k ] if one is to remain committed to contract liability. Default on debt is an
inescapable consequence, irrespective of an inherent honest intention. The assumption is
reducible to the following expression
Assumption 4'
Akδ H t1−δ < R q

(α)

Akδ+1 H t1−δ > R q

(β)

We are now able to prove, by means of what has already been said, that an
equilibrium state may exist with the economy being placed on a path of ever-sustained
growth. As has been stated previously, this potential is realized as a result of the private
financing for education being made feasible, if only initially for the segment of society
with relatively high investment return (namely, the types j ∈ [k + 1,K, J ] ). Similarly
worded, the foregoing theorem forms an exact generalization of Proposition 3 to the
multiple J-type case.
Proposition 11 A competitive equilibrium with a subset of the population acquiring
privately financed education exists on the condition of occurrence of the following
requirements
• A positive measure of individuals optimally choose to obtain education,
• The credit market is sustainable,
• Savings be non-negative for all agent types.
Proof
•

The participation constraint for the borrower side consists of the following

condition
Vt E , ND ( j ) > Vt NE

∀t ≥ r , j ∈ [k + 1,K, J ] ,
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(97)

where we recall, V E , ND ( j ) , and V NE are given by equations (18) and (19) respectively.
Relation (88) is satisfied so long as
∀t ≥ r , j ∈ [k + 1,K, J ] ,

Aδj H tII 1−δ > hmin + R q

(97')

which, evaluated in period t = r , for type j = k + 1 yields
1−δ
Akδ+1 hmin
> hmin + R q .

(97'')

Evidently, it suffices to impose relationship (97'') to ensure the validity of (97') for all
types j ∈ [k + 1,K, J ] , in each and all time periods t ≥ r .
•

Drawing on Proposition 2, it is purely logically proved that the financial market

for human capital investment is privately sustainable. The requirement of proof is fully
satisfied upon the postulated definitions of Assumption 4'.
•

In order to prove that it is individually rational for credit entities to engage in loan

provision we need to impose that saving be positive for all types of agents. Invoking the
optimal saving function (equation 8) we obtain

(

)

s 2jt∗+1 = (1 − β ) Aδj H tII 1−δ − R q > 0

∀t ≥ r , j ∈ {k + 1,K, J } ,

(98)

which is strictly positive on the basis of Assumption 4'(β). With respect to the individuals
of relatively low productivity saving is given by
s 2jt∗+1 = (1 − β ) hmin > 0

∀t ≥ r , j ∈ {1,K, k } ,

(99)

obviously being strictly positive for β ∈ (0,1) , and hmin > 0 . In summary, the proof of
Proposition 11 requires the validity of Assumption 4'(α), and of constraint (97''). The
truth of the remaining relations is then logically inferred.
The dynamic evolution of the society’s stock of human capital along this equilibrium
path is governed by the first order non-linear difference equation
k

H t +1 = hmin ∑ λ j + H tII 1−δ
j =1

J

∑λ

j

Aδj

∀t ≥ r .

j = k +1

The solution to the linear form (i.e. δ = 1) is described as
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(100)


t
hmin (1 − ϕ )θ + ϕ


Ht = 

k


hmin 1 + t ∑ λ j 



j =1



[

]

J

if θ ≡

∑λ

j

Aj ≠ 1

j = k +1

∀t ≥ r + 1 .

(101)

J

∑λ

if θ ≡

j

Aj = 1

j = k +1

k

∑λ
where we define ϕ ≡

j

j =1

1−θ

.

We prove the existence of a critical level of development which, once reached, type k
has an optimal incentive to invest in education.
Proposition 12 There exists a time period τ 1 > 0 , where τ 1 ∈ [r + 1, ∞ ) , in which the
income realization of educated type-k agents exceeds the threshold level that defines
education the optimal choice. In other words,
≥ R q + hmin
Akδ H t1−δ 
< R q + hmin

∀ t ∈ [τ 1 , ∞ )
∀ t ∈ [0,τ 1 − 1]

.

(102)

Considering the linear human capital technology, τ 1 is defined as

 ln[Φ ]

,
 ln[θ ]
τ1 = 
 R q + hmin (1 − Ak )
,
k

 Ak hmin ∑ λ j
j =1


with Φ ≡

if θ > 1

,

(103)

if θ = 1

R q + hmin (1 −ϕ Ak )
.
Ak hmin (1 − ϕ )

Proof
Relationship (93) is written in linear form
Ak H t ≥ R q + hmin .

(104)
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We use the solution of aggregate human capital stock as given by (101), to substitute for
H t . Equations (103) are then derived in a straightforward manner.
The requirement must be imposed that τ 1 be greater than one. More precisely, it must
hold true that
R q + hmin (1 −ϕ Ak )
>
Ak hmin (1 − ϕ )
Ak <

J

∑λ

j

Aj

if θ > 1 .

(105)

j = k +1

R q + hmin
.
k


1 + ∑ λ j  hmin


j =1



(106)

We prove the following theorem
Proposition 13 A competitive equilibrium exists in each and all time periods t ∈ [τ 1 , ∞ )
having the following characteristics: the measure of population with learning abilities
ranging in the interval A j ∈ [Ak , AJ ] acquire privately financed education, whereas the
remaining subset with abilities A j ∈ [ A1 , Ak −1 ] choose to remain unskilled. The existence
of the equilibrium is established on the condition of occurrence of the following
requirements
• The measure of the population with ability types j ∈ [k , J ] optimally choose to
obtain education.
• The credit market is sustainable.
• Savings be non-negative for all agent types.
Proof
•

As has already been mentioned, the participation constraint for the borrower side

consists of the condition
Vt E , ND ( j ) > Vt NE

∀t ≥ τ 1 , j ∈ [k ,K, J ] ,

(107)

Drawing upon equations (18) and (19), we obtain that relation (107) is satisfied so long as
Aδj H t1−δ > hmin + R q

∀t ≥ τ 1 , j ∈ [k ,K, J ] ,
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(107')

Evidently, it suffices to impose relationship (107') for type j = k to ensure its validity for
all remaining types j = k + 1,K, J . Evaluated in the linear case, expression (107') yields
Ak >

•

hmin + R q
Ht

∀t ≥ τ 1 .

(107'')

Drawing on Proposition 2, it is logically proved that the financial market for

human capital investment is privately sustainable. The requirement of proof is fully
satisfied upon the feasibility conditions

•

Akδ−1 H t1−δ < R q

∀t ≥ τ 1 ,

(108)

Akδ H t1−δ > R q

∀t ≥ τ 1 .

(109)

Finally, we need to impose that saving is positive for all types of agents. Invoking

the optimal saving function (equation 8) we have

(

)

s 2jt∗+1 = (1 − β ) Aδj H tII 1−δ − R q > 0

∀t ≥ r , j ∈ {k K, J } ,

(110)

which is strictly positive on the basis of condition (107''). With respect to the individuals
of relatively low productivity, saving is given by
s 2jt∗+1 = (1 − β ) hmin > 0

∀t ≥ r , j ∈ {1,K, k − 1} ,

(111)

obviously being strictly positive for β ∈ (0,1) , and hmin > 0 . In summary, the proof of
Proposition 13 requires the validity of conditions (107''), and (108). The truth of the
remaining relations is then logically inferred.
The dynamic evolution of the society’s stock of human capital along the time path
t ∈≥ τ 1 is governed by
k −1

J

j =1

j =k

H t +1 = hmin ∑ λ j + H t1−δ ∑ λ j Aδj

t ∈≥ τ 1 .

(112)

The solution to the linear form of difference equation (112) (i.e. δ = 1) is described by
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~ ~t ~
hmin (1 − ϕ )θ + ϕ


Ht = 

k −1


hmin 1 + t ∑ λ j 



j =1



[

~ J
if θ ≡ ∑ λ j A j > 1

]

j =k

∀t ≥ τ 1 + 1 .

(113)

~ J
if θ ≡ ∑ λ j A j = 1
j =k

k −1

where we define ϕ~ ≡

∑λ

j

j =1

~.
1−θ

The following theorem proves that per capita income reaches a critical threshold
which, once surpassed, agents of type k-1 optimally choose to invest in education.
Proposition 14 Let there exist a time period τ 2 > 0 , with τ 2 ∈ [τ 1 + 1, ∞ ) . The income
realization of educated individuals of type k-1 exceeds the threshold level that defines
education the optimal choice. In other words,
≥ R q + hmin
Akδ−1 H t1−δ 
< R q + hmin

∀ t ∈ [τ 2 , ∞ )
∀ t ∈ [0,τ 2 − 1]

.

(114)

Considering the linear human capital technology, τ 2 is defined as

~
 ln Φ
 ~ ,
 ln θ
τ2 = 
 R q + hmin (1 − Ak −1 )
,
k −1

 Ak −1 hmin ∑ λ j

j =1

[ ]
[]

~
if θ > 1

,

(115)

~

if θ = 1

~ R q + hmin (1 −ϕ~ Ak −1 )
.
with Φ ≡
Ak −1 hmin (1 − ϕ~ )
Proof
Equation (115) is derived by following the same procedure as in Proposition 12. We
write relationship (114) in linear form
Ak H t ≥ R q + hmin .

(116)
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Using the solution of aggregate human capital stock as given by (110) to substitute for
H t , we obtain the expression for τ 2 (115). Once again, the requirement must be imposed
that τ 2 be greater to unity. Precisely, it must be
R q + hmin (1 −ϕ~ Ak −1 ) J
> ∑ λ j Aj
Ak −1 hmin (1 − ϕ~ )
j =k
Ak −1 <

~
if θ > 1 ,

R q + hmin
.
 k −1 
1 + ∑ λ j  hmin


j =1



(117)

(118)

It is straightforward to prove
Proposition 15 A decentralized equilibrium exists in time periods t ≥ τ 2 having the
following characteristics: the subset of the population with learning abilities ranging in
the interval A j ∈ [Ak −1 , AJ ] acquire privately financed education, whereas the remaining
set of individuals with abilities A j ∈ [ A1 , Ak −2 ] choose to remain unskilled. The existence
of the equilibrium is established upon the condition of occurrence of the following
requirements
• The measure of population with ability types j ∈ [k − 1, J ] optimally choose to obtain
education.
• The credit market is sustainable.
• Savings be non-negative for all agent types.
Proof
The proof procedure bears an evident analogy to that of Proposition 13. We forgo an
extensive step-by-step analysis, and plainly assert our argument. Proposition 15 is
established upon the condition that education be the optimal choice for type k-1 agents, as
well as the assumption that loan repayment be non-feasible for agent type k-2. Hence,
Akδ−1 H t1−δ > hmin + R q

∀t ≥ τ 2 ,

(119)

being reducible in the linear case to
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Ak −1 >

hmin + R q
Ht

∀t ≥ τ 2 .

(119')

and
Akδ− 2 H t1−δ < R q

∀t ≥ τ 2

(120)

The dynamic evolution of the society’s stock of human capital along the time path
t ∈≥ τ 2 is governed by the first-order difference equation
k −2

J

H t +1 = hmin ∑ λ j + H t1−δ
j =1

∑λ

j

Aδj

t ∈≥ τ 2 .

(121)

j = k −1

The solution to the linear form of equation (121) is given by

ˆt
hmin (1 − ϕˆ )θ + ϕˆ


Ht = 

k −2


hmin 1 + t ∑ λ j 



j =1



[

]

if θˆ ≡

J

∑λ

j

Aj > 1

j = k −1

∀t ≥ τ 2 + 1 .
if θˆ ≡

(122)

J

∑λ

j

Aj = 1

j = k −1

k −2

∑λ
where we define ϕˆ ≡

j

j =1

1 − θˆ

.

The economy finally attains a level of per-capita income that defines education the
optimal choice for each and every agent type.
Proposition 16 There exists a time period τ n > 0 , where τ n ∈ [τ 1 , ∞ ) , in which the
income realization of educated individuals of the lowest ability exceeds the threshold
level that defines education the optimal choice. Namely,
≥ R q + hmin
A1δ H t1−δ 
< R q + hmin

∀ t ∈ [τ n , ∞ )
∀ t ∈ [0,τ n − 1]

.

(123)

where A1 ≡ min {A j }j =1,K, J . Taking the case of linear technology, τ n is defined by the
following expression
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 ln[Φ ]
 ln θ ,

τn = 
 R q + hmin (1 − A1 )
,

A
h
λ
1
1
min


[]

where Φ ≡

J

if θ ≡ ∑ λ j A j > 1
j =2

,

(124)

J

if θ ≡ ∑ λ j A j = 1
j =2

R q + hmin (1 −ϕ A1 )
λ
, and ϕ ≡ 1 .
1−θ
A1 hmin (1 − ϕ )

Proof
The proof of existence of time period τ n is exactly analogous to the proof procedure
of Propositions 12, and 13. Once again, the requirement must be imposed that τ n be
greater to unity. In specific, it must hold true that
R q + hmin (1 −ϕ A1 ) J
> ∑ λ j Aj
A1 hmin (1 − ϕ )
j=2
A1 <

R q + hmin
(1 + λ1 )hmin

if θ > 1 .

if θ = 1 .

(125)

(126)

The proof of existence of the equilibrium path on which growth is supported by human
capital investment of each and all types is enclosed in the following theorem
Proposition 17 A competitive equilibrium where the entire population acquires privately
financed education exists in each and all time periods of the interval t ∈ [τ n , ∞ ) on the
condition of occurrence of the following requirements
• All types optimally choose to invest in individual improvement.
• The credit market is privately sustainable.
• Individual saving be non-negative for each and all individual types.
Proof
• Each and every individual type must be induced to engage in human capital
investment. Once again, this is guaranteed only insofar as
Aδj H t1−δ > hmin + R q

∀j ∈ {1,K, J } , ∀ t ∈ [τ n , ∞ ) .
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(127)

Evidently, it suffices to impose relationship (127) for type j = 1 to ensure its validity for
all remaining types j = 2,K, J . Hence,
A1δ H t1−δ > hmin + R q

∀ t ∈ [τ n , ∞ )

(127')

Evaluated in the linear case, expression (127') yields
A1 >

hmin + R q
Ht

∀ t ∈ [τ n , ∞ ) .

(127'')

• In light of Corollary 1, the human capital credit market is sustainable upon the
condition that feasibility is established for the lowest-ability agents. The condition
translates into
A1δ H t1−δ > R q

•

∀ t ∈ [τ n , ∞ ) .

(128)

Saving must be positive for all types of agents. Invoking the optimal saving

function (equation 8) this means

(

s 2jt∗+1 = (1 − β ) Aδj H t1−δ − R q

)

∀j ∈ [1,K, J ] , ∀ t ∈ [τ n , ∞ ) ,

(129)

which is strictly positive on the basis of optimality conditions (127). Once again, we need
only establish that saving be positive for the lowest-type agents, which evidently is met
under the condition (127'). It is trivial to show that Proposition 17 is established for the
linear case upon the imposition of condition (127''). The validity of the remaining
relations is logically implied.
Our argument on the non-monotonic dynamics of the economy-wide distribution
ought not to be qualitatively sensitive to an analysis of higher degree of heterogeneity.
Following the same proof procedure, the essence of Proposition 7 is here established in
the form of a more general argument.
We recall that the income share of the class of type-j individuals, at time period t, is
defined as sht j ≡ y tj Yt , ∀j ∈ {1,K, J } . The economy-wide income distribution is

{

}

represented by the set of shares of all income classes sh lt +1 = sht1+l1 , K, shtJ+1l , for t ≥ 0 ,
with l denoting the stage of equilibrium growth, l ∈ {I , II ,K, J − k + 1} . We now
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proceed to establish that the economy-wide income distribution in the state of poverty
Lorenz dominates the distribution of the equilibrium where the subset of the population
with abilities ranging in the interval j ∈ [k + 1, J ] invests in human capital accumulation.
Invoking the aforementioned definition of income share, as well as the equations on
individual and average income (22) and (23) respectively, we obtain the following
expression for the share of income classes in the poverty equilibrium:
j ∈ [1, J ] , ∀t ∈ [0, r − 1] .

sht j+1I = 1

(130)

As has been previously stated, in the phase of underdevelopment genetic differences in
learning aptitude vanish in the sense that they are not reflected in the income earning
ability of agents. This is a state of perfect income equality, with all agents earning the
minimum average income, hmin .
We recall that adaptations in the legislative system to accommodate strong legal
protection of creditors are effective on period t = r . Along the growth path following
such development the various types of agents earn the respective income shares
sht j+1II = hmin

{h

min

sht j+1II = Aδj H tII 1−δ

∑

j =1

λ j + H tII 1−δ ∑ j =k +1 λ j Aδj

min

∑

{h

k

J

} j ∈ [1, k ] , ∀t ∈ [r,τ

− 1] .

(131)

j ∈ [k + 1, J ], ∀t ∈ [r ,τ 1 − 1] .

(132)

λ + H tII 1−δ ∑ j =k +1 λ j Aδj
j =1 j

k

J

1

}

Applying the criterion of Lorenz superiority, we obtain that the income distribution sh tI+1
Lorenz dominates distribution sh tII+1 under the condition that the following requirements
be met
• λ1 sht1+II1 ≤ λ1 sht1+I1

∀t ∈ [r ,τ − 1] ,

(133)

implying
hmin ∑ j =k +1 λ j ≤ H tII 1−δ ∑ j =k +1 λ j Aδj
J

J

• λ1 sht1+II1 + λ 2 sht2+1II ≤ λ1 sht1+I1 + λ 2 sht2+1I
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∀t ∈ [r ,τ 1 − 1] .

(133')

∀t ∈ [r ,τ 1 − 1] ,

(134)

which also reduces to relation (133').
• λ1 sht1+II1 + λ2 sht2+1II + K + λk shtk+1II ≤ λ1 sht1+I1 + λ2 sht2+1I + K + λk shtk+1I
∀t ∈ [r ,τ 1 − 1] ,

(135)

similarly being true on the basis of relation (133').
• λ1 sht1+II1 + K + λ k shtk+1II + λ k +1 shtk++11 II ≤ λ1 sht1+I1 + K + λ k shtk+1I + λk +1 shtk++11 I
∀t ∈ [r ,τ 1 − 1] ,

(136)

which reads into
k
k +1
k

hmin ∑ λ j + λk +1 Akδ+1 H tII 1−δ ≤ ∑ λ j  hmin ∑ λ j + H tII 1−δ
j =1
j =1
j =1


J

∑λ
j = k +1

j


Aδj 


∀t ∈ [r ,τ 1 − 1] .

(136')

• λ1 sht1+II1 + K + λ k shtk+1II + K + λ J shtJ+1II ≤ λ1 sht1+I1 + K + λ k shtk+1I + K + λ J shtJ+1I
∀t ∈ [r ,τ 1 − 1] .

(137)

whose validation can be much too easily proved (each side equals unity).
In the last stage of development, l ≡ J − k + 1 , educational investment is consistent
with optimal incentives for the array of all types of individuals. Along this equilibrium
state, the various classes of agents earn the following share of aggregate output
sht j+1l = Aδj

∑

J
j =1

j ∈ [1, J ] , ∀t ∈ [τ n , ∞ ) .

λ j Aδj

(138)

We establish that distribution sh tII+1 is characterized by greater income inequality in terms
of Lorenz superiority compared to the income distribution of the last phase of
development, sh lt +1 . As it is known, the proof entails the following requirements
∀t ∈ [τ n , ∞ ) ,

• λ1 sht1+II1 ≤ λ1 sht1+l1

(139)

which is satisfied upon the truth of the following relation

{

hmin ∑ j =1 λ j Aδj ≤ A1δ hmin ∑ j =1 λ j + H tII 1−δ ∑ j =k +1 λ j Aδj
J

k

J
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}

∀t ∈ [τ n , ∞ ) .

(139')

It must further be met
∀t ∈ [τ n , ∞ ) ,

λ1 sht1+II1 + λ2 sht2+1II ≤ λ1 sht1+l1 + λ2 sht2+1l

•

(140)

being validated on the basis of the condition

(λ1 + λ2 )hmin ∑Jj =1 λ j Aδj

){

≤ λ1 A1δ + λ 2 A2δ hmin ∑ j =1 λ j + H tII 1−δ ∑ j =k +1 λ j Aδj

(

k

J

}

∀t ∈ [τ n , ∞ ) .

(140')

• λ1 sht1+II1 + λ2 sht2+1II + K + λ k shtk+1II ≤ λ1 sht1+l1 + λ2 sht2+1l + K + λk shtk+1l
∀t ∈ [τ n , ∞ ) ,

(141)

being equivalent to

{

hmin ∑ j =1 λ j ∑ j =1 λ j Aδj ≤ ∑ j =1 λ j Aδj hmin ∑ j =1 λ j + H tII 1−δ ∑ j =k +1 λ j Aδj
k

J

k

k

J

}

∀t ∈ [τ n , ∞ ) .

(141')

• λ1 sht1+II1 + K + λ k shtk+1II + λ k +1 shtk++11 II ≤ λ1 sht1+l1 + K + λ k shtk+1l + λ k +1 shtk++11 l
∀t ∈ [τ n , ∞ ) ,

(142)

implying
k

 J
k +1
k
J
δ
δ
δ
II 1−δ
II 1−δ
h
λ Aδ ,
 min ∑ λ j + λk +1 Ak +1 H t
∑ j =1 λ j A j ≤ ∑ j =1 λ j A j hmin ∑ j =1 λ j + H t
∑
j = k +1 j j
j =1



{

}

∀t ∈ [τ n , ∞ ) .

(142')

Lastly,
• λ1 sht1+II1 + K + λ k shtk+1II + K + λ J −1 shtJ+−11 II ≤ λ1 sht1+l1 + K + λk shtk+1l + K + λ J −1 shtJ+1l
∀t ∈ [τ n , ∞ ) ,

(143)

which yields

{h

min

∑

λ + H tII 1−δ ∑ j = k +1 λ j Aδj
j =1 j

k

J −1

}∑

{

λ Aδ ≤ ∑ j =1 λ j Aδj hmin ∑ j =1 λ j + H tII 1−δ ∑ j =k +1 λ j Aδj
j =1 j j
J −1

J
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k

J

}

∀t ∈ [τ n , ∞ ) .

(143')

The reader may find the Kuznets curve of this version of the model in the Appendix.
VII. Less stringent punishment scheme
In this section we pursue an extension of the model in which individual consumption
in old age is expanded to include a fixed retirement income. By assumption, all economic
agents receive the same real endowment, irrespective of one’s educational status. The
objective underlying this approach is to determine the ability of the economy to sustain
the existence of a private credit market in the education area when the punishment
scheme is effectively weakened. This is examined by actually rendering default less
costly (whereas previously V E , D ( j ) → −∞ , in the present case V E , D ( j ) > 0 ). We show
that a market for education loans may be privately sustained in this context, albeit at the
cost of stricter conditions.
The budget constraint in the last period of life is modified to be
c3jt + 2 = ω 3 + R s 2jt +1 ,

(144)

where ω 3 denotes the endowment in real units. Adopting the utility function of
logarithmic form (7), optimal saving is now expressed as

(

s 2jt∗+1

)

 (1 − β )R Aδj H t1−δ − R q − β ω3

R

=
 (1 − β )R hmin − β ω 3

R


if q > 0
∀j = L, H .

(145)

if q = 0

Upon substitution of the saving function (145) into the budget constraints (5'') and (144),
we obtain the optimal second- and third-period consumption, respectively given by

{(

c

j∗
2t + 2

)

 β R Aδj H t1−δ − R q + ω 3

R

=
 β {R hmin + ω 3 }

R


}

if q > 0
∀j ∈ {L, H }.
if q = 0
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(146)

c

j∗
3t + 2

{(

)

(1 − β ) R Aδj H t1−δ − R q + ω 3

=
(1 − β )(R hmin + ω 3 )

}

if q > 0

∀j ∈ {L, H } .

(147)

if q = 0

State of underdevelopment Given that a member of generation t receives education
her intertemporal consumption if she chooses to default is described by equations

β (R Aδj H t1−δ + ω 3 )

(c )

=

(c )

= (1 − β ) R Aδj H t1−δ + ω 3

j ∗ WR , D
2 t +1

R

∀j ∈ {L, H },

(148)

)

(149)

and
WR , D
j∗
3t + 2

(

∀j ∈ {L, H } ,

When remaining loyal to contract commitment optimal adult- and old-age consumption is
given by, respectively

β {R (Aδj H t1−δ − R q ) + ω 3 }

(c )

=

(c )

= (1 − β ) R Aδj H t1−δ − R q + ω 3

j ∗ ND
2 t +1

q > 0 , ∀j ∈ {L, H } ,

R

(150)

and
ND
j∗
3t + 2

(

where cνj t∗+1

)

WR , ND

{(

(

= cνj t∗+1

)

SR , ND

)

(

≡ cνj t∗+1

)

ND

}

q > 0 , ∀j ∈ {L, H } ,

(151)

for ν = 2, 3. Evidently, utility is higher when

evading debt obligations due to higher second-period consumption, and because agents
can still engage in intertemporal smoothing through saving. Hence,
VtWR , D ( j ) > Vt ND ( j )

q > 0 , ∀j ∈ {L, H } ,

(152)

where
VtWR , D ( j ) = ln ϑ R Aδj H t1−δ + ω 3

{(

)}

{( (

)

∀j ∈ {L, H } ,

(153)

and
Vt E , ND ( j ) = ln ϑ R Aδj H t1−δ − R q + ω 3

)}
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q > 0 , ∀j ∈ {L, H } ,

(154)

1− β

with ϑ ≡ β β (1 − β )

R β . Obviously, it applies VtWR , ND ( j ) = Vt SR , ND ( j ) ≡ Vt E , ND ( j )

∀ j = L, H . The conclusion is reached that an individual who acquires education shall

always commit default on her debt. Were one to receive no education she would earn the
unskilled income hmin , and hence lifetime utility
Vt NE ( j ) ≡ Vt NE = ln [ϑ (R hmin + ω 3 )] ∀j ∈ {L, H } .

(155)

Drawing upon Assumption 1, we infer that remaining unskilled is never the preferred
choice. It is evident that
VtWR , D ( j ) > Vt NE

∀j ∈ {L, H }

(156)

Similarly to the core version (where ω 3 = 0 ) the model predicts that financial institutions
engage in no educational funding as a result of the expected lack of commitment on part
of borrowers. Once again, owing to the rationing of all credit, the entire population
remains uneducated earning the minimum income of unskilled labor. On the assumption
that a system of weak legal rights prevails in each period of the time interval t ∈ [0, r − 1] ,
r > 0 , the equilibrium path has the characteristics of a poverty trap
ytj+1 = ht j+1 = hmin

∀j ∈ {L, H }, ∀t ∈ [0, r − 1] .

(157)

The competitive outcome along this equilibrium path prescribes that the economy
produces the time-invariant quantity
Yt +NE1 = H tNE
+1 = hmin ,

(158)

where we recall y 0j ≡ y 0 = hmin , ∀ j , thus Y0 = hmin .
A segment of the society invests Once again, we take as our basis that effective on
period t = r , r > 1 , legislation entitles creditors to seize the entire assets of a debtor in
default, effectively prohibiting the latter from any act of saving as time unfolds.
The contract design elicits promise-keeping behavior for the high-type agent only
insofar as
Vt E , ND ( j ) > Vt SR , D ( j )

for j = H , ∀t ≥ r + 1 .
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(159)

The present utility value associated with repudiating on one’s debt is given by

{(

Vt SR , D ( j ) = ln A δj H t1−δ

)ω
β

1− β
3

}

∀j = L, H , ∀t ≥ r + 1 .

(160)

Drawing upon equation (154), there results that the following condition must be imposed

ϑ {R (AHδ H t1−δ − R q ) + ω 3 } > (AHδ H t1−δ ) ω31− β
β

∀t ≥ r + 1 .

(159')

Taking as our basis Assumption 2, we note again that relation (159) cannot possibly hold
for the low-type agents, since the logarithmic function V E , ND ( j ) is non-definable on a
negative argument. Insofar as the only possibility is to renege on the agreement, the
household attains the utility level associated with no consumption smoothing. V E , ND (L )
in effect degenerates to individual welfare V SR , D (L ) . We quote the proposition
Proposition 18 The contract arrangement (q, R) offered in a system where borrowers
have no access to savings opportunities conditional on default may be supported as a selfenforcing contract. Granting the feasibility of loan repayment, if consumption in old age
falls not below the fixed threshold ω 3 , constraint (159') is required in order for borrowers
to renege not on agreed obligations.
The following theorem is proved without difficulty
Proposition 19 A private credit market for human capital investment is sustainable if and
only if
• Given the feasibility of loan repayment agents seeking credit are offered a selfenforcing contract.
• Individuals for whom debt repayment is non-feasible prefer to receive no education.
Proof
• We have established that upon the validity of relationship (159'), high-ability agents
optimally choose to adhere to the contract agreement.
• The second necessary condition requires that low ability agents optimally choose to
remain unskilled. On the basis of a plausible condition, it holds that low-type agents
indeed prefer to earn the low income of unskilled labor, while maintaining their ability to
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enhance consumption in the retirement age beyond the fixed endowment ω 3 . The
optimality condition states:
Vt NE > Vt E , D (L )

∀t ≥ r + 1 .

(161)

Upon invoking equations (155) and (160), we obtain that the following hypothesis must
be imposed:

ϑ (R hmin + ω 3 ) > (ALδ H t1−δ ) ω 31− β
β

∀t ≥ r + 1 .

(161')

We conclude this section with the following proposition:
Proposition 20 A competitive equilibrium with a subset of population acquiring privately
financed education exists on the condition of occurrence of the following requirements
• The measure of high-type agents optimally chooses to obtain education.
• The credit market is privately sustainable.
• Individual savings is non-negative for both H and L types.
Proof
•

The measure of high-type agents is induced to participate in the contract

arrangement if the following condition is met
Vt E , ND (H ) > Vt NE

∀t ≥ r .

(162)

which, upon invoking equations (154) and (155), translates into
AHδ H t1−δ > R q + hmin

∀t ≥ r .

(162')

Evaluated in period t = r , we have
1−δ
AHδ hmin
> R q + hmin .

(162'')

Evidently, it suffices to impose relationship (162'') to ensure the validity of (162') in all
forthcoming periods, t > r .
•

In light of Proposition 19, the human capital credit market is privately sustainable

upon the validity of Assumption 2, as well as conditions (159') and (161').
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•

The individual rationality constraint for financial entities entails that saving be

positive for both types of individuals, which reads into the conditions
AHδ H t1−δ ≥ R q +

β ω3
(1 − β )R

∀t ≥ r .

(163)

and
hmin ≥

β ω3
(1 − β )R

∀t ≥ r .

(164)

The proof of Proposition 20 consists of imposing Assumption 2(β), and relations (159'),
(161'), (162'') and (164). The truth of the remaining conditions is then logically
inferred.
The dynamic evolution of the society’s stock of human capital along the
aforementioned equilibrium path is governed by the first-order non-linear difference
equation (30). Similarly to the baseline model, the solution to the linear version is given
by the expressions (31).
All types invest Due to perpetual growth the stock of aggregate knowledge reaches a
critical threshold, above which individuals of both types have an optimal incentive to
invest. Similarly to the core version of the model, we establish this proposition for the
case of the linear human capital technology. A restatement of Proposition 4 reads as
follows
Proposition 21 There exists a time period τˆ > 0 , where τˆ ∈ [r + 1, ∞ ) , in which the
income realization of educated low-type agents exceeds the threshold level that defines
education the optimal choice. Mathematically, this reads into
≥ R q + hmin
ALδ H t1−δ 
< R q + hmin

∀ t ∈ [τˆ, ∞ )
∀ t ∈ [0,τˆ − 1]

.

Considering the linear human capital technology, τˆ is defined as
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(165)

 ln[Θ]
if λ AH > 1
 ln[λ A ] ,
H

τˆ = 
,
 R q + hmin (1 − AL )
 A h (1 − λ ) , if λ AH = 1
L min

with Θ ≡

(166)

(R q + hmin )(1 − λ AH ) − AL hmin (1 − λ ) .
AL hmin λ (1 − AH )

The condition that defines education the optimal choice (relation 162), is written as
ALδ H t1−δ ≥ R q + hmin .

(165')

This is identical to the corresponding condition in the baseline version of the model

(ω3 = 0 ) . It is only evident that the two versions imply identical solutions for the critical
time period τ , hence τ = τˆ . The proof of the theorem being identical to that of
Proposition 4 is here omitted.
Proposition 1 is rephrased in our context to read as follows
Proposition 22 The contract arrangement (q, R) offered in a system where borrowers
have no access to savings opportunities conditional on default, may be supported as a
self-enforcing contract. Granting the feasibility of loan repayment for all types of agents,
conditions (167') ought to be imposed in order for borrowers to renege not on agreed
obligations.
Proof
The feasibility of loan repayment is ensured for both types of agents under the fulfillment
of relation (165'). It goes without saying, then, that V E , ND ( j ) is a definable function, and
positive for both H and L types (see equation 154). The contract arrangement (q, R) is
self-enforcing for agents of both ability levels on condition that relation (159) applies for
∀j ∈ {L, H }. Evidently, this reads into

ϑ {R (ALδ H t1−δ − R q ) + ω 3 } > (ALδ H t1−δ ) ω31− β

∀t ≥ r + 1 ,

(167α)

ϑ {R (AHδ H t1−δ − R q ) + ω 3 } > (AHδ H t1−δ ) ω31− β

∀t ≥ r + 1 ,

(167β)

β

β
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The theorem logically follows:
Proposition 23 The credit market for educational investment is privately sustainable in
each and all time periods t ∈ [τˆ, ∞ ) given the validity of condition (165'), and optimality
constraints (167).
The proof of existence of the equilibrium in which the entire population invests is
enclosed in the following proposition
Proposition 24 A competitive equilibrium where the entire population acquires privately
financed education exists on the condition of occurrence of the following requirements
• Both types make the optimal decision to invest in individual improvement.
• The credit market is privately sustainable.
• Individual saving is non-negative for both H and L types.
Proof
•

The participation constraint for the borrower side entails that condition (162)

applies for both types of agents. This translates into
Aδj H t1−δ > R q + hmin

∀ j = L, H ,

(168)

which is reducible to the optimality condition (165').
•

Drawing on Proposition 24, we assert that the financial market for human capital

investment is privately sustainable upon the validity of optimality conditions (165'), and
(167α, β).
•

Loan provision ought to be individually rational for credit institutions, which

implies the conditions

(

s 2jt∗+1 = (1 − β ) Aδj H t1−δ − R q

)

∀j ∈ {L, H }, ∀ t ∈ [τˆ, ∞ ) .

(169)

It is evident that individual saving is strictly positive for both types on the basis of
optimality condition (165'). In summary, the proof of this proposition requires the
validity of optimality conditions (165'), and (167α, β).
As in the core version of the model, the dynamic evolution of the economy’s
aggregate stock of knowledge is governed by the non-linear difference equation (42). The
74

solution to the linear case is given by equations (43). An analysis on income distribution
is omitted here due to being identical to that of the benchmark version (see Section IV).
VIII. Concluding remarks
Let us cast a glance backward on the course of this essay. We sought to construct a
theory which in a novel way lends truth to the proposition formed by Kuznets (1955),
with respect to the non-monotonic relationship between prosperity and inequality of
income distribution. Our attention centered on the role of financial markets in defining
the process of economic development, and ultimately the distribution of income earning
capabilities in a population of ex ante heterogeneous individuals. If the roots of
development lie in human capital accumulation, the possibility to fund educational
choices through private credit organizations is critical in its own right. The theory
abstracts from the possibility of education be publicly provided, and of alternative means
of financing human capital investment, through wealth possessions or forms of inherited
bequests. Owing to this confinement it is a consequence of the failure of the credit market
that individuals may be entirely barred from productive educational choices. In this
circumstance, the potential for differing earning productivities remains unrealized, with
all workers being trapped in the choice of a single low-income occupation, and therefore
identical earnings. The provision of credit in this market is hindered by one-sided lack of
commitment, and particular enforcement issues embedded in the area of educational
investment. Contract enforcement hinging on the nature of consequences following an act
of default ultimately is a matter of the legislative system. In the tradition of Kehoe and
Levine (1993) we assume that legislation accommodates the complete and permanent
exclusion of defaulting borrowers from financial markets. The prospect of being
prohibited to invest in tangible assets induces agents to choose commitment to previous
agreements. Contract arrangements thus become enforceable, leading credit institutions
to eagerly engage in educational funding. This is the critical requirement for the economy
to be carried on a dynamic path of ever sustained growth, escaping a poverty loophole.
We trace out paths of development so constructed as to give an explicit proof of the
trickle-down theory of economic growth. Initially, an equilibrium is taken to exist in
which a particular group of individuals, those with the highest investment return, only
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choose to engage in education. Owing to the accumulation of human capital and the
associated externality on future generations’ knowledge productivity, the economy
ultimately makes its transition to a state where the aggregate of all agents invest in
individual improvement. As endogenous technological knowledge takes off, the
externality effect arising from knowledge spillovers gives rise to inverted-U dynamics in
the evolution of income distribution. A pattern of worsening inequality prevails in early
stages of growth. However, as dynamics bring the economy on a more evolved stage,
income differentials appear to shrink. Income convergence is established to be the signal
that an advanced level of development has been attained.
Following the mainstream tradition, our enquiry on the dynamic pattern of wage
income distribution was accommodated in the context of a deterministic theory. Implicit
in our model is the assumption that no unpredictable change ever occurs, or at least
economic agents believe that it doesn’t. Consequently, the study remains silent about the
impact of uncertainty on the actions of individual agents, and thus on the dynamics of the
system. A model denying that economic variables may be inherently unpredictable leaves
valid questions quite unanswered, thus weakening the position of proven theorems. An
endeavor sought in future work is to extend the existing analysis in a way that uncertainty
is embedded into investment decisions in human capital.
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ESSAY II
Money’s Role in Determining Long-Run Growth*
*The present essay was written under the supervision of Dr. Mohammed Mohsin, during
the academic semester of spring 2004, at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville. The
research analysis is the product of the author’s collaborated work with Dr. Mohsin. The
literature review in this essay (introductory section pp.81-103) is the sole work of the
author of the doctoral dissertation, written and edited at a later time.

Introduction
Theme and outline of the essay This essay constitutes a contribution in the theoretical
research elaborating on the importance of monetary policy in determining an economy’s
long run growth prospects. Exploiting the developments in the theory of endogenous
growth, perpetual unbounded growth is sustained upon the accumulation of a broad
concept of capital, encompassing both physical and human notions. In a framework of
endogenously determined growth it is possible to analyze the effects of economic policy
on the growth rate of aggregate real variables. At this level, the analysis departs from the
traditional approach in the literature, which had been to focus on the impact of monetary
policy on the steady state levels of real economic aggregates. Theorists in the monetary
literature concentrated early on, on how developments in financial intermediation by
imposing a role for money in the payment system, in essence define the way monetary
policy exerts its influence on the real economy. In an influential paper, Stockman (1981)
proposed that when a credit market for consumption and capital goods is missing,
distortionary monetary policy interacts with private capital decisions, causing investment,
and real output to fall at a lower steady state level. The crucial feature of the model that
generates this result is that money is required to purchase capital in addition to
consumption goods. In this case investment is taxed twice; once through the effect of
inflation on current capital purchases, and secondly, through the impact of future inflation
on future consumption spending. However, if money is not required in transactions
involving capital, then there is a gain from additional investment in the form of lower
current money holdings that offsets the lower utility yield from investment due to higher
future inflation. In this case, the superneutrality proposition reclaims validity on
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theoretical ground. A number of authors dealt thoroughly with the applicability of
Stockman’s (1981) argument in the context of endogenous growth, and this is the area
this study belongs as well. Relying on different mechanisms -Jones and Manuelli (1993),
Marquis and Reffett (1995) and De Gregorio (1993) specify different applications of the
investment channel within the context of constant-returns-to scale equilibrium growth,
whereas Marquis and Reffett (1991a) employ a human capital channel- they all get across
the same idea: distortionary monetary policy affects the prospects of growth negatively.
Thus, the cited studies all bring a valid argument in favor of the nonneutrality of money;
the latter yet, is established in the context of closed-economy settings. Herein lays the
contribution of the following research essay. The analysis is carried with reference to an
economy being open, yet a price taker in the international capital markets. The aim is
once again to examine the theoretical validity of Stockman’s (1981) argument in the
context of equilibrium growth remains.
It goes without saying that when credit markets do not function perfectly, or are entirely
missing, money is assigned the role of the primary, or sole, medium of exchange. We
postulate that the possibility of intermediated credit does not exist, the intention of the
assumption being to uncover the role of inflation as tax on private spending. Initially, the
postulate applies on purchases of consumption goods only. In an alternative version of
the model (titled Model II) the investment on capital goods is also being subjected to the
constraint that cash holdings are the only means of conducting the transaction. In this
latter case, inflation bears an evident analogy to a capital tax. The theory been
constructed thus gives us an insight into how inflation is been conceived to imitating
fiscal tax instruments.
To elucidate the consequences of endogenously determined labor, the theory is initially
built on models that abstract from the decision to allocate time between leisure and other
productive activities. Using a model of inelastic labor to analyze the consequences of
policy changes may prove limiting, since a tax on consumption and wage income operate
as non-distortionary taxes in such an environment. Further, there is merit in the task itself
of exploring how the decision to allocate time between various activities interacts with
the intertemporal allocation of consumption to determine the dynamic and long-term
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growth behavior of an economy. The analysis is been extended to account for the
endogeneity of the time-allocation decision in the latter part of this essay (titled Models
III and IV).46
A word about the essay’s arrangement. The following section presents an elaborate
review of the literature on monetary growth theory. The subsequent section proceeds with
the exposition of the research analysis, comprising of the aforementioned (four)
analytical models. A brief discussion in the end takes the role of final conclusion.
Theory of money and growth The effects of monetary growth on the real side of the
economy have been the subject of research of an enormous amount of the theoretical
literature in macroeconomics. This literature starts with the classic contributions of Tobin
(1965), and Sidrauski (1967). Using the framework of the conventional exogenous
growth model, Tobin emphasized the portfolio substitution effect, according to which
agents, as a result of higher inflation, reallocate their savings in favor of capital and away
from nominal assets. Thus, he argued that monetary growth, and therefore inflation, is
positively related to the economy’s long run capital stock. Sidrauski (1967) took up the
same question by developing a model where savings and money demand functions are
derived from the optimizing behavior of agents, rather than being postulated and held
fixed as in Tobin’s framework. The major path through which money affects the
workings of the economy in the Tobin model is through its effect on the real disposable
income, which in turn determines the consumption (or equivalently savings) behavior of
the individuals [Levhari and Patinkin, 1968, p.714]. In Sidrauski’s model, it is assumed
that expectations are adaptive; in other words, they are induced from the past history of
changes of the relevant variables, and when they do not materialize individuals partially
revise them. The model concludes that the long-run stock of capital depends only on the
latter’s depreciation rate, the population’s growth rate, and the representative agent’s
subjective discount rate. Thus, money is found to be superneutral in the sense that the
steady state capital stock is independent of changes in the rate of money growth and
inflation. Fischer (1979) complemented the work of Sidrauski by examining whether the
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The last two models differ with respect to the exchange function of money, in the same vein as Models I
and II respectively.
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superneutrality result obtains also on the transition path towards the long run equilibrium.
He found that even in the original Sidrauski model, the path the economy takes to the
steady state is not invariant to the rate of monetary growth. The Tobin effect may prevail
at every point along the transition path but the steady state.
The subsequent literature evolved in several directions with the main aim to analyze
the robustness of the superneutrality result in different frameworks. Brock (1974)
extended Sidrauski’s work by developing an intertemporal optimizing growth model
where expectations are endogenously determined so that perfect foresight obtains. In
addition, labor supply is no longer assumed to be perfectly inelastic, as is the case in
Sidrauski’s model. Brock showed that the neutrality result is challenged as long as the
marginal utility of consumption and leisure are not independent of money, which, he
argues is a plausible assumption.
The superneutrality result is contingent on the assumption of Ricardian debt
neutrality, which in Sidrauski’s model is ensured by assuming an infinite planning
horizon of the economic unit, in other words the birth and death rates are zero. In order to
depart from debt neutrality one has to assume that there is entry of new generations in the
model and that there is no operational bequest motive, so that the burden of government
debt can be passed on to future generations. A number of studies have analyzed the
effects of macroeconomic policies in a framework where debt neutrality does not apply.
Weil (1986) obtains non-neutrality of money in a model of population growth. Marini
and Van der Ploeg (1988) developed a model of finite lifetimes and no intergenerational
bequest motive. They assume that the birth and death rates are the same in order to
abstract from population growth. Considering the effects of monetary policy under a taxfinance regime, they show that an increase in monetary growth leads in the long run to an
increase in capital, output and consumption of physical goods. This effect is very similar
to the Tobin effect, yet it is derived from a general equilibrium model with micro
foundations. All of the above papers discuss the effects of monetary growth on capital
accumulation in closed economy settings. Van der Ploeg (1991) takes the same issue in
the context of a two-country optimizing model with uncertain lifetimes, population
growth and no intergenerational bequest motive. His findings support the link between
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Ricardian debt neutrality and Sidrauski superneutrality. More specifically, as long as the
birth rate is positive, both joint and unilateral increases in tax-financed monetary growth
lead to global increases in capital accumulation and output. The main result of this paper
is therefore to provide a micro foundation for the Tobin effect.
Several earlier theorists concentrated on the question of how the way money is
introduced into a model affects the predicted relationship between money growth and
capital. Generally speaking there are several alternatives to introduce money into an
optimizing model: the money-in-the-utility function, the money-in-the-production
function approach, the transactions-costs and cash-in-advance approaches. Examples of
the first approach are Sidrauski (1967), Brock (1974), and Fischer (1979) among others.
The sensitivity of the superneutrality result has also been examined within the money
in the production-function framework. One of the pioneering studies in this context is
Levhari and Patinkin (1968). Using the conventional neoclassical growth model where
money provides productive services, they show that superneutrality does not prevail in
the level sense. The money-in-the-production-function approach, as is also emphasized
by Fischer (1974), essentially recognizes the role of money as a medium of exchange:
real money balances provide ‘shopping services’ in the sense that they enable the
economic unit in question to acquire a quantity of commodities. In this way, at an
economy-wide level, real balances free resources –labor and capital- for the production of
commodities that would otherwise be devoted to sustaining the exchange system in an
economy without money. This is the exact meaning lying behind the introduction of
money in the production function. Real balances are not described as a factor because
they directly increase physical production but rather because they free resources that
would otherwise be tied up in transactions. The real effects of alternative rates of
inflation have also been analyzed in a similar framework by Dornbusch and Frenkel
(1973). Although the interpretation of the role of money in their model is the same, real
money balances do not enter directly the production function of physical output, but that
of ‘delivered’ consumption [Dornbusch and Frenkel, 1973 p.152]. The fraction of output
that reflects the real costs of ‘delivering’ output to consumers is assumed to be a

81

decreasing function of real balances, since by definition, the latter are a substitute for the
real resources needed to sustain transactions.
Incorporating money in the utility or the production function have been two widely
used approaches in the literature of monetary models. One of their main advantages is the
generality they bring in producing a demand for money. The use of money in these
models is essentially postulated, or better imposed, sometimes even arbitrarily. In this
spirit, Clower (1967) has criticized the money-in-the-utility approach that it does not
yield a theory where money plays a special role in transactions. In the same vein,
Kareken and Wallace (1980) have opposed at the implicit theorizing that takes place in
this approach and have argued that underlying consistency cannot be checked. The lack
of microfoundations in the use of money was a source of discomfort for many
macroeconomists. In response, a number of studies pursued models in which the reasons
for the use of money are explicitly described, so that the demand for money emerges
from within the model.
Early on, in a seminal study, Saving (1971) objecting to the use of money as an
argument in the utility function attempted to ‘remedy’ this issue by developing a model
of transactions costs. The key feature of the transactions technology is that a scarce
resource, the agent’s time, is used up in transacting. This implies that any change in the
economic environment that alters the time spent in transacting directly alters the
resources available for work and leisure. What motivates the agent to hold money in this
framework is that the transactions time required for each unit of consumption depends
negatively on the ratio of real money holdings to his nominal consumption expenditure. It
is evident that on this foundation the demand for money is derived from within the
model, through the optimizing decisions of the economic agent. Using a similar model,
where money balances reduce the costs of transactions, Kimbrough (1986) examined the
real effects of an inflationary policy. His model predicts an inverse relationship between
inflation and both output and employment, in the level sense. However, due to its
analytical difficulty, his model focuses on the analysis of employment and abstracts from
capital accumulation. Wang and Yip (1991) fill this gap by developing a tractable
shopping-time model of money with capital and endogenous labor-leisure choice which
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enables them to examine the effects of money growth on both employment and capital
accumulation. It is shown that higher rates of money growth have a negative effect on the
economy’s long run capital stock, employment level, consumption and welfare.
One popular alternative to the transactions cost approach that is often used to
motivate a transactions-based demand for money is the cash-in-advance constraint. This
is an extreme case of the transactions cost technology described above (the time spent
transacting is a decreasing function of the ratio of real balances to consumption
expenditure) where the transactions costs are infinite when the ratio of real balances to
consumption is smaller than one, and zero otherwise. The cash-in-advance type constraint
most commonly adopted in monetary models, and as has been advocated by Clower
(1967), states that nominal consumption in the current period cannot exceed nominal
money balances carried over from the previous period. An economy with this feature in
the money-and-growth literature has been studied by Stockman (1981). In his model, he
incorporates into the conventional exogenous growth model the constraint that the
individual must be able to finance his purchases of consumption and gross investment out
of his current-period money balances. The model reaches the different and surprising –for
the time- result that a permanent increase in the rate of monetary growth leads to a
decrease in the steady state capital stock. The crucial feature of the model that generates
this result is that money is required to purchase capital in addition to consumption goods.
In this case investment is taxed twice; once through the effect of inflation on current
capital purchases, and second, through the impact of future inflation on future
consumption spending. However, if money is not required in transactions involving
capital, then there is a gain from additional investment in the form of lower current
money holdings that offsets the lower utility yield from investment due to higher future
inflation. In this case, it is shown that the steady state capital stock is neutral with respect
to higher inflation.47 Abel (1985) examined the dynamic behavior of the economy along
the linearized transition path in Stockman’s model, in the same way Fischer (1979)
analyzed the transition path in the Sidrauski (1967) model. In particular, he focused on
47

This is not identical with the result obtained in Sidrauski’s (1967) model because in the later the steady
state real money balances fall as a result of higher monetary growth, while in the present model they remain
unchanged.
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the effect of a permanent (unanticipated) increase in monetary growth on the speed of
adjustment of the economy towards the steady state. In the case where cash is required in
advance for consumption but not for investment purchases, it is shown that money is
superneutral along the transition path as well as in the long run. If the cash-in-advance
constraint applies to both consumption and investment, Abel finds that the dynamic
behavior of the economy is not independent of the rate of monetary growth. The effect on
the speed of adjustment, however, can differ dramatically depending on a certain simple
function of parameters of preferences and technology. An extension to Abel’s work
(1985) has been provided by Carmichael (1989). The latter’s contribution lies in the fact
that he further examines the effects of perfectly anticipated monetary policy, whereas
Abel is limited to the effects of unexpected changes in the rate of monetary growth. In
addition, since his primary interest is to characterize co-movements between output,
interest rates, and stock-market prices he abstracts completely from capital accumulation,
which is the main consideration in Abel’s model. Using a model with endogenous labor
supply and money introduced via a cash-in-advance constraint, Carmichael shows that an
unanticipated increase in the growth rate of money supply induces agents to substitute
leisure for consumption, leading to a negative effect on output. An anticipated increase in
the money growth rate has similar real effects by influencing, in this case, inflationary
expectations alone.
A different response to the dissatisfaction at the arbitrary use of money in macro
models came by Feenstra (1986). In his seminal study, Feenstra (1986) showed that there
exists an exact equivalence between a general class of models with liquidity costs
appearing in the budget constraint and the money-in-the-utility framework. 48 The former
class of models captures many of the conventional models of money demand as special
cases, such as the Baumol (1952) and Tobin (1956) transactions models, generalized
transactions and precautionary models49, the cash-in-advance and money-in-the-
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Dornbusch and Frenkel (1973) were the first to develop a comparison between the approaches where the
demand for real money balances is assumed, pioneered by Tobin (1965), and the money-in-the-utility
framework initiated by Sidrauski (1967). The equivalence between these two approaches was first
indicated by a simple example in Brock (1974).
49
In this class of models money is held to finance consumption and there are penalty costs associated with
a cash shortfall.
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production-function framework. The last is treated as a case of negative liquidity costs.
Using the studies of Calvo (1979) and Obstfeld (1984) which investigate multiple stable
equilibria in a monetary growth model, Feenstra demonstrates the equivalence between
the approaches of entering money in the production and utility function. Proceeding with
the case of cash-in-advance constraints, he shows that models that adopt the Clower
(1967) constraint that consumption purchases should be financed by money holdings
carried over from the previous period, have similar qualitative properties to models where
real balances enter as an argument in the utility function and the cross derivative of the
latter between goods and money is positive. This result is significant since it is generally
known that the sign of this derivative affects the properties of monetary equilibria. The
main insight drawn from Feenstra’s study is that the superneutrality result obtained by
Sidrauski (1967), and others, in optimizing models gains additional validity.
Theory of endogenous growth The studies that we discussed so far all build on the
neoclassical theory of economic growth as was developed by Robert Solow (1956). A
volume of literature evolved in the 1960s as a response to Solow’s (1956) seminal paper
aiming to explore variations of the latter. These models are consistent with the premise
that the forces that drive economic growth are technology and population growth, with
the former taking the leading role. Technological change provides the incentive for
continued capital accumulation, and together, capital accumulation and technological
change account for much of the increase in output [Romer, 1990 p.72]. The vehicle
through which technological progress contributes to growth is its accumulative effect on
the economy’s stock of knowledge. Knowledge, through its nonrival50 character,
possesses the important feature that it can be accumulated without bound on a per capita
basis, thus making possible the occurrence of sustainable growth.
Formally, the standard approach is to incorporate into the production process a
separate argument that represents the stock of technological knowledge or more
generally, the level of nonrival inputs. The issue that arises in this case, where the
nonrival input has a productive value, is that the production technology cannot be a

50

A purely nonrival good has the property that its use by one firm or person in no way precludes or limits
its use by another.
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constant-returns-to-scale function of all its inputs taken together. Because of the
properties of homogeneous functions it follows that a firm with these kinds of production
possibilities could not survive as a price taker, since if all inputs –including technologywere paid their value marginal product, the firm would suffer losses [Romer, 1990 p.76].
The neoclassical growth literature dealt with this issue by treating technology as a public
input that is exogenous to the economy (Solow 1956) or is provided by the government
(Shell 1966, 1967). Technology is viewed in these models as a purely nonrival and
nonexcludable input, whose stock is free to be exploited at zero cost by every individual
and firm in the economy.
Clearly, treating the technological factor as public good has the virtue of reconciling
the non-convexity in the production possibilities with price-taking behavior. On the other
hand, the exogenous specification of technological progress is a technically useful device
that offers coherence to a theory of growth that nonetheless does not attempt to analyze
the source of technical change.51 The latter neglect constitutes a major shortcoming of the
neoclassical theory of growth. As Lucas (2002) emphasizes
“Treating exogenous technical change as an engine of growth… is a partial
equilibrium argument that simply evades the question of the source of
technical change”.
He then adds
“In growth theory, exogenous technological change is just a euphemism for
unanalyzed production externalities” [Lucas, 2002 pp.6-7].
A second weakness of the neoclassical growth theory, which evidently follows from its
aim not to explain the accumulation of knowledge, is that there is no place in it for
individual purposeful behavior in the growth process [Romer, 1990 p.76]. It is
undoubtedly true that the creation of knowledge in society is the product of intentional
investment of resources to inventive activities on the part of profit-maximizing firms and
entrepreneurs (Romer 1990, Grossman and Helpman 1994). An early reaction to this
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The exogenous specification of the accumulation of knowledge eliminates the need to incorporate
external effects into growth theory. Therefore it provides a framework where of optimal and competitive
equilibrium paths are equivalent (Lucas, 2002).
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unsatisfactory situation came from Kenneth Arrow in 1962, with his innovative work on
learning-by-doing. In his work, he attempts to provide a theory of knowledge creation,
and to incorporate the latter into a growth model such that steady technological change
emerges endogenously from the dynamics of the model. Arrow based his argument on
two established premises: The first is that learning is the product of experience.
Knowledge is acquired through the attempt to ‘solve a problem’, and therefore takes
place only during activity (Arrow 1962, p.155). The second premise involves the
existence of diminishing returns during a subject’s attempt to solve the same problem
repeatedly. For any given stimulus, learning decreases with repetition sharply until it
reaches a state of ‘equilibrium’. Therefore, the assertion is that steady increases in
learning, and as a consequence performance, require continuing development of new
stimulus situations. In Arrow’s model, the variable that represents experience is
cumulative gross investment. New capital goods change continuously the environment
where production takes place, providing the stimuli for new knowledge, and steady
growth in productivity, to emerge. In accordance to the models proposed by Solow and
Shell, Arrow maintains the assumption that knowledge is a public good, therefore not
compensated by the market.
The learning-by-doing model has been a prominent attempt to make the evolution of
technological change endogenous, and responsive to market incentives. However, in
certain respects the formulation of the model is inadequate. First, the assumption of fixed
proportionality between new physical capital and new knowledge is restrictive. Second,
the model does not allow for intentional private investment in research and development.
Individual optimizing behavior has rather a more indirect role in generating new technical
knowledge, as the latter is merely a side effect of the production of capital goods. An
attempt to fill the second gap came from Romer (1986). He proposed an equilibrium
model of endogenous technological change which builds on Arrow’s learning-by-doing
formulation, but it departs from it in that the accumulation of knowledge is driven by
firms’ intentional optimizing behavior. The technology for a firm is a function of the
firm-specific stock of knowledge, the economy-wide aggregate knowledge, and the level
of all other inputs. New knowledge can be created by investing resources in research. It is
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assumed that newly produced private knowledge although it cannot be patented it can be
partially kept secret. It is this partial excludability of the benefits of research and
development that ensures the intentional private investment of resources in R&D. The
concept of knowledge used in this model is that of disembodied knowledge, e.g.
knowledge in books (Romer, 1986). However, the formulation of the model can be
compatible with a concept of knowledge as being embodied in some form of tangible
capital, such as physical or human capital. In this case, knowledge and capital are
assumed to be used in fixed proportions in production, and the variable in question is
reinterpreted to represent a composite good that is made up of both capital and intangible
knowledge. As a result, the dynamics of the model are similar to those of Arrow’s
learning-by-doing model, and the mathematical equations can be interpreted in terms of
learning-by-doing that is incidental to capital production [Romer, 1990 p.77].
Romer’s (1986) paper has been one of the main contributions that challenged the
prominent role of the neoclassical growth theory, and marked the advent of the so-called
new theories of growth. The new theories of endogenous growth represent a class of
models sharing the distinctive characteristic that the engine of growth comes from the
model itself; no exogenous technological progress or population growth is required. Even
more, the models in this body of literature possess the feature that the source for
sustaining growth lies in some form of increasing returns to scale or the externality effect
arising from knowledge spillovers. There are several alternative devices considered in the
literature through which endogenous growth is generated. The first basic approach is
represented by Romer’s (1986) model and, as it was previously mentioned, it attributes
the leading role in the growth process to a natural externality created from investing in
new knowledge. In this economy the rate of growth of per capita output, and
consumption, is monotonically increasing over time approaching an upper bound
asymptotically. The key feature of the model that generates this result is the presence of
increasing returns to scale in the production of output, and more importantly the presence
of an increasing marginal product of knowledge.52 It is this latter assumption that ensures
52

The assumption of an increasing marginal productivity of knowledge from a social point of view is what
distinguishes the production function adopted in the paper of Romer (1986) from the one used in Arrow
(1962) [Romer, 1986, pp.1015-6].

88

the unbounded growth of knowledge on all possible efficient and competitive equilibrium
paths. The marginal product of knowledge never reaches a level that is low enough such
that it is optimal on the part of firms not to undertake further research, and therefore stop
at a steady state where knowledge is constant.
An alternative approach to endogenous growth theory argues that the prime engine of
economic growth is the accumulation of human capital. The latter is defined to refer to
the skills and knowledge level possessed by the labor force. The theory of human capital
was introduced in the literature with the influential paper of Lucas (1988). 53 His theory
builds on the premise that knowledge cannot be treated separately from the human inputs
that create it or possess it [Lucas, 1099 p.15]. The dominant hypothesis is that the
accumulation of human capital results in the production of technological knowledge,
which in turn is the source of increases in macroeconomic productivity and increasing
returns in technology. The knowledge externality takes the form of the positive effect of
the economy’s average level of human capital on the productivity of all factors of
production. Since no individual decisions affect in an appreciable way the average skill
level, although all benefit from it, no one takes the latter into account when deciding how
to allocate his time. In such a model, growth can be sustained by continuing accumulation
of the input that generates the positive externality (Grossman and Helpman, 1994). As in
the learning-by-doing formulation, the production of nonrival knowledge is an
unintentional side effect of the production of a conventional good, which is human capital
[Romer, 1990 p.77]. However, there is a role, even though indirect, for private decision in
this process. This stems from the fact that individual agents can make intentional
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Perhaps the earliest study that proposes a model of endogenous human capital accumulation is that of
Uzawa (1965). In his model, all changes in technological knowledge are embodied in labor, and are
reflected in the efficiency of the labor force. Improvements in the latter occur as a result of various
activities in the ‘educational sector’, which represent a larger share of resources employed in education,
health, construction and maintenance of public goods, etc. on the part of some public authority. These
activities have a uniform impact over the whole economy. The important feature of his solution is that
growth is sustained without the need of an external engine of growth. Instead, the growth rate of the
economy is endogenously determined from the rate of labor that is allocated at the educational sector –
labor is the only factor employed in this sector.
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investment of resources, a share of their working time and physical capital, into the
process of formal education in order to enhance their future levels of human capital.54
The theory of human capital was developed in an attempt to assign an important role
as a source of growth to factors other than technology. Although the theory has
succeeded in this regard, it is unsatisfactory in one respect. There is a logical difficulty
that stems from the prediction of this theory that the growth rate of the economy is equal
to the rate of the accumulation of human capital, or a linear function of it. This implies
that never-ending growth requires never-ending increases in human capital. However, for
such a variable, never-ending growth is implausible because human capital skills are
possessed by individual human beings and so are not automatically passed on to workers
in succeeding generations [McCallum 1996]. McCallum extends this argument by stating
that the real force behind sustaining growth is the accumulation of some form of
knowledge, not human capital. The former is possessed by society in general, and can be
passed on from generation to generation; therefore, it can be accumulated without limit,
providing the basis for never-ending growth.
In response to the various shortcomings of the learning-by-doing and human capital
formulations, Romer (1990) developed a formal model that fulfils two objectives. First,
in accordance with the neoclassical economists and contrary to the human capital
approach, he assigns the role of the primary engine of growth to technological change.
Second, he goes a step forward into filling the theoretical gap in the literature by making
improvements in technology the explicit product of the intentional investment in research
on the part of profit-maximizing firms. The contribution of this paper compared to Romer
(1986) lies mainly in the refinement of the concept of knowledge. The latter is redefined
in a way that supports its properties of being a nonrival, yet excludable input. New
knowledge is the product of research and is defined to be embodied, or codified, in the
designs of new products. Designs, or ‘blueprints’ are assumed to be protected by patents
in their use in the production of new goods, therefore generating monopoly profits to the
private firms who undertake the research and development activities that render their
54

The growth rate of consumption and per capita capital is linearly determined by the rate of growth of
human capital. It is through the latter variable that the parameter indicating the effectiveness of investment
in human capital, and the rate of time preference affect the growth rate along the balanced path of both the
socially optimal and competitive equilibria.
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creation. It is this effective excludability of the benefits of new research that provides the
incentive to private firms to invest in the development of new knowledge. Apart from
their productive role in the production of output, designs contribute through an
externality effect in the process of research itself. Designs of new goods are not protected
by patents over their use in research. Therefore, any inventor has free access to the entire
stock of new research. This implies that as the total stock of designs, and new knowledge
grows larger, the productivity of human capital in the research sector increases as well. It
is this non-excludable part of the benefits of research that creates the spillover effects in
the process of knowledge creation, and provides the mechanism for endogenous neverending growth.
The models that were described so far emphasize increasing returns to scale as the
source of endogenous growth. In a classical paper, Rebelo (1991) showed that increasing
returns to scale and externalities are not necessary to generate endogenous growth. The
latter can be compatible with production technologies that exhibit constant returns to
scale as long as there are constant returns to the factors that can be accumulated. This
implies that labor and non-reproducible factors are not used in production. If the latter are
essential to production then sustained growth is made feasible only by assuming that the
technology displays increasing returns to scale. In addition, Rebelo shows that the special
case where the production function is linear in a measure of capital broadly defined to
encompass both physical and human inputs, and everything is reproducible, captures all
the main qualitative features of the class of more complicated endogenous growth models
with convex technologies. This framework, which is the so called ‘AK’ model, has been
commonly adopted in the literature of monetary growth due to its main advantage of
preserving a theory’s analytical simplicity.
Money and endogenous growth The developments in the theory of endogenous
growth have been exploited to analyze the long run interactions between monetary policy
and the real sector of an economy. The endogenous generation of growth in these models,
without relying on the occurrence of technical progress or population changes, provides
the appropriate framework to analyze the effects of economic policies on the growth rate
of the aggregate real variables. This has made it possible to depart from the traditional
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approach in the literature which had been to focus on the impact of monetary policy on
the steady state levels of real economic aggregates. The literature addressing the long run
effects of inflation on growth does so using various mechanisms of endogenous growth,
and various channels of linkage between monetary policy and long term economic
performance. One of the main transmission mechanisms in the core volume of literature
is the so-called ‘investment channel’, by which it is meant that monetary expansion sets
in motion a chain of economic events that ultimately affect private investment decisions,
hence real economic performance. There are two avenues through which this mechanism
operates: one is by altering the effective relative price of capital, and the other through
affecting the real net return on investment. Returning to the insight of the early papers of
Stockman (1981) and Abel (1985), the former was the first to identify the role of
imperfect credit markets for investment on the way monetary policy exerts its influence
on real economy. His argument defines an example of the investment channel, as it works
through an effect on the effective relative price of capital. As has already been mentioned
in the previous section, the central idea of these studies is that the existence of cash-inadvance constraints on purchases of physical capital goods translates under an
inflationary policy into a higher effective relative price of the latter, henceforth into lower
investment and real output. If only consumption purchases are subject to cash-in-advance
constraint there is no channel through which higher inflation can affect investment or
other private decisions, hence the real sector of an economy. The theoretical validity of
Stockman’s argument was examined in the context of equilibrium growth by Jones and
Manuelli (1993). Adopting the simplest technology that embodies endogenous growth,
and allowing for a cash-in-advance constraint on purchases of consumption goods only,
the model yields the conclusion that monetary policy continues to be impotent in having
an impact on either the level or the growth rate of real output. The latter, as is standard in
the endogenous growth literature, is solely determined by parameters of taste and
technology. The paper proceeds with providing further insight into how the investment
channel applies to this endogenous-growth framework. If the model is extended such that
in addition to consumption spending, purchases of investment goods are also subject to a
cash-in-advance constraint, then the resulted prediction accords with Stockman’s
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proposition that inflationary policy raises the effective relative price of capital, hence
acting like a tax on investment. In contrast to the neoclassical setting, however, the
effects of the decline in the rate of accumulation of capital extend beyond the level of
output to its growth rate, thus establishing the claim that money matters for growth.55 The
latter argument can also be the outcome of employing different routes of the investment
channel. Potential ways through which this could be achieved involve the introduction in
the model of nominally denominated rigidities in the tax code. Specific examples would
be the nominally denominated tax credits, imperfectly indexed tax bracketing and
nominally denominated depreciation allowances [Jones and Manuelli, 1993]. Exploring
this last case is the focus of attention of the second part of the paper of Jones and
Manuelli (1993). The prediction of the model is once again that a higher rate of growth of
the money supply has a negative effect on the economy’s growth rate. The argument that
supports this conclusion is that higher inflation, through the following increase in the
nominal interest rate, causes a reduction in the present value of tax credits that
correspond to the depreciation allowance. On this view, the future capital stock becomes
more expensive to acquire, thus leading to a reduction in current investment spending,
and consequently real output in both the level and growth sense. A natural extension of
the existing analysis would be to consider two forms of capital, specifically to incorporate
human in addition to physical capital into the model. This would allow the operation of
an additional result that moderates the overall negative effect of inflation on growth. As
in the previous setting, the increase in the inflation rate results in an increase in the cost
of acquiring physical capital by decreasing the value of the depreciation allowance in real
terms. Considering that depreciation allowances for human capital are not generally
predicted by most tax codes, there is a force that promotes investment in human
compared to physical capital. This effect generates a positive impact on growth allowing
for the final -negative- effect of inflation to be moderated.
Marquis and Reffett (1995) have also taken this line and have investigated, on
theoretical ground, the applicability of Stockman’s argument in the context of
endogenous growth. The production technology in their model is constructed to
55

This is a stated argument. The derivations of this particular extension of the basic model are not included
in the paper.
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accommodate the neoclassical technology adopted in Stockman (1981) and Abel (1985),
as well as to exhibit the potential for asymptotic equilibrium growth.56 Maintaining
compatibility with the former papers, the same trading environment is adopted. Thus,
economic agents are required to hold cash in advance of their purchases of consumption,
as well as investment goods in order to finance those expenditures. The conclusions
drawn from the analysis regarding the long run effects of monetary policy are consistent
with the argument of Jones and Manuelli (1993), and the predicted implication of the
aforementioned investment channel at work. In specific, expansionary monetary policy
interacts with private capital decisions, causing investment and real output to settle at a
lower steady state level. The model suggests that as a result of the inflation tax,
asymptotic endogenously determined growth decreases as well. The size of the decrease
depends crucially upon the level of the monetary distortion, as it is measured by the
magnitude of the inflation tax, or alternatively, the change in the nominal interest rate.57
The core argument of the paper consists of the claim that as the monetary distortion
grows larger the growth effect it is associated with is amplified. Moreover, there exists a
threshold level of the nominal interest rate beyond which long run growth is eliminated
altogether. At this level, the model connects with the papers of Stockman (1981) and
Abel (1985) from the perspective that they yield the same proposition: A higher rate of
monetary growth produces ‘level’ but not growth effects.58 It is evident that within the
course of this analysis, which is broad enough to encompass both the neoclassical growth
setup and the potential for asymptotic equilibrium growth, the predictions of Stockman
and Abel are contained as special cases.
56

This is a one-sector version of the technology developed in Jones and Manuelli (1990). As in the latter,
the production function consists of a linear growth part, and a concave, constant-returns-to-scale
technology in both capital and labor. Imposing a certain condition on preferences and technology
(Condition G, Jones and Manuelli, 1990 p.1014) ensures that the linear growth term is sufficiently large
such that, the existence of a competitive equilibrium balanced growth path is guaranteed, along which
endogenously determined growth is displayed (Marquis and Reffett, 1995 p.111).
57
The ability of monetary policy to affect the economy’s growth rate (the standard result in endogenous
growth theory applies, that consumption, investment and output all grow at the same rate) depends, in
addition to the monetary distortion, on preferences (as described by the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution, and the discount factor) and technology (the linear growth parameter, and the depreciation rate
of capital) [Marquis and Reffett, 1995 p.116]. For example, a higher intertemporal elasticity of substitution
implies a lower rate of discount for households, and more pronounced growth effects of monetary policy.
58
These consist of a reduction in the rate of investment, and consequently, of a lower steady state level of
both capital and real output.
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Additional insight into how the investment mechanism operates in the context of
endogenous growth has also been provided by De Gregorio (1993).59 In the same line as
Jones and Manuelli (1993) and Marquis and Reffett (1995), this paper seeks to examine
the ability of monetary policy to generate growth effects in the framework of an AK
technology. However, in terms of modeling the role of money, the author pursues a
different direction. The modeling strategy he adopts is built on the transactions costs
approach developed by William Baumol (1952), James Tobin (1956) and later Robert
Barro (1976). In specific, holdings of real money balances are assumed to facilitate
transactions by reducing the cost of contacting them.60 Both the purchases of
consumption and investment goods, undertaken on the part of households and firms
respectively, are subject to this type of financing constraint.61 The analysis establishes the
standard sequence of results of the investment mechanism as it operates within the
context of AK technology interacting with imperfect credit markets for investment. In
support of the argument expressed in Marquis and Reffett (1995), De Gregorio (1993)
emphasizes the negative role of monetary policy in affecting the level and growth rate of
real output. The process in the interim is similar to that taking place in the case where
investment spending is subject to a cash-in-advance constraint. Firms’ reaction to higher
inflation is to economize on their holdings of real money balances, thus incurring an
increase in their transactions costs. This in turn causes a reduction in the private return on
investment by raising the latter’s effective relative price, thereby creating a strong
disincentive to invest. As is standard in the AK framework, the lower rate of capital
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This study presents two distinct models. The discussion here refers to the first model. The second model
will be discussed further below in this section.
60
The cash-in-advance constraint can be seen as a special case of the transactions costs approach, in which
case liquidity costs equal infinity when real money balances are lower than the consumption or investment
expenditure they are intended to finance, and zero otherwise. These conditions result in the optimal rule
that real money holdings exactly match the amount of consumption, or investment expenditure [De
Gregorio 1993 p.276]. In contrast, the assumption in the general transactions costs formulation is that the
cost of implementing transactions is positive and finite irrespective of the value of the real money balances
to expenditure ratio. Although this liquidity cost can be reduced by increasing one’s real money holdings,
for no amount of the latter can it be eliminated to zero [Feenstra, 1986 p.278].
61
As in Barro (1976) liquidity costs are defined to be a non-linear function of the ratio of real money
balances to consumption. In specific, the liquidity cost function for both consumption and investment
purchases is decreasing and convex in the ratio of real money holdings to consumption, and investment,
expenditure respectively [De Gregorio, 1993 pp.274-5].
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accumulation is followed by an adverse effect on growth, in addition to the level effects
of lower steady state capital and real output.62
Building on a different aspect of the endogenous growth literature, the human capital
accumulation mechanism, Marquis and Reffett (1991a) contribute an additional study in
the literature that investigates the role of money in determining the growth rate of
economic aggregates. The central feature of their model is the absence of credit markets
for investment in human capital. Given that the accumulation of human capital is the
engine of growth, this hypothesis provides an alternative channel through which
distortionary monetary policy generates growth effects. The objective of the authors is to
construct a model with more general characteristics than the others in the literature,
which allows for the possibility the implications of inflation taxes to be simultaneously
processed through a ‘human capital channel’, in addition to the standard investment
mechanism. This more general setting serves to establish a richer set of theoretical
predictions, in which the superneutrality result and the Stockman and Abel propositions
range as potential outcomes.63 The analysis contains different cases of credit-constrained
markets, and suggests the following answers with respect to the determinants of long run
growth: When no cash-in-advance constraint applies on purchases of either physical or
human capital, whereas a cash-in-advance constraint applies on consumption goods,
monetary policy is found to have no effect on output. This outcome, in favor of the
conventional superneutrality result, provides a generalization to an endogenous growth
framework of Stockman’s (1981) and Abel’s (1985) proposition that, when the inflation
tax acts on consumption decisions only, steady state capital stock is unaltered.64 The
same theoretical consistency is obtained when Marquis and Reffett (1991a) examine the
case of cash-in-advance constraints applying on purchases of physical but not of human
62

It is important to emphasize that this result stems from the assumption that purchases of capital goods can
only be financed through money; thereby making firms subject to the inflation tax. If only consumers faced
transactions costs, the only channel through which monetary policy can affect growth, namely the private
return of capital, is constant and invariant to the rate of inflation. In this case, consumer behavior with
respect to inflation has no effects on growth [De Gregorio, 1993 p.278].
63
This paper provides an extension of a previous work of the same authors (Marquis and Reffett, 1991b).
In the latter working paper they show that when cash-in-advance constraints apply on investment in human
capital, monetary policy distorts private decisions with respect to investment in education, and leads to a
reduction in growth rate. The present article introduces a more general setting, with the possibility of cashin-advance constraints to apply on investment in both physical and human capital.
64
This is emphasized by the authors in Marquis and Reffett, (1991a) p.108.
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capital: The monetary distortion produces adverse level effects on steady state capital and
output. This is the exact claim of Stockman’s (1981) second proposition, only that now it
is obtained in the context of endogenous growth. As is standard in human capital
methodology, in both cases the economy’s growth rate is determined by the preference
parameter, the term measuring the quality of education, and the rates of depreciation of
the two types of capital. Within this framework, the only way for macroeconomic policy
to cause an effect on growth is if it distorts decisions that interact with the accumulation
of human capital. Imposing cash-in-advance constraints on purchases of human capital
provides a means to achieve this. This is the subsequent focus of the paper, and results in
the prediction that an increase in the inflation rate generates a negative effect on growth.
The mechanism at work here is that higher inflation increases the cost of acquiring
human capital, thereby leading individuals to reallocate their time in favor of productive
activities. This comes at the cost of devoting less time- and other resources, in education
resulting in a lower steady state level of human capital and rate of growth. The present
analysis shares, therefore, the same conclusion with the equilibrium growth studies we
previously mentioned. Relying on different mechanisms –Jones and Manuelli (1993),
Marquis and Reffett (1995) and De Gregorio (1993) specify different applications of the
investment channel within the context of constant-returns-to scale equilibrium growth,
whereas Marquis and Reffett (1991a) employ a human capital channel- they all get across
the same idea: distortionary monetary policy affects the prospects of growth negatively.
The paper ends with providing some insight on the case where cash-in-advance
constraints apply on purchases of both physical and human capital. Since the latter
constraint alone is responsible for generating negative growth effects, it works to
intensify the human capital effects on growth.65
The effectiveness of the above model to connect the growth process with public
policy lies not simply on the fact that accumulating human capital is a matter of
individual choice; for this is the underlying feature of all human capital models. It lies in
65

In addition, the Stockman level effect on output is obtained due to the cash-in-advance constraint on
physical capital. However, in contrast to the previous cases, the overall impact of inflation on the real
interest rate becomes ambiguous. This is due to the opposite effects on the latter displayed as a result of the
decrease in steady state (physical) capital and growth rate. The former leads to higher marginal productivity
of capital, and hence real interest rate, while the lower growth rate implies the exact opposite effect.
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that it contains a theory linking policy with the individual decisions to obtain new skills.
It is evident then that the role of money into a model is not complementary to the
economy’s real side, but plays an equally critical role in providing answers to policy
issues. For instance, in a similar framework where money has the role of providing
productive services, the growth neutrality results cannot be nullified.66
Labor-leisure choice The research in the monetary-growth literature in its greatest
extent treats labor as being inelastic. Thereby it builds on models that abstract from the
decision to allocate time between leisure and other productive activities. This approach,
although common, is not adequate on the ground of several perspectives. First, the
endogeneity of labor supply introduces an important aspect of realism into the model.
This applies with equal significance to optimal growth models, as well as to models of
business cycle theory.67 Second, leisure is relevant in the theory of taxation. It is
generally true that a tax on labor affects the time allocated to productive occupations only
if there is the possibility of substitution towards untaxed leisure activities. Hence, using a
model of inelastic labor to analyze the consequences of policy changes is limiting, since a
tax on consumption and wage income operate as non-distortionary taxes in such an
environment. Lastly, there is merit in the task itself of exploring how the decision to
allocate time between various activities interacts with the intertemporal allocation of
consumption to determine the dynamic and long-term growth behavior of an economy.68
One of the earlier studies on optimal growth theory with endogenous labor supply is
that of Brock (1974). His work offers insight on the conditions under which the result of
money neutrality applies within the standard neoclassical growth framework.69 But
classic growth theory does not really help in understanding the connection between
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This case is examined in Wang and Yip (1992). When money is incorporated in the production function
via Hicks neutral technology, monetary policy is non-neutral only in the level sense. Using a modified
setup, Pecorino (1995) restores the connection of money and growth rate. The key assumption and novel
feature of this model is that physical capital is an input in the process of human capital accumulation.
Monetary policy affects growth through altering implicit taxation on inputs in the physical capital/output
sector.
67
Leisure is a key variable in modern business cycle theory, since around two-thirds of the output variation
over the business cycle can be accounted for by fluctuations in hours worked (see Ladron-De-Guevara et
al., 1999).
68
See Ladron-De-Guevara et al. (1999).
69
Elsewhere in this essay we refer in specific on the predictions of Brock’s study.
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employment and sustained growth in endogenous terms. In view of this limitation, a few
authors worked out models of endogenous growth that allow for variability in
employment levels to emerge from within the model’s dynamics. One such effort was
taken by De Gregorio (1993). In his model, the marginal productivity of capital is
specified to be a function of the economy’s employment ratio.70 As long as higher
inflation leads agents to economize on real balances by substituting toward leisure
activities, this framework is successful in offering an alternative channel through which
monetary policy can affect labor variability, hence growth.71
An alternative mechanism that establishes on the distortionary impact of inflation on
labor supply is provided in models of endogenous human capital accumulation. In the
particular setting where money has a positive value in reducing the time costs in
transacting, monetary policy has the ability to cause a negative effect on income growth.
This possibility is examined in Wang and Yip (1993), where the time-effort spent in
transactions directly affects the resources devoted in accumulation of new knowledge.72
Love and Wen (1999) further extend this approach to allow for leisure to be endogenous,
in addition to the time invested in the market and education sector.73 The purpose of this
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The model assumes full employment of the number of workers; the latter however are assumed to be
employed a variable number of hours. Thus the employment ratio represents labor employed -measured in
hours worked- per unit of the economy’s labor endowment. The latter is more closely related to
economically active population than to the labor force (in the second case the ratio would be referred to as
the employment rate). Under the proper normalization of labor endowment to unity, the labor input denotes
both the overall level of employment, as well as the employment ratio, while per capita quantities are
defined as ‘per units of labor endowment’. It should be further noted that this is the only modeling strategy
that allows the marginal product of capital to depend on employment, while at the same time we avoid the
scale effects that arise from defining per capita variables in terms of quantities per unit of employed labor
(see De Gregorio, 1993 pp.280-1).
71
Using Romer’s (1986) specification of endogenous growth and emphasizing the transactions motive for
holding money, the model implies that inflation reduces the overall level of employment, and hence the
marginal productivity of capital. The former is both a result of a fall in labor demand due to increased labor
costs, and a reduction in labor supply due to an increase in the time-cost of transactions, and a subsequent
substitution towards leisure. As a result of lower employment, inflation in this economy has a negative
impact on investment, and rate of income growth.
72
In this framework, the level of real money balances relative to consumption expenditure has an inverse
impact on transactions costs. Individuals respond to higher inflation by economizing on money holdings.
This has the effect of raising the time cost of transactions, causing them to cut back on their time invested
in education.
73
In their model, time is allocated among productive services in the market sector, investment in
acquisition of human capital, and leisure. This is different from the remaining literature, which places
emphasis on the decision between the former two activities, and thus assumes that non-leisure time is
inelastic.
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is to explore how the intertemporal substitution between consumption and leisure
interacts with the growth mechanism through labor supply. The implication is that the
endogeneity of leisure intensifies the negative effect of inflation on the time supplied in
both productive and knowledge-accumulating activities.74 The return to both physical and
human capital in turn declines, with a consequent fall in the growth rate.75
Money and endogenous growth in an open economy

In this section we carry the

theoretical question of the long run effects of monetary policy within the international
macroeconomic framework. All the previous studies that we have considered explore
different aspects of this issue for closed economies. Little emphasis has been placed in the
literature on the extension of monetary growth theory in the open economy setting. One
such effort has been made by Palokangas (1997), which is to our knowledge the first
attempt at such an endeavor. The distinctive characteristic of his model is that inflationary
policy is adopted as an optimal response by public authorities in order to ameliorate the
distortionary impact of ‘ordinary’ taxation.76 By providing an alternative means of raising
revenue, seigniorage allows the possibility to reduce taxation, hence raise the real rate of
return to capital. In the present model, in which the particular structure of endogenous
growth is that of Rebelo’s (1991), the engine of growth is provided by the accumulation of
a broad concept of capital, defined to encompass both physical and human capital. A
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Economic agents respond to the increase in the effective price of consumption due to higher inflation by
substituting leisure for consumption. Labor supply is thus reduced (indirect effect) in addition to the
decrease due to less available time caused by the increase in transaction costs (direct effect). The size of the
former effect depends positively on the elasticity of labor supply, and the elasticity of transaction costs with
respect to consumption.
75
The possibility for monetary policy to impact growth through level employment effects is also examined
in Jones and Manuelli (1993). In his model with human capital utilization inflationary monetary policy has
growth effects if and only if it affects asymptotically the level of labor supply. Although Jones and
Manuelli employ Lucas’s (1988) technology, their model does not distinguish between productive and
education activities. Investment in knowledge accumulation is not based therefore on the allocation of time
between the two activities, but is modeled directly in terms of consumption good equivalents. This
distinction separates the model’s structure and monetary policy mechanism from the models of Wang and
Yip (1993), and Love and Wen (1999).
76
In the open economy setting the feature that renders taxation potentially distortionary is the ability of
agents to transfer resources abroad. On the same principle, closed economy models would require the
incorporation of a non-taxable sector, which would enable agents to substitute away form tax-burdened
activities. Palokangas (1997) uses the former strategy to put forth a model with an elastic tax base with
respect to the various tax rates. It is this latter property that creates the space for monetary policy –in
particular the creation of money through seigniorage- to have a potential positive effect on aggregate
welfare by relieving the economy of part of the deadweight burden caused by ‘ordinary’ taxation.
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potential route thus exists for public policy to enhance growth, through altering the mix of
revenue-raising policies away from distortionary taxation. However, depending on the role
of money that is emphasized in the model, this effect can be reversed. The approach of this
paper is to use the transactions-cost theory of holding money, which predicts a negative
relationship between the growth rate of money and rate of investment in human capital.77
Model I. Inflation imitating a consumption tax. The case of fixed labor supply78
The economy consists of a constant number (N) of identical individuals, each of whom
has an infinite planning horizon and possesses perfect foresight. Population remains fixed
over time. We shall denote individual quantities by lowercase letters, so that X = N x .
We assume that the economy produces a single traded commodity, the foreign price of
which is given in the world market. In the absence of any impediments to trade,
purchasing power parity (PPP) is assumed to hold. Expressed in percentage terms, the
latter is described by the following expression

π =π* +ε ,

(I.1)

where π denotes the inflation rate of the good in terms of the domestic currency, π * is
the inflation rate of the traded commodity in terms of the foreign currency assumed to be
exogenously given to the small open economy. Finally, ε denotes the rate of exchange
depreciation of the domestic currency.
The model we shall examine is that of a small open economy that operates in a world
of perfect capital markets. This implies that the real rate of interest earned on foreign
bond holdings is constant, and exogenously given for the small economy irrespective of
its international transactions. Furthermore, we assume for simplicity that there is no
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Following Kimbrough (1986) and De Gregorio (1993) this modeling approach suggests that transactions
costs depend negatively on the money-to-expenditure ratio. In the present framework the accumulation of
human capital can only be financed by individual savings; it is this assumption that allows inflation to have
an adverse impact on the growth process.
78
The following remark is ought to be made. The analytical framework of the model has a similar character
with the theory presented in Turnovsky (1996). Turnovsky (1996) investigates the effects of tax and
expenditure policies on a small open economy in a model with linear production technology that exhibits
ongoing, endogenously determined growth. Similarly to the present framework, the model abstracts from
effects on the employment side of the economy by assuming that labor is totally fixed or, alternatively, that
it grows at some exogenously determined rate.
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foreign inflation. Normalizing the foreign price level to a constant79, its rate of increase
becomes zero and equation (I.1) is written as

π =ε .

(I.2)

The model’s production side is built on Rebelo’s (1991) approach of modeling
endogenous growth. The economy has one sector of production, the output of which can
be used both as a consumption and capital good. The production process involves one
factor of production, which represents a composite of various types of physical and
human capital. Labor and non-reproducible factors (e.g. land) do not play a role in
production. Constant-returns-to-scale imply that the production function takes the simple
linear form of an AK technology80
y = A0 k .

(I.3)

where y and k denote the individual firm’s output and capital stock respectively.
Combining (I.3) with Y = N y , aggregate output in the economy is given by
Y = A0 K

A0 > 0 .

(I.3´)

Thus aggregate output is proportional to the aggregate capital stock, thereby leading to an
equilibrium having ongoing, endogenously determined, growth.
The individual firm accumulates physical capital, which is assumed to be infinitely
durable. The expenditure on a given increase in the capital stock is represented by i ≡ I .
N
An important feature of the model is the assumption that the investment process involves
costs of adjustment, or installation,81 which are represented by the convex component of
the following cost function
79

For reasons of tractability the foreign price level is assumed to equal one.
Rebelo (1991) shows that this linear model in which only reproducible factors are incorporated into the
production technology captures all the essential features of the class of endogenous growth models that
exhibit increasing returns to scale, or embody some form of knowledge externality. Models in which
‘everything is capital’, in the sense that all factors of production can be accumulated over time, have also
been studied early on in the economic literature (Knight, 1935, 1944, and Hagen, 1942) [Rebelo, 1991
p.507].
81
The model of a small open economy that faces perfect world capital markets, a constant rate of time
preference and investment is tradable, is characterized by degenerate dynamics. In particular, in steadystate equilibrium, the condition of optimal intertemporal allocation of consumption requires that the rate of
time preference be equal to the given (real) world interest rate. This implies the existence of a steady state
80
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h i2
 hi
Φ ( i, k ) = i + H (i, k ) = i +
= i 1 +
.
2k
 2k

(I.4)

where the addition of i units of capital requires the use of H(i, k) units of output. The
function H(i, k) is assumed to be (a) nonnegative; (b) linearly homogeneous, and (c)
convex in investment; i.e. H ′ ≥ 0 , and H ′′ > 0 . The assumption of non-negativity
implies that disinvestment at the rate I < 0 involves positive dismantling costs, also
represented by H (⋅) . The homogeneity assumption is made largely for convenience; in
addition it ensures that the market value of the capital stock is invariant with respect to
changes in the scale of the economy. We also specify that the total cost of zero
investment is zero and the marginal cost of the initial installation is unity; thus, it is
assumed that H ( 0, k ) = 0 , and H i (0, k ) = 0 .82
Aggregating over the N individual firms, leads to

Φ(I, K ) = I +

h I2
 h I 
= I 1 +
.
2K
 2K

(I. 4′ )

The representative agent’s welfare is given by the intertemporal isoelastic utility
function
∞

γ

( )e

U=∫1 C
0γ N

− ρt

dt

−∞ < γ ≤ 1 ,

(I.5)

at this limiting case only, and the absence of dynamics that restore the equilibrium condition once there is
divergence from it. Several approaches have been used in the literature to ‘remedy’ this situation. One,
proposed by Uzawa (1981) has been to endogenize the rate of time preference by specifying the latter as a
function of the level of utility. Another way to circumvent this problem is to assume imperfect
substitutability between domestic and foreign bonds by imposing quadratic costs on holdings of foreign
bonds (see Turnovsky, 1985). An alternative approach, subject to less criticism than the previous two is to
introduce the uncertain lifetime assumption of Blanchard (1985), or assume a growing population of
overlapping infinitely lived households as in Weild (1989). Other possible ways are to introduce some form
of nominal price or wage rigidity into the model (see e.g. van der Klundert and van der Ploeg, 1988), or
assume the small economy faces an upward sloping schedule for debt (Bhandari, Haque and Turnovsky,
1990). The most commonly used approach to solve the degeneracy of dynamics, and important source of
sluggishness into the model is the assumption that the accumulation of physical capital is subject to
adjustment, or installation, costs. In the absence of such costs, and under the assumption of a perfect world
capital market the small economy can import an unconstrained quantity of capital from abroad. In response
to a change in the market value of capital, the stock of physical capital can thus adjust instantaneously to
the new steady-state level with no new investment taking place (see Turnovsky, 2000).
82
For a more detailed discussion on the properties of the adjustment cost function see Turnovsky (2000).
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where C denotes aggregate private consumption. The parameter γ is related to the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution, s, by s = 1 (1 − γ ) .
We assume that the individual agent holds two assets, domestic money, which is not
held by foreigners and net foreign bonds. The latter pays the exogenously given world
interest rate, r.83, The individual’s total assets, a, are therefore defined as follows

a = b + mi ,

(I.6)

where b denotes the individual’s real stock of foreign bonds, and mi is the individual i’s
money holdings. Aggregating over the N individuals, we obtain an expression for the
aggregate stock of assets, A,
A = B + m,

(I.6´)

where B stands for the aggregate stock of net foreign bonds, and m for the aggregate real
money holdings. Differentiating this equation yields
A& = B& + m& .

(I. 6′′)

The accumulation of assets by the aggregate economy is described by the following
equation
 h I 
A& = Y + rB − C − I 1 +
 +τ − ε m ,
 2K

(I.7)

where τ represents real transfers received from the government. It is assumed that this is
identical among all agents, received independently of economic behavior.
Money is incorporated into the model by means of the Clower (1967) constraint,
interpreted to mean that ‘only money buys goods’. We impose the assumption that this
rule applies on consumption, but not on investment expenditure. Therefore, at any time
period an agent can acquire goods only to the value of his current money stock (mi ) . The
latter is equal to money carried over from the previous period, plus any current transfer

83

Since we abstract from the possibility of foreign inflation, the world interest rate represents both the
nominal and real rate of return on foreign bonds.
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receipts from the government. The cash-in-advance constraint for individual agent i is
given by

mi = c .

(I.8)

Aggregating over the N individuals leads to
(I. 8′ )

m=C.

Substituting equations (I. 3′ ), (I. 6′ ) and (I. 8′ ) into (I.7) yields the following asset
accumulation equation for the aggregate economy
 h I 
A& = A0 K + rA − (1 + r + ε ) C − I 1 +
 +τ .
 2K

(I.9)

For simplicity we assume that capital does not depreciate. Therefore, the economy faces
the physical capital accumulation constraint

K& = I .

(I.10)

Using the fact that in the absence of distortions the competitive equilibrium is a
Pareto optimum, we solve for the competitive equilibrium for this economy by
computing the solution to a central planner’s problem. Taking this approach, we consider
a central planning authority which chooses the values of aggregate capital (K),
consumption (C) and investment (I) that maximize the utility of the representative agent,
subject to the aggregate resource constraint of the economy (I.9), and the capital
accumulation equation (I.10). The problem is stated as follows
∞

max
K ,C , I

γ

( )e

U=∫1 C
0γ N

− ρt

dt ,

 h I 
subject to A& = A0 K + rA − (1 + r + ε ) C − I 1 +
 +τ ,
 2K

and

K& = I .

The Hamiltonian for this optimization problem is given by
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γ

H=

1C 

 h I   ′
  + λ  A0 K + rA − (1 + r + ε ) C − I 1 +
 +τ  + q I ,
γ N
 2K 


where λ and q ' are the current-value Lagrange multipliers. The optimality conditions are
given by the following expressions
§

H C = 0 ⇒ N −γ C γ −1 = λ (1 + r + ε ) ,

(I.11)

§

HI = 0 ⇒

I q −1
=
≡φ ,
K
h

(I.12)

§

λ& = −

∂H
λ&
+ λρ ⇒ = ρ − r ,
∂A
λ

(I.13)

§

q& ′ = −

2

∂H
h I  
′
′
&
+ q ρ ⇒ q = −λ  A0 +    + q′ρ .
∂K
2  K  


(I.14)

Taking the time derivative of (I.11) we obtain an expression for the growth rate of
aggregate consumption

C& r − ρ
≡ψ ,
=
C 1− γ

(I.15)

so that starting from an initial level C0 , aggregate consumption at time t is

Ct = C0 eψ t .

(I.15´)

Equation (I.12) is an expression for the growth rate of aggregate capital

K&
= ϕ , which
K

can be solved to yield
 q −1 
K t = K 0 exp {φ t} = K 0 exp 
t .
 h 

(I.16)

Combining equations (I.12), (I.14) and q = q ' λ leads to
A0 q& (q − 1) 2
+ +
= r.
2hq
q q

(I.17)
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Equation (I.17) equates the net rate of return on domestic capital to the rate of return on
the traded bond. The former consists of three components. The first is the output per unit
of installed capital (valued at the price q), while the second is the rate of capital gain. The
third element reflects the fact that an additional source of benefits of higher capital stock
is to reduce the installation costs associated with new investment.
Finally, the following transversality conditions must be imposed:

lim λ At e − ρt = 0 ,

(I.18a)

t→∞

lim q′ K e− ρ t = 0 .

t →∞

(I.18b)

The critical determinant of the growth rate of capital is the market price of installed
capital, q, the path of which is determined by the arbitrage condition (I.17). In order for
the capital stock to follow a path of steady growth (or decline), the stationary solution to
this equation, attained when q& = 0 , must have at least one real solution.
Setting q& = 0 in (I.17) implies that the steady state value of q ( q~ ) must be a solution
to the quadratic equation
A0

2
q% − 1)
(
+

2h

= rq% .

(I.19)

The necessary and sufficient condition for the capital stock to converge to a steady
growth path is that this equation has real roots. This will be the case if and only if
 hr 
r 1 +  ≥ A0 .
2 


(I.20)

Equation (I.20) implies that the smaller the adjustment costs (h) are, the smaller the
marginal physical product of capital ( A0 ) must be, in order for a balanced growth path
for capital to exist. The reason this holds is that there is a tradeoff between the first and
third components of the rates of return to capital given by the left-hand side of (I.17). The
smaller the adjustment cost (h) the greater the return to capital due to valuation
differences between installed capital and the embodied resources, and the greater the
incentive to transform new output to capital. If for a given h, A0 is sufficiently large to
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reverse (I.20), the returns to capital dominate the returns to bonds, irrespective of the
price of capital, so that no long-run balanced equilibrium can exist where the returns on
the two assets are bought into equality.
The formal solutions for the two real roots are
 hr 
q%1 , q%2 = (1 + rh ) ± h r 1 +  − A0 .
2 


(I.21)

With equation (I.19) having two real roots, the potential arises for two steady equilibrium
growth rates for capital to exist. Two cases can be identified:
Case I: q~ > 1 > q~ > 0 ,
2

1

Case II: q~2 > q~1 > 1 .
In order to identify the dynamics of q& , we use (I.17) to obtain
q −1
∂q&
=r−
.
h
∂q

(I.22)

Therefore, we have the following cases:
§

∂q&
≥ 0 ⇒ q ≤ rh + 1 ,
∂q

(I.23a)

§

∂q&
< 0 ⇒ q > rh + 1 .
∂q

(I.23b)

Figure 1 below illustrates the phase diagram for (I.17) in the case (I.20) holds, so that
a steady state growth path for capital exists. It is seen from the diagram that the
equilibrium point A, which corresponds to the smaller equilibrium value q~ (negative
1

root) is an unstable equilibrium, while point B corresponding to the larger value q~2
(positive root) is locally stable. However, it can be shown that any time path for q
converging to B violates the transversality condition (I.18b), which is required to be met.
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q’

B

A

q

Figure 1. Phase diagram.

Substituting equation (I.16) into (I.18b) one obtains
 q~ − 1  
lim λ0 qt K 0 exp
− r t = 0 .
t →∞
 
 h

It is clearly seen that when

(I.24)

q~ − 1
− r > 0 ⇒ q~ > rh + 1 this limit diverges. Thereby, the
h

larger root q~2 violates the transversality condition on the capital stock. Similarly, the
smaller root q~1 ensures that the required transversality condition holds. The behavior of q
can thus be summarized by the following proposition:
Proposition 1 The only solution for q which is consistent with the transversality condition
is that q always be at the unstable steady-state solution q~ , given by the negative root to
1

(I.21). Consequently there are no transitional dynamics in the market price of capital q. In
response to any shock, q immediately jumps to its new equilibrium value.
Note that this result is identical with that derived in Turnovsky (1996). Therefore, the
predictions of the model regarding the behavior of the market price of capital, q, and the
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capital stock are not altered with the inclusion of money in the form of a cash-in-advance
constraint.
The description of the economy is completed with the introduction of the government
sector. We shall assume for simplicity that the only expenditure the government engages
into is the distribution of lump-sum transfers to the private sector. The sole source of
revenue for the government is by printing new money.84 We abstract from ordinary
taxation and alternative modes of financing the government deficit, such as the issuing of
domestic government bonds. The budget constraint of the domestic government, assumed
to be maintained continuously balanced, is expressed by
m& + ε m = τ .

(I.25)

Substituting equations (I.3′) and (I.6 ′′) in (I.7) yields
 h I 
m& + B& = A0 K + rB + τ − C − I 1 +
 −ε m .
 2K

(I.26)

Combining (I.25) and (I.26) we obtain an expression for the net rate of accumulation of
traded bonds by the private sector
 h I 
B& = A0 K − C − I 1 +
 + rB .
 2K

(I.27)

The expression states that the rate of accumulation of traded bonds equals the balance of
payments on current account, which in turn equals the balance of trade plus the net
interest earned on the traded bonds. Substituting the expressions for C(t) from (I.15′) , for
I from (I.12) and for K(t) from (I.16), the accumulation equation (I.27) can be written in
the form
B& = rB + θ K 0 exp{φ t} − C 0 exp{ψ t} ,

(I.28)

84

Seignorage represents the real revenue a government acquires by using newly issued money to buy goods
and nonmoney assets. Seignorage revenue consists of the change in the economy’s real money holdings
( m& ), plus the proceeds of the inflation tax. The latter represents the devaluation of the previous period’s
stock of real money balances due to the higher level of prices. Mathematically, it is equal to the inflation
rate over the previous period’s stock of real money balances. In continuous-time framework it is expressed
as ε m .
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where ϕ and ψ are defined in (I.12) and (I.15), respectively, and

θ ≡ A0 −

q2 −1
.
2h

(I.29)

Solving (I.28) we obtain the solution for the net stock of traded bonds
C
θ K0

Bt =  B0 +
− 0
r − φ r −ψ


C
 rt θ K 0 φ t
e + 0 eψ t .
e −
r −φ
r −ψ


(I.30)

The variable q appearing in (I.29) is the negative root q1 given by (I.21), though for
notational convenience the subscript 1 will henceforth be omitted.
In order to ensure national intertemporal solvency, the transversality condition given
by equation (I.18a), lim λ At e − ρ t = 0 must be satisfied. Solving the differential equation
t →∞

(I.13) yields

λt = λ0 e( ρ −r )t .

(I.31)

Using (I.31) equation (I.18a) is written as
limλ0 e( ρ − r )t At e − ρ t = 0 .

(I.32)

t →∞

Substituting for At from (I.6′) and using the cash-in-advance constraint given by (I.8′)
we obtain

lim λ0 e

t →∞

( ρ −r )t

( Bt + Ct ) e− ρt = 0 .

(I.32´)

Using the solutions for Bt and Ct given by (I.30) and (I.15′) respectively yields

ϑ K0
C
− 0
limλ0  B0 +
r − φ r −ψ
t →∞



 ϑ K 0 (φ − r )t
C
+ 0 e(ψ − r )t + C0 e(ψ − r )t  = 0 .
e
−
r −ψ
 r −φ


(I.33)

In order for (I.33) to be satisfied the following conditions must hold

ϑ K0 

C0 = ( r −ψ )  B0 +
,
r − φ 


(I.34a)
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r −ϕ > 0 ,

(I.34b)

r −ψ > 0 .

(I.34c)

Condition (I.34a) determines the feasible initial level of consumption and ensures the
convergence of the first term. Condition (I.34b) ensures the convergence of the second
term, and the last condition is necessary for the third and fourth terms to converge.
Substituting (I.34a) into (I.30) gives us the equilibrium stock of traded bonds

ϑ K 0  ψ t ϑ K 0 φt

Bt =  B0 +
e −
e .
r − φ 
r −φ


(I.35)

Equations (I.12), (I.15), (I.15 ′) , and (I.35), together with the solution for q and the
initial condition (I.34a) comprise a closed form solution describing the evolution of the
small open economy starting from given initial stocks of traded bonds ( B0 ), and the
capital stock K 0 .
There are several properties of the competitive equilibrium of this economy that are
worth noting: First, an important feature of the simple linear technology that we adopted
q~ − 1 ~
≡ϕ ,
is that domestic output, and capital grow at the same long-run rate g Y = g K =
h
where q~ stands for the negative root given by (I.21). Substituting from (I.21) we obtain:

ϕ~ = r − r 1 + hr  − A0 .


(I.36)

2

The equilibrium growth rate of capital is thus determined by the technological conditions
in the domestic economy, represented by the marginal physical product of capital ( A0 )
and the adjustment costs (h), as well as of the nominal return on foreign bonds. The
influence of technology on the rate of growth is rather intuitive. The latter is higher the
larger the marginal product of capital, and the lower the installation costs in investment.
A second implication of this model is that it can sustain differential growth rates of
consumption and output. The former is driven by the difference between the rate of return
on traded bonds and the domestic rate of time preference, as is described by equation
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(I.15). The intuition behind the effects of these variables is straightforward: the higher the
rate of interest on foreign bonds, or alternatively the lower the rate of time preference (in
other words, the more patient the domestic country) the greater is the fraction of their
wealth that domestic agents invest in foreign assets. The income generated from the
increased accumulation of foreign bonds provides the source that sustains an increase in
the future rate of growth of domestic consumption.85
The ability of the economy to sustain differential growth rates of consumption and
output is a consequence of it being open. If the economy is closed, consumption has to
grow at the rate of growth of domestic output; thus being restricted by the economy’s
own productive capabilities [Turnovsky, 1996 p.51]. It should be further noted that the
model’s predictions regarding the equilibrium behavior of growth rates of all real
variables are fully consistent with the corresponding predictions in the endogenous
growth literature (see for example Rebelo, 1991, and Turnovsky, 1996).
An additional property of the equilibrium in this economy is that it has no transitional
dynamics; consumption and output expand always at their steady state growth rates. The
former (given by ψ ) is determined by the constant preference parameters, and the given
interest rate on foreign bonds. The latter is driven by the market price of capital ( q~ ),
which adjusts instantaneously in response to any disturbance to ensure that capital and
output always lie on an equilibrium growth path. This characteristic of the equilibrium
path is a straightforward implication of employing Rebelo’s (1991) approach of
endogenous growth.
85

In a version of the model with a richer tax structure, the growth rate of consumption is a function of the
after-tax interest rate on foreign bonds. This implies that a policy that reduces the tax rate on income from
foreign assets has parallel growth consequences for domestic aggregate consumption, as does an increase in
the given world interest rate, and growing patience of domestic consumers. This indicates that the principal
determinants of the consumption growth rate include government policy variables, in addition to economic
fundamentals (parameters of tastes). While this version of the model has been examined byTurnovsky
(1996), the theme is part of a larger literature that aims to identify the extent to which cross-country
differences in per-capita growth rates is attributed to corresponding variations in tax policy regimes. In this
endeavor Jones and Manuelli (1990) use a convex technology that allows for sustained growth to examine
the impact of taxation on capital income on the long-run behavior of the economy. They prove that
proportional taxes on capital can potentially move the economy from the region of sustained equilibrium
growth to one in which there is no growth in the long-run along the equilibrium path (p.1023). In general, it
is shown that positive tax rates result in a decrease in the asymptotic growth rate relative to the no-tax
situation. In a similar study, Rebelo (1988) analyzes the role of government policies in determining the
growth properties of a convex model of endogenous growth.
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Another important characteristic of this equilibrium relates to the effect of the
inflation rate on economic performance. The use of the cash-in-advance approach enables
us to analyze the effects of inflation on the real decisions of firms and households,
through the ‘taxing’ effect on money holdings. In particular, the assumption that money
is required to finance purchases of consumption goods has the implication that inflation
acts as a distortionary tax on consumption spending. The question of the impact of
various personal and corporate taxes on the real decisions of firms and households has
been examined by Turnovsky (1996) in a similar endogenous growth framework. One of
the conclusions to emerge from the author’s analysis is that the equilibrium growth rates
of consumption and capital (output) are completely neutral with respect to the
consumption tax, given that the proceeds of the latter are rebated back in a lump-sum
fashion.86 In this case, the tax on consumption does not affect the marginal rate of
substitution between consumption at different dates, thus acting as a lump-sum tax.
Hence, it is neutral with respect to growth consequences. Our analysis supports this
prediction, for we observe that neither the growth rate of consumption (ψ ) nor that of
capital ( ϕ~ ) are affected by the inflation rate ( ε ).87
The fact that inflation does not have a role in the determination of the economy’s
growth rate of output, is hardly surprising in an economy where inflation imitates the role
of a distortionary tax on consumption expenditure. This result bears analogy to the
conclusion arisen in Barro (1990)’s theory of a closed economy. Owing to being closed,
the economy may never sustain differential growth rates on domestic production, and
consumption. The latter both grow at a common rate defined by the difference between
the marginal productivity of capital and the rate of time preference, multiplied by the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution. In an environment that lacks an endogenous labor
– leisure choice, a consumption tax (similarly, a flat – rate income tax) proves to be
86

Three taxes are considered in his analysis; namely a consumption tax, a tax on income from physical
capital and from holdings of foreign bonds. The equilibrium growth rate of consumption is unaffected by
any tax rate, while the growth rate of capital (and output) is neutral with respect to the consumption tax
only. In particular, the growth rate of capital is negatively impacted by the tax rate on assets of physical
capital.
87
In a setting where the supply of labor is elastic, the consumption tax affects the trade-off between
consumption and leisure, and hence the consumption tax is distortionary. Depending on preferences,
however, the intertemporal decision may not change, resulting in no effect on growth rates (see Jones and
Manuelli, 1990 p.1034).
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equivalent to lump – sum taxation. Therefore, it exerts no effect on either private
decisions, or the path of steady – state growth. It has to be said that the validity of this
result rests heavily on the labor supply being held fixed. Proceeding in the way of
endogenizing the labor – leisure choice invalidates the above neutrality proposition. A
higher tax on consumption, or wage income, leads to a fall in the equilibrium
consumption – to – output ratio, the employment level, and subsequently, the rate of
output growth.
We are led to the insight that if inflation does have a determining effect on the
economy’s growth rate it must be through channels that we have not explored yet. A
natural extension of the present model is to incorporate such a mechanism, by assuming
that the acquisition of capital goods is constrained by the absence of credit markets for
their financing. In consequence, firms are subject to a cash-in-advance constraint on their
investment expenditure on physical capital. In such a context, inflation acts as tax on
investment, thus imitating the role of ordinary taxation on assets of physical capital. This
task is pursued in the model of following section.
Model II. Inflation acting as a capital tax in a model of fixed labor supply88

The purpose of this section is to examine the effects of the inflation tax on the
investment path of the economy. To accomplish this, the exchange role of money is
expanded along the direction of allowing investment to be a “cash” good. Specifically,
credit markets for investment are assumed to be imperfect, or completely absent. Either
of these assumptions implies that in each period investment purchases are constrained by
available cash balances. The structure of the economy parallels that developed in the
previous section. Therefore, we consider a small open economy populated by a
representative agent, who consumes and produces a single traded commodity. We assume
that the foreign price of the good is given in the world market. In the absence then of any
impediments to trade, the purchasing power parity condition implies
88

The following note is remarked. The analytical framework of the model has a similar character with the
theory presented in Turnovsky (1996). Turnovsky (1996) investigates the effects of tax and expenditure
policies on a small open economy in a model with linear production technology that exhibits ongoing,
endogenously determined growth. Similarly to the present framework, the model abstracts from effects on
the employment side of the economy by assuming that labor is totally fixed or, alternatively, that it grows
at some exogenously determined rate.
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π =π* +ε ,

(II.1)

where the notation is similar to that of Model I.
Imposing the assumption that the foreign price level is constant and normalized to
one, π * = 0 and equation (II.1) yields

π =ε .

(II.2)

It is convenient in the present framework to distinguish between the consumption and
production activities of the representative agent. We will therefore treat the optimization
problems of the typical household and firm as separate.89 We assume that the domestic
resident holds three assets. The first is domestic money, which is not held by foreigners.
The other two assets are domestic and foreign bonds, which earn the same real interest
rate, r. The individual’s total assets, Ah , are therefore defined as follows
Ah = B h + m h .

(II.3)

The representative consumer is assumed to choose her level of consumption, C, and
total assets, Ah , by solving the following intertemporal optimization problem
∞

Maximize U = ∫

1

t =0 γ

C γ e− ρ t dt

−∞ < γ ≤ 1 ,

(II.4)

subject to the budget constraint, which expressed in real terms is given by
C + B& h + m& h + ε m h = w + D + rB h + τ ,

(II.5)

where B h represents the real stock of domestic and foreign bonds held by the
representative agent, m h denotes the real money holdings of the individual consumer, w
is the real wage rate, D depicts the real profit paid out to the individual consumer, and τ

i

denotes the government transfer in real terms.
We assume that labor is fixed, or is supplied inelastically, and therefore we normalize
it to unity. The agent's labor income is thus given by w. We also impose the additional

89

The corresponding variables will be distinguished by superscripts h and f respectively.
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condition that the individual holds money in order to finance her consumption
expenditure. This implies the cash-in-advance constraint
mh = C .

(II.6)

Combining equations (II.3), (II.5) and (II.6), the individual’s budget constraint is written
as follows
A& h = w + D + rAh + τ − (1 + r + ε ) C .

(II.7)

Therefore, the representative consumer’s optimization problem is to choose C, and A, to
maximize (II.4) subject to (II.7). The Hamiltonian for this problem is
H=

1

γ

C γ + λ [ w + D + rA + τ − (1 + r + ε )C ] .

(II.8)

The optimality conditions for this problem are the following
§

H C = 0 ⇒ C γ −1 = λ (1 + r + ε ) ,

(II.9)

§

λ& = −

λ&
∂H
λρ
+
⇒
= ρ −r,
λ
∂A h

(II.10)

§

The Transversality Condition: lim λ Ath exp {− ρ t} = 0 .
t →∞

(II.11)

Taking the time derivative of (II.9) we obtain an expression for the growth rate of
individual (as well as aggregate) consumption
C& r − ρ
=
≡ϕ .
C 1− γ

(II.12)

This is a first-order differential equation, which can be solved to yield
Ct = C0 eφ t .

(II.13)

The representative firm’s formal optimization problem is to choose the level of
investment, I, and capital, K, to maximize real profit
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∞

Π = ∫ De− rt dt ,

(II.14)

t =0

subject to the accumulation equation
K& = I .

(II.15)

The firm’s profit, D, is defined as follows
M& f
.
D = A0 K − w − Φ(I , K ) − rB f + B& f −
P

(II.16)

As in the previous model, the production side is built on Rebelo’s (1991) approach of
modeling endogenous growth. The economy has one sector of production, the output of
which can be used both as a consumption and capital good. The production process
involves one production factor, which represents a composite of various types of physical
and human capital. Labor and non-reproducible factors (e.g. land) do not play a role in
production. Constant-returns-to-scale implies that the production function of domestic
output Y takes the simple linear form of an AK technology
Y = A0 K

A0 > 0 .

(II.17)

It is also assumed that the expenditure on a given increase in the capital stock, I, involves
adjustment (installation) costs, which are represented by the following quadratic function
Φ( I , K ) = I + h

I2
 h I 
= I 1 +
.
2K
 2K

(II.18)

Furthermore, we assume that firms can finance their investment plans either by issuing
bonds, or by using retained earnings. Thus, at any period t the firm issues private
securities at the rate B& f , and pays interest rate r on the stock of previously issued bonds,
Bf .

We also impose the restriction that investment expenditure can only be financed by
cash balances carried over from previous periods. We thus have the following cash-inadvance constraint
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 h I 
m f = Φ ( I , K ) = I 1 +
,
 2K

(II.19)

where m f is the typical firm’s real money holdings. In other words,
mf =

Mf
.
P

(II.20)

Differentiating (II.19) we obtain an expression for the rate of change of the firm’s money
holdings in real terms
M& f
= m& f + εm f ,
P

(II.21)

where ε m f is the cost of inflation tax.
The firm’s total assets are defined as
Af = mf − Bf ,

(II.22)

which implies
A& f = m& f − B& f .

(II.23)

Combining equations (II.16), (II.19), (II.21), (II.22) and (II.23) we obtain90
 h I 
f
&f
D = A0 K − w − (1 + r + ε ) I 1 +
 − A − rA .
 2K

(

)

(II.24)

Therefore, the firm’s optimization problem becomes
∞ 
 h I 
f  − rt
&f
Maximize ∫  A0 K − w − (1 + r + ε ) I 1 +
 − A − rA  e dt ,
 2K
t =0 


(

subject to the capital accumulation equation K& = I .
It can be shown that this is equivalent to solving91

90
91

The detailed derivation may be found in Appendix II.
The reader may find the derivation in Appendix II.
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)

∞
 h I   − rt
max ∫  A0 K − w − (1 + r + ε ) I  1 +
  e dt ,
I ,K 0 
 2 K 

subject to K& = I .
The Hamiltonian for this problem is
 h I 
H = A0 K − w − (1 + r + ε ) I  1 +
 + qI ,
 2K

(II.25)

and the optimality conditions are given by
I q − (1 + r + ε )
=
=ψ ,
K
h (1 + r + ε )

§

HI = 0 ⇒

§

q& = −

§

The Transversality Condition: lim qt Kt e− rt = 0

(II.26)

2
q& A (q − (1 + r + ε ) )
∂H
=r,
+ qr ⇒ + 0 +
∂K
q q
2hq(1 + r + ε )

t →∞

Equation (II.21) is an expression for the growth rate of aggregate capital:

(II.27)

(II.28)
K&
=ψ .
K

Solving this differential equation yields

 q − (1 + r + ε ) 
K t = K 0 exp {ψ t} = K 0 exp 
t.
 h (1 + r + ε ) 

(II.29)

The critical determinant of the growth rate of capital is the market price of installed
capital, q, the path of which is determined by the arbitrage condition (II.22). In order for
the capital stock to follow a path of steady growth (or decline), the stationary solution to
this equation, attained when q& = 0 , must have at least one real solution.
Setting q& = 0 in (II.22) implies that the steady state value of q ( q~ ) must be a solution
to the quadratic equation
A0 +

( q% − (1 + r + ε ) )2
2h (1 + r + ε )

= rq% .

(II.30)
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The necessary and sufficient condition for the capital stock to converge to a steady
growth path is that this equation has real roots. This will be the case if and only if
A0
 hr 
.
r 1 +  ≥
2  1+ r + ε


(II.31)

The formal solutions for the two real roots are
A0
 hr 
.
q%1 , q%2 = (1 + rh )(1 + r + ε ) ± h (1 + r + ε ) r 1 +  −
2  1+ r + ε


(II.32)

With equation (II.25) having two real roots, the potential arises for two steady
equilibrium growth rates for capital to exist. Two cases can be identified:
Case I: q~ > 1 > q~ > 0
2

1

Case II: q~2 > q~1 > 1
In order to identify the dynamics of q& , we use (II.22) to obtain
∂q&
q
1
=r−
+ .
∂q
h (1 + r + ε ) h

(II.33)

We have the following cases
§

∂q&
≥ 0 ⇒ q ≤ (1 + r + ε )( rh + 1) ,
∂q

§

∂q&
< 0 ⇒ q > (1 + r + ε )( rh + 1) .
∂q

Figure 2 illustrates the phase diagram for (II.22) in the case (II.26) holds, so that a
steady state growth path for capital exists. It is seen from the diagram that the equilibrium
point C, which corresponds to the smaller equilibrium value q~ (negative root), is an
1

unstable equilibrium, while point D, which corresponds to the larger value, q~2 (positive
root), is locally stable. However, it can be shown that any time path for q which
converges to equilibrium point D violates the transversality condition (II.23), which is
required to be met.
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q’

B

A

q

Figure 2. Phase diagram.

Substituting (II.24) into (II.23) we get
 q − (1 + r + ε )
 
− r t = 0 .
lim qt K 0 exp 
t →∞
 h(1 + r + ε )
 

It is clearly seen that when

(II.34)

q − (1 + r + ε )
− r > 0 ⇒ q > (1 + r + ε )(1 + rh ) this limit
h(1 + r + ε )

diverges. Thereby, the larger root q~2 violates the transversality condition on the capital
stock. Similarly, the smaller root q~1 ensures that the required transversality condition
holds. The behavior of the q can thus be summarized by
Proposition 1 The only solution for q which is consistent with the transversality condition
is that q always be at the unstable steady-state solution q~ , given by the negative root to
1

(II.27). Consequently there are no transitional dynamics in the market price of capital q.
In response to any shock, q immediately jumps to its new equilibrium value.
The domestic government is assumed to maintain a continuously balanced budget, given
by
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(

)

m& h + m& f + ε mh + m f = τ .

(II.35)

Defining m ≡ m h + m f (II.30) is written as
m& + ε m = τ .

(II.36)

Combining equations (II.3), (II.6), (II.7), (II.16) and (II.21) with the government's budget
constraint (II.31) implies that the rate of accumulation of net foreign bonds by the private
sector, the current account balance, is described by92
 h I 
B& = rB + A0 K − C − I 1 +
,
 2K

(II.37)

where B is the stock of net foreign bonds defined as B ≡ B h − B f .
Substituting the expressions for C(t) from (II.13), for I from (II.21) and K(t) from
(II.24), the accumulation equation (II.32) can be written in the form
B& = rB + θ K 0 e −ψ t − C0 e−φ t ,

(II.38)

where ϕ and ψ are defined in (II.12) and (II.21), respectively, and

θ ≡ A0 −

q 2 − (1 + r + ε )

2h(1 + r + ε )

2

2

.

(II.39)

The q appearing in (II.34) is the negative root q1 given by (II.27), though for notational
convenience the subscript 1 will henceforth be omitted.
The final step is to solve (II.33). Starting from a given initial stock B0 , the stock if
traded bonds at time t is given by

θ K0
C 
θ K 0 ψ t C0 φt

Bt =  B0 +
e +
e .
− 0  e− rt −
r −ψ r − φ 
r −ψ
r −φ


`

(II.40)

Equations (II.13), (II.24) and (II.35) together with the solution for q describe the
evolution of the small open economy starting from given initial stocks of traded bonds
B0 and capital stock K 0 . An important characteristic of this equilibrium is that

92

The reader may find the detailed derivation in Appendix II.
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consumption and physical capital are always on their steady state growth paths, growing
at the rates ϕ and ψ respectively. The former is driven by the difference between the
rate of return on foreign (and domestic) bonds and the domestic rate of time preference,
as is described by equation (II.12). The growth rate of output (and capital) is driven by q,
which is determined by the technological conditions in the domestic economy, as
represented by the marginal physical product of capital, A0 , and adjustment costs h, as
well as the return on foreign (and domestic bonds). Substituting the negative root from
equation (II.27) into (II.21) we obtain the following expression for the equilibrium
growth rate of capital

(

2)

ψ% = r − r 1 + rh −

A0
.
1+ r + ε

(II.41)

For the simple linear production function the rate of growth of capital also determines the
equilibrium growth rate of domestic output. Therefore, an important feature of this
equilibrium is that it can sustain differential growth rates of consumption and domestic
output.
Another important characteristic of this equilibrium is that the growth rate of
consumption, ϕ , is completely neutral with respect to the inflation (or equivalently
depreciation) rate, ε . Given that money holdings are used to finance investment
expenditure, inflation can be interpreted as an investment tax. The neutrality result found
above is consistent with Turnovsky (1996), where the rate of growth of consumption is
immune to changes in the capital income tax. On the contrary, equation (II.36) implies
that the inflation rate affects negatively the equilibrium growth rate of capital (and
output). This result is qualitatively no different than that obtained in Turnovsky (1996),
where a higher tax on capital reduces the growth rate of capital.
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Model III. Inflation imitating a consumption tax in a model of endogenous labor93

The objective of the present section is to extend the benchmark framework (Model I)
in terms of allowing labor to be endogenously determined. Apart from enriching the
model’s realistic plausibility,94 this extension offers us insight on the validity of the
superneutrality result in an environment where employment channels are at work. The
model’s previous analytical structure is followed in near precision, while it reformulated
to account for the endogeneity of the time-allocation decision. The linguistic explanation
of mathematics is justly omitted, in order to avoid the unfruitful repetition of details.
The economy is populated by N identical individuals, each of who has an infinite
planning horizon and possesses perfect foresight. Population remains stationary over
time. Once again, we assume that the economy produces a single traded commodity, the
foreign price of which is given in the world market. In the absence of any impediments to
trade, the purchasing power parity condition is expressed in percentage terms as95

π =π* +ε .

(III.1)

Assuming that the foreign price level is constant and equal to one, π * is zero; hence
equation (III.1) implies

π =ε .

(III.2)

Output of the individual firm, y, is determined using an AK technology
β

y = A0 (1 − l ) k

A0 > 0 , 0 < β < 1 ,

(III.3)

We assume that the representative agent is endowed with one unit of time that can be
allocated either to leisure, l, or to work, 1-l, [0 < l < 1] . The individual firm faces
diminishing returns to scale in labor, and constant returns to scale in the factors that can
be accumulated (capital).
Combining (III.3) with Y = N y , aggregate output in the economy is given by
93

The following remark is ought to be made. The analytical framework of the model bears an evident
similarity with the theory presented in Turnovsky (1999). Turnovsky (1999) investigates the effects of tax
and expenditure policies on a small open economy in a model with linear production technology that
exhibits endogenously determined growth.
94
The terms ‘model’, or ‘benchmark model’ refer to Model I.
95
Unless otherwise specified, the notation of variables is identical to that of the previous models.
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β

Y = A0 (1 − l ) K

Ao > 0 , 0 < β < 1 .

(III.3´)

Thus aggregate output is proportional to the aggregate capital stock, thereby leading to an
equilibrium having ongoing, endogenously determined, growth. The aggregate output is
an AK technology, in which the productivity of the aggregate capital stock depends
positively upon the fraction of time devoted to work.
The individual firm also accumulates physical capital, with expenditure on a given
increase in the capital stock, i ≡ I , involving adjustment (installation) costs which we
N
incorporate in the quadratic function
Φ ( i, k ) = i +

h i2
 hi
= i 1 +
.
2k
 2k

(III.4)

Aggregating over the N individual firms, leads to
Φ(I, K ) = I +

h I2
 h I 
= I 1 +
.
2K
 2K

(III.4´)

Preferences are modeled in the conventional time-separable way using an
intertemporal isoelastic utility function. In addition to the optimal consumption level, the
individual chooses at each period the optimal allocation of time between leisure and
work.96
∞

U=∫1
γ
0

γ

(( ) ) e
C lθ
N

− ρt

dt ,

θ > 0 , − ∞ < γ ≤ 1 , 1 > γ (1 + θ ) ,

(III.5)
1 > γθ ,

where the parameter θ measures the impact of leisure on the welfare of the private agent.
The remaining constraints on the coefficients are required to ensure that the utility
function is concave in the C and l.
96

There are two classes of time-separable preferences for which the endogenous treatment of leisure is
consistent with steady-state growth. In the first class, the utility function takes the form U(C ,L), where U is
concave, twice differentiable and homogeneous of degree k. The second class of utility functions has been
proposed by King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988). This takes the form U(C, L) = log(C) + v(L), in the case of
unit elasticity of intertemporal substitution. [Rebelo, 1991 pp.513-4].
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We assume that the individual holds two assets. The first is domestic money, which is
not held by foreigners. The other is net foreign bonds that pay an exogenously given
world interest rate, r. The individual’s total assets, a, are therefore defined as follows
a = b + mi ,

(III.6)

Aggregating over the N individuals, we obtain an expression for the aggregate stock of
assets
A = B + m,

(III.6´)

Differentiating this equation yields
A& = B& + m& .

(III.6′)

The accumulation of assets by the aggregate economy is described by the following
equation
 h I 
A& = Y + rB − C − I 1 +
 +τ − ε m ,
 2K

(III.7)

Finally, we also impose the cash-in-advance constraint
mi = c ,

(III.8)

which, aggregating over the N individuals leads to
m=C.

(III.8´)

Substituting equations (III.3′) , (III.6′) , and (III.8′) into (III.7) yields the following asset
accumulation equation for the aggregate economy
β
 h I 
A& = A0 (1 − l ) K + rA − (1 + r + ε ) C − I 1 +
 +τ .
 2K

(III.9)

For simplicity we assume that capital does not depreciate, so that the economy faces the
physical capital accumulation constraint
K& = I .

(III.10)
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We consider the equilibrium generated in a centrally planned economy in which the
planner chooses K, C, I and l to maximize the utility of the representative agent, subject
to the aggregate resource constraint of the economy (III.9), and the capital accumulation
equation (III.10)
∞

U=∫1
0γ

max
K ,C , I ,l

γ

(( ) ) e
C lθ
N

− ρt

dt ,

β
 h I 
subject to: A& = A0 (1 − l ) K + rA − (1 + r + ε ) C − I 1 +
 +τ ,
 2K

K& = I .

and

The Hamiltonian for this optimization problem is given by
γ

( )l

H=1 C
γ N

θγ


β
 h I   ′
+ λ  A0 (1 − l ) K + rA − (1 + r + ε ) C − I 1 +
 +τ  + q I ,
 2K 


where λ and q ' denote the current value Lagrange multipliers. The optimality conditions
are the following
§

H C = 0 ⇒ N −γ C (

γ −1) ϑγ

§

H l = 0 ⇒ N −γ C γ θ l (

§

HI = 0 ⇒

§

λ& = −

§

2

∂H
h I  
β
q& ′ = −
+ q′ρ ⇒ q& ′ = −λ  A0 (1 − l ) +    + q′ρ .
∂K
2  K  


l

θγ −1)

= λ (1 + r + ε ) ,

= λ A0 K β (1 − l )

(III.11)
( β −1)

,

(III.12)

I q −1
=
≡ψ ,
K
h

(III.13)

λ&
∂H
+ λρ ⇒ = ρ − r ,
∂A
λ

(III.14)

Combining (III.15), with (III.13), (III.14) and q =

q'

λ

(III.15)

leads to

β

A0 (1 − l )
q& (q − 1) 2
+ +
=r.
q
q
2hq

(III.16)
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Equation (III.16) equates the net rate of return on domestic capital to the rate of return on
the traded bond. The former consists of three components. The first is the output per unit
of installed capital (valued at the price q), while the second is the rate of capital gain. The
third element reflects the fact that an additional source of benefits of higher capital stock
is to reduce the installation costs associated with new investment.
Finally, the following transversality conditions must be imposed
lim λ At e − ρt = 0 ,

(III.17a)

lim q′ K e− ρ t = 0 .

(III.17b)

t →∞

t →∞

Taking the time derivative of (III.11) we obtain the following expression

( γ − 1)

C&
+θγ
C

l& λ&
= = ρ −r .
l λ

(III.18)

Equation (III.13) is a differential equation for the growth rate of capital which can be
solved to yield
 q −1 
K t = K 0 exp {ψ t} = K 0 exp 
t .
 h 

(III.19)

Taking the time derivative of equation (III.12) and using equations (III.3 ′) , (III.11) and
(III.14) we get the following equation
 C&
l&  C
β 
K&
 l   l&  
Y  ρ − r + − ( β − 1) 
+ (θ γ − 1)  =
   .
l  l 1− l 
K
 1 − l   l 
 C

(1 + r + ε ) θ γ

(III.20)

Solving equation (III.12) and using equation (III.11) we obtain the equilibrium
consumption-leisure ratio
C
β
1
=Y
⋅
.
l
1 − l (1 + r + ε )θ

(III.21)

Substituting equation (III.21) into equation (III.20) we obtain
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γ

C&
l&
K&
 l   l& 
+ (θ γ − 1) = ρ − r + − ( β − 1) 
  .
C
l
K
 1− l   l 

Substituting for

(III.22)

C&
K&
from equation (III.18), and for
from equation (III.13) yields a
C
K

differential equation for leisure
l& =

(1 − γ )( q − 1)  ,
1 
r − ρ −

F (l ) 
h


(III.23)


1
 1 
where F ( l ) = 1 − γ (1 + θ )   + (1 − γ )(1 − β ) 
 > 0 .
l 
 1 − l 

The macroeconomic equilibrium can be expressed by the pair of differential
equations in q and l, as given by equations (III.16) and (III.23)


( q − 1)2 − A 1 − l β
q& = rq −
)
0(
2h

.

l& = 1  r − ρ − (1 − γ )( q − 1) 

 F (l ) 
h




(III.24)

The steady state is described by setting q& = l& = 0 and is therefore characterized by the
relative price of capital, q, and the fraction of time devoted to leisure, l, both being
constant. Linearizing system (III.24) around the steady state, we can show that the two
eigenvalues to the linearized approximation are both real and positive97. Hence, we
conclude that the only bounded equilibrium is one in which both q and l adjust
instantaneously to ensure that the economy is always on its balanced growth path given
by
~
A0 1 − l
q~

( )

ψ~ =

97

β

+

(q~ − 1)2

=r,
2hq~

(III.25a)

q~ − 1 r − ρ
=
,
1− γ
h

(III.25b)

The reader may find the derivation in Appendix II.
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where ψ~ is the equilibrium growth rate of capital.
Taking the time derivative of the aggregate production function (III.3′) and setting
l& = 0 , it is shown that the rate of growth of capital also determines the equilibrium

growth rate of domestic output
Y& K& r − ρ ~
≡ψ .
= =
Y K 1− γ

(III.26)

Setting l& = 0 in equation (III.18) we obtain an expression for the equilibrium growth rate
of consumption
C& r − ρ ~
≡ψ
=
C 1− γ

(III.27)

One may observe that the equilibrium of this model is one in which domestic output,
capital and consumption all grow at a common rate. The latter is determined by the
difference between the world rate of interest and the domestic rate of time preference,
multiplied by the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. From equation (III.25b) we may
obtain the equilibrium price of capital, q~ ; this is the capital value that once attained, it is
ensured that aggregate capital grows at the equilibrium rate, ψ~ . Having obtained q~ ,
equation (III.25a) then determines the fraction of time devoted to leisure (employment).
We conclude that in this small open economy with elastic labor supply the growth rate of
output, and capital is independent of production characteristics, such as the productivity
parameter, A0 , and the marginal adjustment cost, h. Changes in these parameters are only
reflected in the individual’s labor-leisure choice.
The domestic government is assumed to maintain a continuously balanced budget,
which is expressed by the following equation
m& + ε m = τ .

(III.28)

Substituting equation (III.6′′) into (III.7), and using the government's budget constraint,
we obtain the current account balance equation
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 h I 
B& = Y + rB − C − I 1 +
,
 2K

(III.29)

 C  Y
I  h I 
or B& = rB + 1 −  − 1 +
 K .
 Y  K K  2 K 
We substitute

(III.29´)

C
I
,
, and K (t ) in (III.29′) for the equivalent expressions from
Y K

equations (III.21), (III.13), and (III.19) respectively. We obtain

β
l%  Y% q% 2 − 1 
ψ% t
B& = rB + 1 −
⋅
 K0 e .
 %−
%
r
K
h
θ
ε
+
+
(1
)
2
l
−
1




(III.30)

Solving this equation we get an expression for the nation's intertemporal resource
constraint
K
B0 + 0
r −ψ%


l%  Y% q% 2 − 1 
β
⋅
 1 −
 = 0.
 −
2h 
 θ (1 + r + ε ) 1 − l%  K%

(III.31)

The initial value of the nation's foreign bonds plus the capitalized value of the current
account surplus along the balanced growth path must sum to zero. Having determined the
~
equilibrium values of l , q~ and Y% K% , the intertemporal constraint (III.31) then
determines the combination of the initial capital stock, K 0 , and the initial stock of
foreign bonds, B0 , necessary for the equilibrium to be intertemporally viable. If the
inherited stocks of these assets violate (III.31) it is assumed that the central planner can

% 0 = 0 to bring about the correct ratio.
engage in an initial trade, described by dB0 + qdK
The above model with a simple cash-in-advance constraint imposed on individual
consumption purchases behaves very similarly with the model developed in Turnovsky
(1999). Domestic consumption, capital, and output all grow at a common rate determined
by taste parameters, together with the rate of return on foreign bonds. The long-run
growth rate was found to be independent of the inflation rate. This result is consistent
with the findings of Turnovsky (1999), according which the growth rate is completely
neutral with respect to any fiscal instruments, including the tax rate on consumption.
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Model IV. Inflation imitating capital taxation in a model of endogenous labor98

We consider a small open economy populated by a representative agent, who
consumes and produces a single traded commodity, the foreign price of which is given in
the world market. In the absence of any impediments to trade, purchasing power parity is
assumed to hold. Expressed in percentage terms, it is described by

π =π* +ε ,

(IV.1)

Assuming that the foreign price level is constant and equal to one, π * is equal to zero,
and equation (IV.1) is written

π =ε .

(IV.2)

We assume that the domestic resident holds three assets, domestic money, which is
not held by foreigners, and domestic and foreign bonds. The latter two earn the same real
interest rate, r. The individual’s total assets, A h are therefore defined as
Ah = B h + m h ,

(IV.3)

where B h denotes the real stock of domestic and foreign bonds, and m h the real money
holdings of the individual consumer. It follows that
A& h = B& h + m& h .

(IV.3´)

Once again, we assume that the representative agent is endowed with a unit of time that
can be allocated either to leisure, l, or to work, 1-l, [0 < l < 1] . The representative
consumer chooses her level of consumption, C, the fraction of time allocated to leisure
(work) l, and total assets, A h , by solving the following intertemporal optimization
problem
∞

Max

U = ∫ 1 Clθ
0γ

γ

( )

e − ρ t dt ,

(IV.4)
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The following note is ought to be remarked. The analytical framework of the model bears an evident
similarity with the theory presented in Turnovsky (1999). Turnovsky (1999) investigates the effects of tax
and expenditure policies on a small open economy in a model with linear production technology that
exhibits endogenously determined growth.
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where θ > 0 , − ∞ < γ ≤ 1 , 1 > γ (1 + θ ) , 1 > γθ ,
subject to the budget constraint, expressed in real terms as
C + B& h + m& h + ε m h = w (1 − l ) + D + rB h + τ ,

(IV.5)

The constraints on coefficients are required to ensure that the utility function is concave
in the C and l. We recall that w is the real wage rate, D is the real profit paid out to the
individual consumer, and τ denotes real government transfers.
i

We impose the additional condition that the individual holds money in order to
finance her consumption expenditure. This implies the cash-in-advance constraint
mh = C .

(IV.6)

Combing equations (IV.3′) , (IV.5) and (IV.6), the individual’s budget constraint is
written as follows
A& h = w (1 − l ) + D + rAh + τ − (1 + r + ε ) C .

(IV.7)

The representative consumer’s optimization problem is to choose C, l and Ah, to
maximize (IV.4) subject to the budget constraint (IV.7). The Hamiltonian for this
problem is
H = 1 Clθ

γ

)
γ(

+ λ  w (1 − l ) + D + rAh + τ − (1 + r + ε ) C  .

(IV.8)

The optimality conditions for this problem are the following
§

HC = 0 ⇒ C(

γ −1) θγ

§

H l = 0 ⇒ θ C γ lθγ −1 = λ w ,

§

λ& = −

§

The Transversality Condition: limλ Ath e − ρ t = 0 .

l

= λ (1 + r + ε ) ,

(IV.9)
(IV.10)

∂H
λ&
+ λρ ⇒ = ρ − r ,
h
λ
∂A

(IV.11)

t →∞
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(IV.12)

Taking the time derivative of equation (IV.9) we obtain an expression for the growth
rate of individual (as well as aggregate) consumption

( γ − 1)

C&
l& λ&
+θγ = = ρ − r .
C
l λ

(IV.13)

The representative firm’s formal optimization problem is to choose the level of
investment, I, and capital, K, to maximize real profit
∞

Π = ∫ D e− rt dt ,

(IV.14)

t =0

subject to the accumulation equation
K& = I .

(IV.15)

The firm’s profit, D, is defined as follows
D = A0 (1 − l )

β

M& f
f
&
K − w (1 − l ) − Φ ( I , K ) − rB + B −
.
P
f

(IV.16)

Domestic output of the commodity, Y, is determined by the domestic capital stock, K, and
employment level, (1 − l ) , using the technology
β

Y = A0 (1 − l ) K

A0 > 0 , 0 < β < 1 .

(IV.17)

Evidently, we have assumed that the representative firm faces diminishing returns to
scale in labor, and constant returns to scale in capital. Thus aggregate output is
proportional to the aggregate capital stock, leading to an equilibrium having ongoing,
endogenously determined, growth. The aggregate output is an AK technology, in which
the productivity of the aggregate capital stock depends positively upon the fraction of
time devoted to work.
We also assume that the expenditure on a given increase in the capital stock, I,
involves adjustment costs (installation costs) which we incorporate in the quadratic
function
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Φ(I, K ) = I + h

I2
 h I 
= I 1 +
.
2K
 2K

(IV.18)

In addition, at any period t, the firm issues corporate bonds at the rate B& f , and it pays
interest on the existing stock of previously issued bonds, B f .
We impose the cash-in-advance constraint that the individual firm holds money in
order to finance its investment expenditure. This implies the additional constraint
 h I 
m f = Φ ( I , K ) = I 1 +
,
 2K

(IV.19)

where, we recall m f is the firm’s real money holdings. In other words,
Mf
m =
.
P
f

(IV.20)

Differentiating equation (IV.19) we obtain an expression for the rate of change of the
firm’s money holdings in real terms
M& f
= m& f + ε m f ,
P

(IV.21)

where ε m f is the cost of inflation tax.
The firm’s total assets are defined as
Af = mf − B f ,

(IV.22)

implying that
A& f = m& f − B& f .

(IV.23)

Combining equations (IV.16), (IV.19), (IV.21), (IV.22) and (IV.23) we obtain
β
 h I  &f
f
D = A0 (1 − l ) K − w (1 − l ) − (1 + r + ε ) I 1 +
 − A − rA .
 2K

(

The firm’s optimization problem becomes
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)

(IV.24)


β
 h I 
f  − rt
&f
∫  A0 (1 − l ) K − w (1 − l ) − (1 + r + ε ) I 1 +
 − A − rA  e dt .
 2K
t =0 

∞

max

(

)

subject to the capital accumulation equation K& = I .
It can be shown that this is equivalent to solving
∞
β
 h I   − rt
max ∫  A0 (1 − l ) K − w (1 − l ) − (1 + r + ε ) I 1 +
  e dt ,
I ,K 0 
 2 K 

subject to the capital accumulation equation K& = I .
The Hamiltonian for this problem is
β
 h I 
H = A0 (1 − l ) K − w (1 − l ) − (1 + r + ε ) I 1 +
 + qI ,
 2K

(IV.25)

and the optimality conditions are given by
I q − (1 + r + ε )
=
≡ψ ,
K
h (1 + r + ε )

§

HI = 0 ⇒

§

H (1−l ) = 0 ⇒ A0 β K (1 − l )

§

( q − (1 + r + ε ) ) = r ,
∂H
q& A (1 − l )
q& = −
+ qr ⇒ + 0
+
2hq (1 + r + ε )
∂K
q
q

(IV.28)

§

The Transversality Condition: lim qKt e − rt = 0 .

(IV.29)

β −1

(IV.26)

= w,

(IV.27)

β

2

t →∞

Equation (IV.26) is an expression for the growth rate of aggregate capital, which can
be solved to yield
 q − (1 + r + ε ) 
K t = K 0 exp {ψ t} = K 0 exp 
t.
 h(1 + r + ε ) 

(IV.30)

Combining equations (IV.10) and (IV.27) we have

θ C γ lθγ −1 = λ A0 β K (1 − l )

β −1

.

(IV.31)
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Taking the time derivative of equation (IV.31) and combining with equations (IV.9),
(IV.11) and (IV.26) we obtain
q − (1 + r + ε )
 C&
 l&  
β 
l&  C
+ (θ γ − 1)  =
− ( β − 1) 
Y ρ − r +
  . (IV.32)
l  l 1− l 
h (1 + r + ε )
 C
 1 − l 

(1 + r + ε )θ γ

Combining equation (IV.31) with equations (IV.9) and (IV.17) we obtain the equilibrium
consumption-leisure ratio
C
β
Y
=
⋅
.
l θ (1 + r + ε ) 1 − l

(IV.33)

Setting equation (IV.33) into (IV.32) yields

γ

q − (1 + r + ε )
 l& 
C&
l&
+ (θ γ − 1) = ρ − r +
− ( β − 1) 
.
C
l
h (1 + r + ε )
 1− l 

(IV.34)

Substituting for C& C from equation (IV.13) yields the differential equation for leisure
l& =

(1 − γ )  q − (1 + r + ε ) 
1 
r − ρ −
,
F ( l ) 
h (1 + r + ε )


(IV.35)


1
 1 
where F ( l ) = 1 − γ (1 + θ )   + (1 − γ )(1 − β ) 
 > 0 .
l 
 1 − l 

The macroeconomic equilibrium can be expressed by the pair of differential
equations in q and l, as given by equations (IV.28) and (IV.35) respectively
2

 q − (1 + r + ε ) 
β
q& = rq −
− A0 (1 − l )
2h (1 + r + ε )

.



−

−
+
+

q
r
1
1
γ
ε
( ) (
)
&
1

l = F l  r − ρ −
h (1 + r + ε )
( ) 



(IV.36)

The steady state is described by setting q& = l& = 0 , hence characterized by the relative
price of capital, q, and the fraction of time devoted to leisure, l, both being constant.
Linearizing system (IV.36) around the steady state, we can show that the two eigenvalues
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to the linearized approximation are both real and positive99. Therefore, the conclusion is
reached that the only bounded equilibrium is one in which both q and l adjust
instantaneously to ensure that the economy is always on its balanced growth path given
by

(

A0 1 − l%
q%

ψ% =

β

) + ( q% − (1 + r + ε ) )

2h (1 + r + ε ) q%

q% − (1 + r + ε )
h (1 + r + ε )

=

2

(IV.37a)

=r,

r−ρ
,
1− γ

(IV.37b)

where ψ~ is the equilibrium growth rate of capital.
Taking the time derivative of the aggregate production function (IV.17), and setting
l& = 0 , we can obtain the equilibrium growth rate of capital (and output)
Y& K& r − ρ ~
= =
≡ψ .
Y K 1− γ

(IV.38)

Setting l& = 0 in equation (IV.13) we obtain an expression for the equilibrium growth rate
of consumption
C& r − ρ ~
=
≡ψ .
C 1− γ

(IV.39)

The conclusion is reached that in equilibrium domestic output, capital and consumption
all grow at a common rate determined by the world interest rate, the domestic rate of time
preference, and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. From equation (IV.37b) we
may obtain the equilibrium price of capital, q~ ; this is the value of capital that once
attained, it is ensured that domestic capital grows at the equilibrium rate, ψ~ . Having
obtained q~ , equation (IV.37a) then determines the equilibrium employment time.
Finally, it is observed that in this small open economy with elastic labor supply, the
growth rate of output (and capital) is independent of production characteristics, such as

99

The reader may find the detailed derivation in Appendix II.
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the productivity parameter, A0 , and the marginal adjustment cost, h. Changes in these
parameters are reflected only in the equilibrium labor-leisure choice.
The domestic government is assumed to maintain a continuously balanced budget,
given by

(

)

m& h + m& f + ε m h + m f = τ .

(IV.40)

Defining m ≡ mh + m f equation (IV.40) is written as
m& + ε m = τ .

(IV.41)

Combining equations (IV.3), (IV.7), (IV.16), (IV.17), (IV.23) and the government's
budget constraint (IV.41) we obtain the rate of accumulation of net foreign bonds by the
private sector (the current account balance)
 h I 
B& = Y + rB − C − I 1 +
,
 2K

 C  Y
I  h I 
or B& = rB + 1 −  − 1 +
 K ,
 Y  K K  2 K 

(IV.42)

(IV.42′)

where we note that the stock of net foreign bonds is defined as B ≡ B h − B f .
We substitute for C Y , I K and K (t ) , in equation (IV.42 ′) , with the equivalent
expressions from equations (IV.33), (IV.26) and (IV.30) respectively. We obtain
2
2

l%  Y% q% − (1 + r + ε ) 
β
&
B = rB + 1 −
 K 0 eψ% t .
 % −
2
%
θ (1 + r + ε ) 1 − l  K 2h (1 + r + ε ) 


(IV.43)

Solving this equation we get an expression for the nation's intertemporal resource
constraint
K
B0 + 0
r −ψ%

2
2

l%  Y% q% − (1 + r + ε ) 
β
 1 −
⋅
 = 0.
 −
2
 θ (1 + r + ε ) 1 − l%  K%
2h(1 + r + ε ) 

(IV.44)

The initial value of the nation's foreign bonds plus the capitalized value of the current
account surplus along the balanced growth path must sum to zero. Having determined the
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~
equilibrium values of l , q~ and Y% K% , the intertemporal resource constraint (IV.44)
determines the combination of the initial capital stock, K 0 , and the initial stock of
foreign bonds, B0 , necessary for the equilibrium to be intertemporally viable.
The above cash-in-advance model, and the model developed in the previous section
(Model III) behave very similarly with the model developed in Turnovsky (1999). In all
three models the equilibrium is such that domestic consumption, capital, and output all
grow at a common rate, determined by taste parameters, together with the return on
foreign bonds (the after-tax rate of return on foreign bonds in Turnovsky, 1999). We
found the long-run growth rate to be independent of the inflation rate. This result is
consistent with the findings of Turnovsky (1999), according which the growth rate is
completely neutral with respect to fiscal instruments, such as the tax rate on consumption,
and capital income.
Concluding remarks

The present study has been an enquiry on an old theme in the theory of
macroeconomics, namely, how far may be carried the confidence in monetary policy’s
importance. The question is reopened, would economic dynamics possibly take monetary
effectiveness too far afield, to determine the pace, and character of the process of
economic growth? The analysis is carried with reference to an economy being open, yet a
price taker in the international capital markets. That financial intermediation constitutes
an inextricable part of the process of economic growth is an idea with a long recognition
in macroeconomic literature. The theory we sketched brings a valid argument of this
view, with the role of monetary policy be interwoven into the process. It goes without
saying that when credit markets do not function perfectly, or are entirely missing, money
is assigned the role of being the primary, or sole, medium of exchange. We postulate that
the possibility of intermediated credit does not exist, with the intention of the assumption
being to uncover the role of inflation as tax on private spending. Initially, the postulate
applies on purchases of consumption goods only. In an alternative version of the model,
the investment on capital goods is being subjected to the constraint that cash balances
carried from the previous period are the only means of conducting the transaction. In this
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latter case, inflation bears an evident analogy to a capital tax. The theory been
constructed thus gives us an insight into how inflation is been conceived to imitating
fiscal tax instruments. To elucidate the consequences of endogenously determined labor,
the theory is initially built on models that abstract from the decision to allocate time
between leisure and other productive activities. The analysis has been extended to
account for the endogeneity of the time-allocation decision in the second part of this
essay.
Owing to access in world capital markets, the economy may sustain differential
growth rates in consumption expenditure, and domestic output production (capital). In all
outlined models, the former is determined by the difference between the rate of return on
traded bonds and domestic rate of time preference, multiplied by the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution. It needs to be said that this definition is logically derived from a
set of properties, and basic assumptions of the theory. A form of specific generality has
been established here, in the sense that the expression of consumption’s growth rate is
shown to be common to all four individual cases. As a consequence, it is independent of
monetary aggregates irrespective of the role of inflation as consumption, or capital
income tax.
With reference to the issue of money superneutrality the analysis has brought up the
following propositions: (i) Inflation in the role of a consumption tax has no impact on the
growth rate of an open economy’s output (capital). This is true in both cases of fixed, and
elastic labor supply. (ii) When inflation performs the role of a capital tax the
superneutrality result breaks down in a framework of fixed labor supply. Monetary
expansion acts to raise the effective relative price of capital, thus having a negative
distortionary effect on the growth rate of output. (iii) In an environment that
accommodates an endogenous labor – leisure choice, the validity of the superneutrality
result is reestablished. This is in contrast to a closed economy, where the adverse effect is
also prevalent in the case of elastic labor supply.
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ESSAY III
Habit Formation in Durable Consumption and the Current Account:
The Dynamic Effects of Fiscal Policies*
*The present essay was written under the supervision of Dr. Mohammed Mohsin, during
the time period October 2004 to February 2005, at the University of Tennessee,
Knoxville. The research analysis is the product of the author’s collaborated work with
Dr. Mohsin.

Introduction
Theme This essay constitutes a theory on the long run effects of fiscal tax and

expenditure policies. The analysis is carried with reference to an open economy, yet a
price taker in the international markets. Our interest lies in exploring the transitional
dynamics of the current account in response to permanent fiscal shocks. The empirical
literature in the international macroeconomics has established that the current account
evolves non-monotonically along its adjustment path to the long run equilibrium. It has
been the aim of this study to show that this empirical phenomenon may be proved within
the theory, thus be validated on the ground of acceptance of a mathematical proposition.
To this endeavor we sought two sources of time non-separability in the preference
structure, habit forming consumption in consumer durable goods. When households
choose to maintain their habitual standard of living and consumption exhibits a degree of
durability, optimal private choices induce the non-monotonic dynamics on consumption,
hence saving, behavior that are exactly consistent with the factual evidence on the current
account. It ought to be said that adopting the aforementioned source of time nonseparability is a critical task in its own right, irrespective of the role in inducing the aimed
dynamics. Empirical studies in macroeconomics have continuously argued in favor of
habit-forming patterns in consumption behavior, as well as of significant private
expenditure in goods with durable character. Clearly, accommodating these aspects of
individual behavior into the model vitally enhances the realistic plausibility of the theory,
thus establishing its practical value. Omitting them from a theory constructed to explain a
phenomenon pertaining to saving behavior may justly become a point of valid criticism.
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Few studies have attempted to examine the implications of government, or monetary
policies in an open economy framework using a time dependent, yet an exogenous
preference structure. Examples include Obstfeld (1992), Mansoorian (1993, 1996, and
1998), and Ikeda and Gombi (1998), with the last being the sole study in the area of fiscal
macroeconomics. The theory outlined in this essay constitutes an extension of the
research in Ikeda and Gombi (1998) on two dimensions. In contrast to the latter study,
consumption possesses a character of durability in our analysis. Secondly, we consider a
broader array of fiscal tax instruments. Whereas Ikeda and Gombi (1998) examine the
implications of capital taxation and government spending, the analysis herein
accommodates the impact of taxation on consumption expenditure, income from holdings
of foreign bonds, and finally lump-sum taxation.
Habit formation In a seminal paper, Ryder and Heal (1973) addressed the issue of

complementarity between consumption at successive moments, and proposed a new, at
the time, more realistic formulation of the utility function. The essential feature of their
approach is that a new variable is introduced into the utility function, interpreted as the
customary level of consumption. Instantaneous satisfaction depends both on
instantaneous consumption and on the customary consumption level, implying a form of
∞

the utility function U (c(⋅) ) ≡ ∫ e −δt u[c(t ), z (t )]dt . The variable z (t ) represents the habitual
0

standard of living, and is defined as the weighted average of past consumption levels,
with the weights declining exponentially into the past. The justification for including
such a variable is obvious: the amount of satisfaction that a person derives from
consuming a given bundle of goods depends not only on that bundle, but also on her past
consumption and on her general social environment. This approach has considerable
intuitive plausibility: For example, it is not uncommon for sociologists concerned with
political changes during economic development to remark that a period of historically
high consumption levels followed by a drop in consumption is more likely to cause social
discontent than is a period of uniformly low consumption levels: in the former case, the
period of high consumption builds up high customary or expected consumption levels,

144

and the decline, though it may be to levels that are historically high, produces a sharp fall
in satisfaction [Ryder and Heal, 1973 pp.1-2].
Models in which habits develop over the flow of services provided by consumption
have been used by a number of authors to explain several macroeconomic and financial
regularities and puzzles. Constantinides (1990) uses the habit-persistence model of Ryder
and Heal (1973) to solve the Mehra and Prescott (1985) equity premium puzzle. He is
able to solve the puzzle because the habit persistence model can smooth consumption
over and above the smoothing implied by the usual time separable preference structure.
Backus, Gregory, and Telmer (1993) show that habit persistence helps to account for the
high variation in the expected returns on the forward relative to spot markets for
currencies. Moreover, Mansoorian (1993) uses the habit-persistence model to reexamine
the Harberger-Laursen-Metzler effect. More recently, Mansoorian (1996) examines the
policy implications of the habit-persistence model in a small open economy framework.
Heaton (1993), Ferson and Constantinides (1991), and Fuhrer (2000) among others
provide empirical evidence in favor of habit persistence.
Durability in consumption expenditure Dunn and Singleton (1986), Eichenbaum,
Hansen and Singleton (1988) and Eichenbaum and Hansen (1990) have documented their
results as evidence of significant consumption expenditures in durable goods. In addition,
Ferson and Constantinides (1991), Heaton (1993, 1995) among others have clearly
confirmed that the introduction of durable goods helped improve the empirical
performance of asset pricing models. It is important to note that durables and semidurables make up about 20 percent of total consumption expenditures in industrial
countries. Moreover durable goods are known to be a big part of business cycles. Yet,
almost all theoretical models with a single-good, intertemporal optimizing framework,
have paid scant attention to these facts and incorporated only non-durable goods. In a
single-good model, a possible approximation of the reality would be to inject a certain
degree of durability.
Outline of the essay The precise structure of the model is set out in the following
section, in accompaniment of an elaborate analysis on the equilibrium dynamics of the
model. A note in the end takes the role of final conclusion.
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The model
Structure of the model The model is one of a small open economy populated by
infinitely lived identical agents. There is a single traded good, which can be used for
consumption and investment. Given the market wage, wt , households supply one unit of
labor inelastically in each point in time t. They hold non-human wealth in the form of
foreign bonds bt . Bonds can be purchased in the international market at a constant
interest rate r .
The household’s consumption behavior is habit-forming. As in Ryder and Heal (1973)
we assume that the habitual standard of living is a weighted average of past consumption
of the services of consumer durables (c j + s j , j < t ) , with exponentially declining weights
given to more distant values of c j + s j . We have
t

z t = ρ ∫ (cτ + sτ ) exp(− ρ (t − τ ))dτ ,

(1)

−∞

where z t represents the habitual standard, and ρ ( > 0) is a parameter determining the
relative weights of consumption at different times. Equation (1) may be re-written as
follows
(1′)

z&t = ρ (ct + st − z t ) .

It is noted that ct denotes the consumption rate (the amount of consumer durables
purchased at time t), and st is the stock of durable goods, assumed to have been inherited
from the past. It is further assumed that durable goods depreciate at the rate δ .
Therefore, we write
t

st =

∫ exp(δ (τ − t ))cτ dτ .

(2)

−∞

It follows that the evolution of st is given by
(2′)

s&t = ct − δ st .
The consumer’s lifetime utility function is specified as follows
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∞

U 0 = ∫ U (ct + st , z t ) exp(−θt )dt .

(3)

0

where θ is the rate of time preference. In accordance to Ryder and Heal (1973) the utility
function U (⋅) satisfies the following regularity conditions:
(i) U 1 > 0 ;
(ii) U 2 ≤ 0 ;
(iii) U 1 (c + s, c + s) + U 2 (c + s, c + s) > 0 ;
(iv) U is concave in (c + s, z ) ; and
(v) lim c + s →0 [U 1 (c + s, c + s) + U 2 (c + s, c + s)] = ∞ .
Intertemporal

complementarities

in

consumption

are

defined

as

U12 (c, c) + ( ρ / (θ + 2 ρ ))U 22 (c, c) < (> )0 , where preferences are said to display distant
(adjacent) complementarity respectively. The meaning is that present consumption is
complementary to consumption in the distant (adjacent) future respectively (see Ryder
and Heal, 1973) [Ikeda and Gombi, 1998 p.366].
The representative household’s optimization problem is choosing the set of variables
C 0 = {ct , z t , st , bt }t =0 so as to maximize equation (3), subject to the equations of motion
∞

for z t , and st , as given by equations (1) and (2) respectively, the flow budget constraint
expressed by
b&t = r (1 − τ b ) bt + wt + π t − (1 + τ c ) ct − Tt ,

(4)

the non-Ponzi game condition lim t →∞ bt e − rt > 0 , the path of {Tt } taken as given, and the
initial conditions (b0 , z 0 , s0 ) . It is noted that π t is the profit that the representative
household receives as the owner of the firm.
The shadow prices of saving, habit formation, and durable goods are represented
respectively by the variables λt (≥ 0) , ξ t (≤ 0) and µ t (≥ 0) . The Hamiltonian for the
representative agent’s problem is expressed as
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H ≡ U (ct + st , zt ) + λt [ r (1 − τ b ) bt + wt + π t − (1 + τ c )ct − Tt ] + ξt [ ρ (ct + st − zt )] + µt (ct − δ st ) .

The optimality conditions for this problem are given by the following expressions
U 1 (ct + st , z t ) − λt (1 + τ c ) + ξ t ρ + µ t ≡ 0 ,

(5)

λ&t = λt (θ − r (1 − τ b )) ,

(6)

ξ&t = −U 2 (ct + st , z t ) + ξ t ( ρ + θ ) ,

(7)

µ& t = −U 1 (ct + st , z t ) + µ t (δ + θ ) − ρξ t .

(8)

The transversality conditions are given by
lim e−θ t λt bt = 0 ,

(9)

lim e−θ tξt zt = 0 ,

(10)

lim e−θ t µt st = 0 .

(11)

t →∞

t →∞

t →∞

Equation (6) implies that the only way for λt to be at steady state is for

θ = r (1 − τ b ) .

(12)

It is taken as given in the foregoing analysis that equation (12) holds true, implying that

λt is always at its steady state value.
The representative firm chooses the time profiles of labor demand and the rate of net
∞

investment { lt , I t }t =0 so as to maximize the present discounted value of its future net cash
flows. The output of the individual firm, y t , is determined using the following
technology
yt = AF (kt , lt ) = Ak a l1−a

a < 1,

(13)
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where A is the productivity parameter, and k t denotes the firm’s capital stock, assumed to
be infinitely durable. Further, the production function AF (k t , l t ) is linearly homogeneous
in k t and l t .
It is a major assumption of the model that the individual firm’s expenditure on a given
increase in the capital stock, I t , involves adjustment (or installation) costs. The latter are
incorporated in the non-negative quadratic function G (I ) , that satisfies the properties
G (0) = 0 and G ′(0) = 0 . Convexity implies G ′ ≥ 0 and G ′′ > 0 .

The representative firm’s optimization problem is therefore described by
∞

V0 = max ∫ π t exp(−(r − τ b ))t ,

(14)

0

subject to k&t = I t ,

(15)

where

π t = AF (k t , lt ) − wt lt − τ k k t − I t − G ( I t ) .

(16)

Considering capital taxation, τ k is specified as the tax levied on each unit of k t . Letting
qt (> 0) represent the shadow price of investment, in other words, the marginal q, the
Hamiltonian for the firm’s problem is
H ≡ AF (k t , l t ) − wt lt − τ k k t − I t − G ( I t ) + qt I t .

(17)

The equilibrium behavior of the firm satisfies the following optimality conditions
AFl (k t ,1) = wt ,

(18)

qt = 1 + G ′( I t )
⇒ I t = G ′ −1 (qt − 1) = I (qt ) ,

(19)

q& t = − AFk (k t ,1) + τ k + (r − τ b )qt ,

(20)

where, it is noted that labor supply has been normalized to unity. Finally, the
transversality condition is given by
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lim qt kt e − ( r −τ b ) t = 0 .

(21)

t →∞

Throughout the analysis it is assumed that domestic government maintains
continuously a balanced budget given by
g t = Tt + τ b rbt + τ c ct + τ k k t .

(22)

Thus, government expenditure g t , is equal to the tax revenues from lump-sum taxation,
and the taxes on holdings of the foreign bond, physical capital, and consumption. For
exogenously given levels of g t , and the tax rates τ b , τ c and τ k , the lump-sum tax Tt is
residually determined by equation (22).
Equilibrium dynamics and the steady state
The dynamic system for ( z t , ξ t , µ t , k t , qt ) is derived from equations (1), (5), (7)-(12),
and (19)-(20). To this goal, equation (5) is linearized around the steady state to obtain
Qt − Q = −

U 12*
ρ
1
( z t − z ) − * (ξ t − ξ ) − * ( µ t − µ ) ,
*
U 11
U 11
U 11

(23)

where Qt = ct + st , and stars denote steady state values. Linearizing equation (1) around
the steady state and using equation (23) one obtains

 U 12*
ρ2
ρ
z&t = − ρ  * + 1( z t − z ) − * (ξ t − ξ ) − * ( µ t − µ ) .
U 11
U 11

 U 11

(24)

Similarly, the linearization of equation (7) yields

ξ&t =

*
*
*

  U 21

U 21
U 12*2 − U 11* U 22


z
z
(
)
ρ
1
θ
(
ξ
−
ξ
)
+
(µt − µ ) ,
+
−
+
+


t
t

 *
U 11*
U 11*


  U 11

(25)

where equation (23) has been used to substitute for (Qt − Q ) . Combining equations (8)
and (5) one gets

µ& t = −λt (1 + τ c ) + (1 + δ + θ ) µ t ,

(26)

which, after linearization becomes
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µ& t = (1 + δ + θ )( µ t − µ ) .

(26΄)

The dynamic system is completed with equations (27) and (28), which are obtained after
linearizing equations (19) and (20), respectively.
k&t = G′′−1 (q − 1)  (qt − q ) ,

(27)

q& t = − AFkk (k ,1)(k t − k ) + (r − τ b )(q t − q ) .

(28)

The system describing the dynamics of the economy consists of equations (24), (25),
(26΄), (27) and (28). Therefore it is given by
*

 U12

 − ρ  * + 1
 U11 
 z&t  
 &   *2
* *
 ξt   U12 − U11U 22
*
 µ& t  = 
U11

& 
0
 kt  
 q&  
 t 
0

0


−

ρ2
*
U11

−

ρ
*
U11

*
*
 U12

U12
ρ  * + 1 + θ
*
U11
 U11 
0
1+ δ +θ

0

0

0

0



  zt − z 
 
ξt − ξ 


0
0
 ⋅  µt − µ  ,
 

0
0
  kt − k 

 
G′′−1 (q − 1)   qt − q 
0
r − τ b 
− AFkk (k ,1)
0

0

where the coefficient matrix is evaluated at the steady state point. The linear dynamic
system has a block structure, which implies that the characteristic roots may be obtained
by solving separately the two sub-systems of dimensions (3 × 3) and (2 × 2) respectively.
The smaller root for the first sub-matrice is given by the expression

θ − (θ + 2 ρ ) 2 +
ω=

ρ
4 ρ (θ + 2 ρ )  *
* 
U 22

U 12 +
*
θ + 2ρ
U 11


2

,

(29)

which is strictly negative by assumption.100 This system has two positive and one
negative eigenvalues, therefore it exhibits saddle point stability. The saddle-path is given
by the following equations
zt − z = ( z0 − z )eω t ,
100

(30)

The reader may see Obstfeld (1992) and Mansoorian (1993, 1996).
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 ω − a11  ω t
e ,
 a12 

ξt − ξ = ( z0 − z ) 

(31)

µt − µ = 0 ,

(32)

*
 U12

ρ2
where a11 = − ρ  * + 1 and a12 = − * . The stable root ω specifies a saddle
U 11
 U11 

trajectory for the optimal consumption dynamics. Differentiating equation (29) one may
derive
z&t = ω ( zt − z ) .

(33)

Substituting equation (33) into equation (1) a saddle trajectory is obtained for (Qt − Q )
and ( z t − z )
ω + ρ 
(Qt − Q ) = 
( z t − z ) .
 ρ 

(34)

From equation (29) it is implied that ω + ρ is negative in the case of distant
complementarity, and thus trajectory (34) is negatively sloping, whereas under adjacent
complementarity ω + ρ is positive implying a trajectory with a positive slope.
In order to derive the solution for st equation (2) is linearized around the steady state.
Using the equations (23) and (30)−(32) it is straightforward to obtain
st − s = −

Γ
Γ


( z0 − z )eω t + ( s0 − s ) +
( z0 − z )  e − (1+δ ) t
1+ δ + ω
1+ δ + ω



(35)

The adjustment of ct along the optimal path derived in a similar way from equations
(23), (30)-(32), and (35), is expressed by
ct − c = −

Γ(δ + ω )
Γ


( z0 − z )eω t − ( s0 − s ) +
( z0 − z )  e − (1+δ ) t ,
1+ δ + ω
1+ δ + ω



where Γ = − (ω + ρ ) ρ . For the (k , q ) sub-matrice, the stable root is given by
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(36)

χ=

(r − τ b ) − (r − τ b )2 − 4 AFkk* G′′
2

(< 0) ,

(37)

where G ′′ = G ′′(q − 1) . The saddle path is given by the following equations
kt − k = (k0 − k ) e χ t ,

(38)

qt − q = (k0 − k ) χ G′′e χ t .

(39)

Combining equations (38) and (39) one obtains the following saddle trajectory
kt − k =

1
(q − q ) .
χ G′′ t

(40)

In order to derive the current account identity of the economy the household’s flow
budget constraint, as given by equation (4), is combined with the definition of the profit
function, as expressed by equation (16). It is noted that the latter is evaluated at the
equilibrium level of labor. The following equation is obtained
b&t = r (1 − τ b ) bt + AF (kt ,1) − τ k kt − It − G ( I t ) − (1 + τ c ) ct − Tt .

(41)

Substituting equation (19) into equation (41), yields
b&t = r (1 − τ b )bt + AF (kt ,1) − τ k kt − I (qt ) − G ( It ) − (1 + τ c )ct − Tt .

(42)

By linearizing equation (42) around the steady state, and subsequently using equations
(36), (38) and (39) one obtains the following differential equation
(1 + τ c )Γ(δ + ω )
b&t = r (1 − τ b )(bt − b ) + ( AFk* − τ k − χ )(k0 − k )e χ t +
( z0 − z )eω t +
1+ δ + ω
. (43)
Γ

 − (1+δ )t
+ (1 + τ c ) ( s0 − s ) +
( z0 − z )  e
1+ δ + ω


The solution of the current account is
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bt − b =
−

AFk* − τ k − χ
(1 + τ c )Γ(δ + ω )
( k0 − k ) e χ t +
( z0 − z )eω t −
(1 + δ + ω )(ω − r (1 − τ b ))
χ − r (1 − τ b )

(1 + τ c )
Γ


( s0 − s ) +
( z0 − z )  e− (1+δ ) t +

(1 + δ + r (1 − τ b )) 
1+ δ + ω


,

(44)

+ {(b0 − b ) − Ψ1 (k0 − k ) − Ψ 2 ( z0 − z ) − Ψ 3 ( s0 − s )} e r (1−τ b ) t

where
Ψ1 =

1+τc
AFk* − τ k − χ
Γ(1 + τ c )(δ + r (1 − τ b ))
, Ψ2 =
and Ψ 3 = −
.
χ − r (1 − τ b )
(ω − r (1 − τ b ))(1 + δ + r (1 − τ b ))
1 + δ + r (1 − τ b )

For equation (42) to converge, the coefficient of er (1−τ b ) t has to be zero. This implies the
following condition
b0 − b = Ψ1 (k0 − k ) + Ψ 2 ( z0 − z ) + Ψ 3 ( s0 − s ) .

(45)

The steady-state equilibrium (b , c , z , s , λ , ξ , µ , k , q ) is determined by the following
system
c+s =z,

(46)

c =δs ,

(47)

U 1 (c + s , z ) = λ (1 + τ c ) − ρξ − µ ,

(48)

( ρ + θ ) ξ = U 2 (c + s , z ) ,

(49)

(1 + δ + θ ) µ = λ (1 + τ c ) ,

(50)

q = 1,

(51)

AFk (k ,1) − τ k = r − τ b ,

(52)

r (1 − τ b )b + AF (k ,1) − τ k k = (1 + τ c )c + T ,

(53)

b0 − b = Ψ1 (k 0 − k ) + Ψ2 ( z 0 − z ) + Ψ3 ( s 0 − s ) .

(54)
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It has to be noted that in deriving the above system no assumption was made with respect
to the government maintaining a balanced budget. The presumption is that the
government runs a deficit (surplus) This system is used to examine the steady state
effects of changes in the consumption tax τ c , the capital tax τ k , the tax on foreign bonds

τ b , the lump-sum tax T and productivity parameter A. Unanticipated and permanent
changes are considered, thought to take place at an arbitrarily chosen point in time.
Examining the effect of changes in government expenditure requires the use of a
differentiated steady state system, which incorporates the assumption of a continuously
balanced government budget. In this system, the current account identity is derived by
integrating the household’s flow budget constraint as given by equation (4) with the
profit function, as given by equation (16) evaluated at the equilibrium level of labor, and
the government’s budget constraint given by equation (22). The current account balance
in this case is given by the equation
b&t = rbt + AF (k t ,1) − ct − g t − I t − G ( I t ) .

(55)

Using the firm’s optimality condition (19) to substitute I t for I (qt ) and linearizing
equation (55) around the steady state the current account identity is written as
b&t = r (bt − b ) + AFk* (kt − k ) − (ct − c ) − I ′(q )(qt − q ) ,

(56)

where Fk* = Fk (k ,1) . Using equations (36), (38) and (39), equation (56) is written
b&t − rbt = Λ 0 + Λ1 e χ t + Λ 2 eω t + Λ 3 e − (1+δ ) t ,
where Λ 0 = − rb , Λ 1 = [ AFk* − χ ](k 0 − k ) , Λ 2 =
Λ 3 = (s0 − s ) +

Γ
1+ δ + ω

(57)
Γ(δ + ω )
( z 0 − z ) , and
1+ δ + ω

( z0 − z ) .

Solving the differential equation (57) the adjustment of the current account along the
optimal path is derived. This is expressed by the following equation
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bt − b =
−

AFk* − χ
Γ
δ +ω
( k0 − k )e χ t +
( z0 − z )eω t
⋅
1+ δ + ω ω − r
χ −r

1
Γ


( z0 − z )  e− (1+δ )t +
⋅ ( s0 − s ) +
1 + δ + r 
1+ δ + ω


.

AFk* − χ
1
Γ(δ + ω )
Γ


 
( k0 − k ) −
( z0 − z ) +
( z0 − z )   ert
⋅ ( s0 − s ) +
(b0 − b ) −
χ −r
(1 + δ + ω )(ω − r )
1+ δ + r 
1+ δ + ω
 


(58)
In order for equation (56) to converge, the coefficient of ert has to be zero. This implies
that the following condition must be met
b0 − b = Ω1 (k 0 − k ) + Ω 2 ( z 0 − z ) + Ω 3 ( s 0 − s ) ,

(59)

where
Ω1 =

AFk* − χ
Γ(δ + r )
1
(< 0) , Ω 2 =
, and Ω 3 = −
(< 0) .
χ −r
(ω − r )(1 + δ + r )
1+ δ + r

ω+ρ
⋅ (δ + r )
ρ
. Since sign(ω − r ) < 0 , then
We note that Ω 2 =
(ω − r )(1 + δ + r )
−

 > 0 if adjacent complementarity
sign {Ω2 } = sign{ω + ρ } => 
.
< 0 if distant complementarity

The steady-state equilibrium (b , c , z , s , λ , ξ , µ , k , q ) is determined by the following
system:
c+s =z,

(60)

c =δs ,

(61)

U1 (c + s , z ) = λ (1 + τ c ) − ρξ − µ ,

(62)

( ρ + θ )ξ = U 2 (c + s , z ) ,

(63)

(1 + δ + θ ) µ = λ (1 + τ c ) ,

(64)

q = 1,

(65)
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AFk (k ,1) − τ k = r − τ b ,

(66)

rb + AF (k ,1) = c + g ,

(67)

b0 − b = Ω1 (k 0 − k ) + Ω 2 ( z 0 − z ) + Ω 3 ( s 0 − s ) ,

(68)

where equation (60) represents z& = 0 (see equation 1), equation (61) represents s& = 0
(see equation 2), equation (62) is the optimality condition for c evaluated at the steady
state (see equation 5), equation (63) represents ξ& = 0 (see equation 7), equation (64)
represents µ& = 0 (see equation 26), equation (65) represents k& = 0 (see equation 19),
equation (66) represents q& = 0 (see equation 20), and equation (67) represents b& = 0
(equation 55). Equation (68), which is a restatement of equation (59), characterizes the
steady-state equilibrium since initial values b0 , k 0 , z 0 and s0 are exogenously given.
Concluding remarks
The purpose of this essay has been to investigate on theoretical grounds the long run
effect of fiscal policies in an open economy framework, in which private consumption
exhibits a degree of durability, and households optimally choose to maintain their
habitual standard of living. Particular attention has been aimed at the dynamics of the
current account, empirically observed to exhibit a non-monotonic trend. Due to the
model’s mathematical complexity, the solutions to the steady state system are analytically
intractable. One would like to obtain a quantitative measure of comparative static results,
such as the direction and the rate of response of economic aggregates to changes in policy
variables. This information is not possible to obtain in the context of graphical and
analytical methods. Numerical integration would enable to approximate the solutions, and
visualize the dynamics of the intractable steady state system. Due to particular difficulties
bound up with the development of numerical integration analysis, the latter is left to
remain an open subject for future research.

157

General Conclusion
The first essay constitutes a theory which in a novel way lends truth to the proposition
formed by Kuznets (1955), with respect to the non-monotonic relationship between
prosperity and inequality of income distribution. The attention is centered on the role of
financial markets in defining the process of economic development, and ultimately the
distribution of income earning capabilities in a population of ex ante heterogeneous
individuals. In a model in which the roots of development lie in human capital
accumulation, the possibility to fund educational choices through private credit
organizations may prove critical. The provision of credit in this market is hindered by
one-sided lack of commitment, and particular enforcement issues embedded in the area of
educational investment. A consequence of the failure of the credit market is that
individuals are initially barred from productive educational choices. In the tradition of
Kehoe and Levine (1993) we assume that legislation accommodates the complete and
permanent exclusion of defaulting borrowers from financial markets. The prospect of
being prohibited to invest in tangible assets induces agents to choose commitment to
previous agreements. Contract arrangements thus become enforceable, leading credit
institutions to eagerly engage in educational funding. This is the critical requirement for
the economy to be carried on a dynamic growth path, escaping the trap in an eversustained poverty state. We trace out paths of development so constructed as to give an
explicit proof of the trickle-down theory of economic growth. Initially, an equilibrium is
taken to exist in which a particular group of individuals, those with the highest
investment return, only choose to engage in education. Owing to the accumulation of
human capital and the associated externality on future generations’ knowledge
productivity, the economy ultimately makes its transition to a state where the aggregate
of all agents invest in individual improvement. As endogenous technological knowledge
takes off, the externality effect arising from knowledge spillovers gives rise to inverted-U
dynamics in the evolution of income distribution.
The second essay is an enquiry on an old theme in the theory of macroeconomics,
namely the role of monetary policy in determining an economy’s long run growth
dynamics. The analysis is carried with reference to an economy being open, yet a price
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taker in the international capital markets. We postulate that the possibility of
intermediated credit does not exist, the intention of the assumption being to uncover the
role of inflation as tax on private spending. Initially, the postulate applies on purchases of
consumption goods only. In an alternative version of the model investment on capital
goods is also being subjected to the constraint that cash holdings are the only means of
conducting the transaction. In this latter case, inflation bears an evident analogy to a
capital tax. To elucidate the consequences of endogenously determined labor, the theory
is initially built on models that abstract from the decision to allocate time between leisure
and other productive activities. The analysis is extended to account for the endogeneity of
the time-allocation decision in the latter part of the essay. With reference to the issue of
money superneutrality the analysis has brought up the following propositions: Inflation
when operating as consumption tax has no impact on the growth rate of output. This is
established irrespective of the labor supply be held fixed, or incorporated as endogenous
decision. When imitating the role of capital taxation, inflationary policy has a negative
effect on capital accumulation in the model of fixed labor supply. However, in an
environment that accommodates the endogeneity of labor–leisure choice, the validity of
the superneutrality result is once again reestablished.
The third, and last, part of this dissertation constitutes a theoretical essay on the long
run effects of tax and expenditure policies. The analysis is carried with reference to an
open economy, yet a price taker in the international markets. Our interest leans heavily in
the transitional dynamics of the current account in response to permanent fiscal shocks.
The empirical literature in the international macroeconomics has established that the
current account evolves non-monotonically along its adjustment path to the long run
equilibrium. It has been the aim of this study to show that this empirical phenomenon
may be proved within the theory, thus be validated on the ground of acceptance of a
mathematical proposition. To this endeavor we sought two sources of time nonseparability in the preference structure, habit forming consumption in consumer durable
goods. When households choose to maintain their habitual standard of living and
consumption exhibits a degree of durability, optimal private choices induce non-
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monotonic dynamics on consumption, hence saving, behavior that are exactly consistent
with the factual evidence on the current account.
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Appendix I
The extended model of a countable infinite set of types, j ∈ [1, J ] , allows the Kuznets
Curve to obtain a smooth-like form (see Figure I.2). Evidently, points A and B
correspond to critical time periods r and τ respectively, at which the transition takes
place to a new equilibrium path.
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Figure 2: Kuznets Curve for the multiple-type case
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Appendix II
Model II
q

Recall from the text that the firm’s optimization problem is to choose I, and K so as to
maximize
∞

Π = ∫ De− rt dt ,

(A1)

t =0

subject to the accumulation equation
K& = I ,

(A2)

where
M& f
D = A0 K − w − Φ ( I , K ) − rB f + B& f −
,
P

(A3)

M& f
= m& f + ε m f .
P

(A4)

and

We recall the equations
Af = mf − B f ,

(A5)

A& f = m& f − B& f ,

(A6)

 h I 
m f = Φ ( I , K ) = I 1 +
.
 2K

(A7)

Substituting equations (A4) and (A5) into (A3), we obtain

(

)

(

D = A0 K − w − Φ ( I , K ) − r m f − A f + B& f − m& f + ε m f

(

)

)

= A0 K − w − Φ ( I , K ) − rm f + r A f − m& f − B& f − ε m f .
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Using (A6) we get
D = A0 K − w − Φ ( I , K ) − ( r + ε )m f + r A f − A& f ,
and combining with (A7) we obtain
 h I 
f
&f
D = A0 K − w − (1 + r + ε ) I  1 +
− A −rA .
K
2



(

q

)

(A3´)

The firm’s objective function is

 h I 
f  − rt
&f
∫  A0 K − w − (1 + r + ε ) I 1 +
 − A − r A  e dt
 2K
t =0 

∞

max

(

)

∞ 
∞
 h I   − rt
f
f
− rt
e
dt
−
= ∫  A0 K − w − (1 + r + ε ) I 1 +
∫  A& − r A  e dt

2
K


t =0 
t =0

Solving the second term yields

∞

∫

(

∂ A f (t ) e − rt

)

∂t

0

= A f (t ) e− rt

∞
0

f

= A (∞) ⋅ 0 − A f (0) ⋅1
= − A f (0) = − A0f .
where we used the assumption that the lim A f (t ) is a finite number.
t →∞

The firm’s optimization problem therefore becomes

 h I   − rt
f
∫  A0 K − w − (1 + r + ε ) I 1 +
  e dt + A0 ,
 2 K 
t =0 
∞

Max

( )

subject to K& = I ,
which is equivalent to maximizing
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(A8)


 h I   − rt
∫  A0 K − w − (1 + r + ε ) I 1 +
  e dt ,
 2 K 
t =0 
∞

subject to K& = I .

q

Recall the text equations (II.3), (II.6) and (II.7) re-written respectively as
Ah = B h + m h ,

(A9)

mh = C ,

(A10)

A& h = w + D + rAh + τ − (1 + r + ε ) C .

(A11)

Substituting (A9) and (A10) into (A11) we have

(

)

A& h = w + D + r B h + mh + τ − C − ( r + ε )mh ,
⇒ A& h = w + D + rB h + τ − C − ε mh .

(A12)

Recall equations (II.16) and (II.21) respectively
M& f
D = A0 K − w − Φ ( I , K ) − rB f + B& f −
,
P

(A13)

M& f
= m& f + ε m f .
P

(A14)

Substituting (A14) into (A13) we have
D = A0 K − w − Φ ( I , K ) − rB f + B& f − m& f − ε m f .

(A15)

Substituting (A15) into (A12) yields

(

)

(

)

A& h = A0 K − Φ ( I , K ) + r B h − B f + B& f − m& f − ε m h + m f + τ − C .
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(A16)

Using the definitions for the stock of net foreign bonds (B) and total money balances (m)
B ≡ Bh − B f ,

m ≡ mh + m f ,
(A16) is written
A& h = A0 K − Φ ( I , K ) + r B + B& f − m& f − ε m + τ − C .

(A17)

(A9) implies
A& h = B& h + m& h .

(A18)

Setting (A18) into (A19) yields

( B&

h

) (

)

− B& f + m& h + m& f = A0 K − Φ ( I , K ) + r B − ε m + τ − C ,

⇒ B& + m& = A0 K − Φ ( I , K ) − C + r B + τ − ε m .

(A19)

Using the government's budget constraint
m& + ε m = τ ,

(A20)

we obtain the current account balance
B& = A0 K − Φ ( I , K ) − C + r B .

Model III
q

The linearized approximation of system (III.24) is given by
β −1 
q% − 1

r−
A0 β 1 − l%

  q − q% 
 q& 
h


⋅
.
 & =
  l − l% 
 l   − 1− γ
0
 hF (l% )

14444

4244444
3
Ω

(

)

The determinant and the trace of Ω are both real and positive, and are given by
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(A21)

 1 − γ  Y%   β 
∆=
> 0,
%  %  % 
 hF (l )   K   1 − l 
Tr (Ω ) = r −

q~ − 1
> 0.
h

Therefore, the system is locally unstable and the only bounded equilibrium is one in
which both q and l adjust instantaneously to ensure that the economy is on its balanced
growth path.

Model IV
q

The linearized approximation of system (IV.36) is given by
β −1 
q% − (1 + r + ε )

A0 β 1 − l%
 r−

h (1 + r + ε )
 q&  
 ⋅  q − q%  .
=
 l&  
  l − l% 
1− γ
  −

0

 
%
h (1 + r + ε ) F (l )
1444444

424444444
3
Ω

(

)

The determinant and the trace of Ω are both real and positive, and are given by

  Y%   β 
1− γ
∆=
>0,
 h (1 + r + ε ) F (l% )   K%  1 − l% 

 

Tr (Ω ) = r −

q~ − (1 + r + ε )
> 0.
h(1 + r + ε )

Therefore, the system is locally unstable and the only bounded equilibrium is one in
which both q and l adjust instantaneously to ensure that the economy is on its balanced
growth path.
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